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Within the political culture of the eighteenth through twentieth centuries, symbols 
abounded that negatively equated immigrants with criminals and welfare cheats. 
Particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there were clear 
similarities between the ways that individuals and groups on all sides of the immigration 
and welfare debate in America used such imagery as an effective tool for their cause, 
either to elicit sympathy for immigrants or fear and animus toward them. 
This dissertation is interdisciplinary in nature. Through analysis of congressional 
records and other government documents, public opinion surveys, and newspaper and 
magazine articles in particular, this dissertation investigates the dominant narratives 
about both the poor and immigrants influencing United States’ immigration and social 
welfare policy, culminating in the mid-1990s and resulting in Hispanic political 
mobilization that had a significant effect on anti-immigrant policy in the late twentieth 
century. I examine the importance of the conjuncture between immigration, social 
welfare policy, and rhetoric in the mid-1990s in order to show how the trope of the 
immigrant pauper, like the trope of the “welfare queen” in the 1980s and 1990s, informed 
major policymaking in last two decades of the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Within the political culture of the eighteenth through the late twentieth centuries, 
anti-immigrant and anti-immigration activists attempted to mainstream a negative 
immigrant narrative that depicted immigrants as criminals, paupers, unfair job 
competitors, lowering or at least stagnating wages, morally corrupt, and using a 
disproportionately high share of governmental assistance. There were particularly strong 
analogues between this rhetoric in the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. For 
example, in the late nineteenth century, many nativists feared an “immediate and 
overwhelming invasion from Asia,” and further lamented the “ruinous influx of Asiatic 
immigrants.” They asserted that, “The labor of these people [the Chinese] is brought into 
unfair competition with white labor, and that the Chinese are themselves so vile as to 
debase and corrupt society.”
1
 Anti-immigrant proponents in the late twentieth century 
sounded some of the very same alarms, though this time largely directed at Hispanic 
immigration. In California, Republican Governor Pete Wilson sued the United States 
government for $5.4 billion in order to recoup the cost of educating illegal immigrant 
children from 1991-1994. This lawsuit states that, “The massive and unlawful migration 
of foreign nationals … constitutes an invasion of the state of California against which the
                                                             
1“John Chinaman Again,” The New York Times, February 20, 1877. 
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 United States is obligated to protect California.”
2
 Fears that immigrants took jobs away 
from native-born citizens were also prevalent in the late twentieth century. Barbara Coe, 
 a member of anti-immigrant groups such as Citizens for Action Now and California 
Coalition for Immigration Reform, was prominent in California efforts to pass 
Proposition 187, and argued that, “They [immigrants] violate our laws and demand we 
feed them, clothe them and educate them in their own language. They are taking jobs 
away from American citizens.”
3
  
Perhaps the most influential symbol within immigration and welfare discourse 
over the course of American history has been the symbol of the immigrant pauper. In the 
mid-nineteenth century, anti-immigrant proponents both within and outside of Congress, 
added an anti-crime discourse to the symbol of immigrants as paupers. Newspaper 
articles depicted the influx of immigrants as helping to increase crime in the U.S., 
particularly by importing people of low character and predisposed toward committing 
such criminal acts, such as Nikolaus Bader, an immigrant pauper from Germany. Bader 
arrived in the United States after being released from a twenty-four year incarceration in 
an insane asylum for committing murder.
4
 Congressional reports such as the 1856 
“Report on Pauperism and Crime,” pointed to statistics such as those found in the 1850 
                                                             
 
2Daniel M. Weintraub, “Wilson Sues U.S. Over Immigrants’ ‘Invasion,’” Los Angeles Times, 
September 23, 1994. 
 
3 Robert Reinhold, “A Welcome for Immigrants Turns to Resentment,” The New York Times, 
August 25, 1993. 
 
4 “Nikolaus Bader, Pauper: More About the Penniless Immigrant Who Was Shipped to The United 
States,” The Washington Post, April 29, 1891. 
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census.
5
 According to this 1850 census, about 27,000 people committed crimes in the 
United States. Of these 27,000 criminals, immigrants made up a disproportionately high 
amount. 14,000 of these criminals were immigrants while only 13,000 were native born.
6
 
Stories such as those of Nikolaus Bader and crime statistics such as those from the 1850 
census were used as an effective tool by nativists in order to portray immigrants as 
criminal or detrimental to American society. Anti-immigrant rhetoric in the late twentieth 
century also included an anti-crime element. According to prominent anti-immigrant and 
anti-immigration activists John Tanton and Wayne Lutton, “All illegal aliens show at 
least some propensity for crime by their very presence.”
7
 Tanton and Lutton also targeted 
legal aliens as being disproportionately made up of criminals such as street gang 
members, drug dealers, thieves, and terrorists. “Frighteningly large numbers of 
newcomers see crime as their avenue to the American dream.”
8
 There are clear 
similarities between this rhetoric and imagery in the late nineteenth and in the late 
twentieth centuries, which I highlight throughout this work. 
In this dissertation, I examine the opposing discourses about immigrants in 
American political culture to discover why the political Right, in particular, grouped 
                                                             
 
5 House Committee on Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Criminals and Paupers, 34th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1856, H. Rep. 359, 1-4, 26-29; Abbot, ed., Historical Aspects of the Immigration Problem, 
824-825, 827-828. 
 
6These numbers were even more damning toward immigrants than they appeared at first glance 
because in 1850, the United States population consisted of 17,737,505 native born and 2,216,828 
immigrants. "Imported Crime," New York Daily Times, September 24, 1853, 4-4. 
 
7Wayne Lutton and John Tanton, The Immigration Invasion (Petroskey, MI: The Social Contract 
Press, 1994), 61. 
 
8Lutton and Tanton, The Immigration Invasion, 62. 
4 
 
aliens in with undeserving native born welfare mothers in the mid-1990s and what this 
discourse tells us about the political Right at this juncture in history. This dissertation is 
interdisciplinary in nature. Through analysis of Congressional records and other 
government documents, public opinion surveys, and newspaper and magazine articles in 
particular, this dissertation investigates the alternative narratives about both the poor and 
immigrants surrounding United States immigration and social welfare policy, culminating 
in the mid-1990s and resulting in Hispanic political mobilization. I examine the 
importance of this conjuncture between immigration and social welfare policy and 
rhetoric in the mid-1990s to show how the trope of the immigrant pauper, like the trope 
of the “welfare queen” in the 1980s and 1990s, informed major policymaking in the 
second half of the twentieth century. 
The rise of modern conservatism (and with it the grassroots political Right) in the 
United States began in earnest in the 1950s, where it largely existed “outside of the 
political structure.”
9
 The mid-twentieth century was a very tumultuous time period, 
which encompassed the Cold War, Rights Revolution (or struggle for equal rights by all 
minority groups from the 1940s through the 1980s), Civil Rights Movement, the decline 
of organized labor’s influence, and the dominance of liberalism as expressed through 
Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Within this broader context, there were 
concrete factors that led to the rise of modern conservatism, much of it a backlash to 
dominant liberal ideas. These factors included desegregation, anti-communism, rejection 
of liberalism’s New Deal and Great Society frameworks, the 1957 recession, and the 
                                                             
9 Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 9. 
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Korean War.
10
 They all contributed to an increasing societal dissatisfaction and attempts 
by members of this new Right to solidify their economic and social status through anti-
immigration and anti-welfare rhetoric. The Right was able to bring seemingly disparate 
class interests together under the banner of the burgeoning grassroots conservative 
movement through their adept use of rhetoric based on the assumption that the public 
                                                             
 
10 See Fred Block et al., The Mean Season: The Attack on the Welfare State (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1987). In their essay within this compilation, “The Historical Sources of the Contemporary Relief 
Debate,” Piven and Cloward place the conservative critique of the welfare state within the context of power 
relationships, with class issues at its heart. They place business at the crux of this struggle and in the clear 
power position in the United States. They continue this exploration and historicization of the debate over 
welfare in “The Contemporary Relief Debate” in which they argue that the meaning of welfare and the 
welfare state is constructed by race. For critique of the liberal response also see Thomas Byrne Edsall and 
Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1992). Along with the Edsalls, both Kevin Kruse in White Flight: Atlanta and 
the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) and Matthew Lassiter in 
The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) 
place race atop the hierarchy of factors leading to the rise of modern conservatism. Lassiter and Kruse see 
race as paramount between whites and blacks, but class issues as paramount in intra-racial issues. While 
they give insightful and nuanced analyses, both Kruse and Lassiter see race as affecting the meaning of the 
other issues tackled by the Right. The Edsalls see the rise of conservatism as a direct result of southern 
resistance to the Civil Rights Movement.  Kruse definitely makes that connection, drawing a line from the 
KKK to the Citizen’s Councils to homeowner’s groups to modern conservatives.  Yet, still both Kruse and 
Lassiter’s analyses are much more complex than the theory of white racial backlash. Race and backlash to 
the civil rights movement is significant, but not the only important factor and not always the most 
significant factor. Kruse and Lassiter also place the beginnings of the rise of the conservative movement 
much earlier than Wallace’s 1964 campaign.  Lisa McGirr, in Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New 
American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) does not wholly discount the element of 
white racial backlash support in the rise of the Right, but she seems to underplay its significance to a much 
greater extent than Lassiter and Kruse. McGirr recognizes the racially coded appeals of conservatives such 
as Reagan. However, she emphasizes  more the importance of such things as moral decay and the 
breakdown of the family, sexuality, gender roles, religion, consumerism, anti-communism, and the 
military-industrial complex. Thomas Sugrue, in The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in 
Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), also argues that the rise of the conservatism 
of the 1960s was not a result of “white backlash” to Johnson’s Great Society reforms. Sugrue shows how 
there had been increasing white discontent, particularly in urban areas, as well as fear of integration 
throughout both the North and the South since the 1940s. Yet in Law and Order, Michael W. Flamm argues 
that too much emphasis has been placed on the white racial backlash theory and too little emphasis placed 
on “the role of security.” See Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the 
Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 9. In The Myth of 
Southern Exceptionalism, Matthew Lassiter and Joseph Crespino argue that the rise of modern 
conservatism was not solely about resistance to the Civil Rights Movement and that the “southern strategy” 
thesis is inaccurate and oversimplistic. See Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino, eds., The Myth of 
Southern Exceptionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6-7. 
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only wanted easy answers, not substance or nuance. One of the most important factors 
here was the role of public discourse as expressed through media and politicians, in 
helping to create this backlash.
11
 Throughout United States history, political, economic, 
and social upheaval has consistently led to increased nativism and anti-immigration 
rhetoric, which led to attempts by members of the new Right to protect themselves and 
their families in the face of rapid economic and social change, which resulted in 
increased anti-immigrant and anti-welfare rhetoric and legislation within the American 
political landscape.
 12
 Uncertainty and dissatisfaction in the 1960s by the new Right led to 
genuine fears over personal safety, concern about the maintenance of law and order, and 
fear about declining economic prosperity. Members of this new grassroots conservatism 
also reacted to the mass immigration and changing demographics that resulted from the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA), which eventually resulted in “permanent 
Republican strength” and a realignment of the geographical base of Republican power 
from the Eastern Establishment to the conservative grassroots dominated by the South 
and West.
13
 As Lisa McGirr notes, the West was a stronghold for conservative grassroots 
organization and mobilization, which, while not synonymous with nativism, did provide 
fertile soil for nativist ideas in the 1990s.
14
 This western conservative power and 
                                                             
 
11 See Lisa Levenstein, “From Innocent Children to Unwanted Migrants and Unwed Moms: Two 
Chapters in the Public Discourse on Welfare in the United States, 1960-1961,” Journal of Women’s History 
11, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 10-33. 
 
12 Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties, 82-84, 23-25. 
 
13 Ibid., 129-130, 134. 
 
14 McGirr, Suburban Warriors, 13-15. 
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influence became apparent in the 1994 Save Our State proposition in California, also 
known as Proposition 187. 
Coinciding with the rise of modern conservatism in the United States in the 1950s 
was a growing perception of economic inequality within American, which caused 
increasing discontent.
15
 This discontent with growing economic inequality was, in part, 
redirected toward immigrants under the charge that they were taking jobs and using 
resources intended for native-born Americans. Implicit in this argument was that 
immigrants were undeserving of these jobs, resources, and welfare benefits while native-
born Americans were deserving. In The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial 
Equality in America, Philip Klinker and Rogers Smith argue that “racial discomfort” is at 
the heart of even seemingly nonracist arguments that attempt to maintain the status quo 
and therefore, white privilege. This argument is consistent with Martin Gilen’s argument 
that it was the American public’s perception of groups as deserving or undeserving of aid 
that most influenced their support or rejection of social welfare programs and spending. 
The American populace’s perceptions of welfare programs were heavily informed by 
media-influenced stereotypes of the groups and individuals receiving such aid. Lisa 
Levenstein also emphasized the important role of the media and public discourse, along 
with race, in helping to shape public response to welfare. The portrayal of welfare 
recipients as undeserving of assistance (in which, race does play a role) was key here. 
Both Levenstein’s and Gilens’ treatment of the role of rhetoric and public discourse in 
                                                             
15 See Fred Block et al., The Mean Season and Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction. 
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shaping both policy and reactions to policy provide useful frameworks for my study 
because of their emphasis on the role of public debate and discourse through media.
 16
  
Another important source of anxiety that conservative grassroots organizations 
tapped into was fear of crime.
17
 This fear of crime and the class, racial, and geographic 
elements intertwined with it helped to fuel both the rise of conservatism and various 
grassroots conservative organizations. Anti-immigrant and anti-welfare rhetoric also 
capitalized on these same fears, and frequently portrayed immigrants and welfare 
recipients as criminal. Conservative grassroots organizations such as the second Ku Klux 
Klan in the 1920s through 1930s and the John Birch Society in the 1950s through 1980s 
helped to give these anxiety-riddled white Americans a sense of control and stability, as 
well as a sense of their own individual power and voice in the midst of a changing 
American society and demographic landscape. In the 1990s, Republicans such as Pat 
Buchanan, Newt Gingrich, and Lamar Alexander significantly exploited these issues on a 
national level, while radical grassroots organizations such as the Birchers and the KKK 
reflected these moves by national Republicans and gave conservatives who felt 
marginalized a forum in which to express themselves politically. Important anti-
                                                             
 
16 Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty 
Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Lisa Levenstein, “From Innocent Children to 
Unwanted Migrants and Unwed Moms: Two Chapters in the Public Discourse on Welfare in the United 
States, 1960-1961,” Journal of Women’s History 11, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 10-33; See also Philip A. Klinker 
and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 327. Klinker and Smith agree with Gilens that “racial discomfort” 
is at the heart of even seemingly nonracist arguments that attempt to maintain the status quo and therefore, 
white privilege. An example of these arguments is the call for states’ rights and the opposition to anything 
deemed to be in the slightest bit interventionist on the part of the federal government. States’ rights 
arguments, of course, have a racist history themselves, and harken to the debate over slavery. 
 
17 David Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1965), 114. 
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immigrant initiatives such as Proposition 187 stemmed from seemingly radical or 
marginal grassroots conservative groups. Thus, while existing on the fringes of 
conservative discourse at times, such groups nonetheless exerted a disproportionate and 
significant impact on public discourse and policymaking. 
More recently, historians have linked the rise of modern conservatism to a 
backlash against the Rights Revolution, in which there were significant family and social 
changes as a result of the extension of equality and rights to minority (including 
immigrant) groups from the 1940s though the 1980s.
18
 The conservative Right displayed 
an intense fear and anxiety about what they believed to be moral decay and the 
breakdown of the family as a result of the moral and social changes the nation had 
undergone, particularly in the previous twenty years.
19
 Largely absent from these 
analyses on the rise of the reactionary politics embodied by modern conservatism was the 
                                                             
18 See Samuel Walker, The Rights Revolution: Rights and Community in Modern America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998). In this work, Walker displays how these rights that were extended to 
minority groups were not actually “new” rights. Instead, our definition of community expanded to include 
more than white men and thus expanded the application of rights to fit the more inclusive definition of 
community. Walker sets forth an insightful analysis of this rights revolution through his systematic 
evaluation of its critiques. Particularly interesting is Walker’s discussion of rights and power. For example, 
he discusses the right to free speech as a fundamental and necessary right in order to enjoy full membership 
in any community. Walker uses particular cases of censorship in regard to information about birth control 
in order to show how the suppression of this knowledge from women was a way for men to maintain power 
over women and their bodies.  According to Walker, “the right of free speech has altered the boundaries of 
community in America, invalidating the power of one group (in this case, men) to silence and disempower 
other groups (in this case, women).”  Walker, 95. We see here then that gender and sexuality, in addition to 
race, have played important roles in the rise of modern conservatism. At its core, the rise of modern 
conservatism is an effort to maintain traditional power relationships. This is evident in the increasing 
economic inequality in America that directly corresponds with the rise of modern conservatism. In 
Suburban Warriors, Lisa McGirr also analyzes the role of anti-feminism, religion, the changing gender 
roles, and women’s reproductive rights on the rise of modern conservatism. As she does throughout, 
McGirr emphasizes loss of control and fear and anxiety as motivating factors on the Right. See McGirr, 
Suburban Warriors, 230-238. 
 
19 Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., Rightward Bound (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), 16-18. 
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influence of citizenship status. The rise of modern conservatism and its associated anti-
immigrant and anti-welfare narrative embodied in the 1994 elections and 1996 
immigration and welfare legislation had its long roots in the nineteenth century. Within 
its more immediate context, the foundations of these mid-1990s anti-immigrant and anti-
welfare narratives sprang from the 1970s and 1980s and was, in many ways, a backlash 
against the egalitarian values of the Rights Revolution as well as to United States 
immigration and refugee policy since the 1960s.  
Beginning in the early nineteenth century and continuing through the late 
twentieth century, in both action and rhetoric, public officials attempting to distribute 
assistance divided the poor and immigrants into subclasses of “deserving,” 
“undeserving,” and “underclass.” As evidenced in the congressional speeches by 
politicians such as Levi Morton in the nineteenth century and in immigrant mobilization 
efforts in the late twentieth century, such as those by the National Council of La Raza, 
both elites and the popular masses contested the division of the poor into these categories. 
Michael Katz displayed how these opposing narratives about the poor competed for 
supremacy in American political culture and linked poverty and immigrants both in 
conceptualization and in articulation of the problems and issues associated with poverty 
and immigration. “How we think and speak … and what we do (or don’t do) about it 
emerges as much from a mix of ideology and politics as from the structure of the problem 
itself.”
20
 The very language used in these discourses displayed how the meanings of and 
                                                             
20 In The Undeserving Poor, Katz restricts his discussion to non-immigrants. However the 
framework laid out in the text is applicable to my discussion of the linked immigration and poverty 
discourses. Katz himself, in The Price of Citizenship also explicitly links poverty and immigration 
11 
 
competing solutions to perceived problems of immigration and welfare were formed, 
largely by politics and ideology. The actual meanings behind the language anti-immigrant 
proponents used to articulate what they perceived as immigration and welfare problems 
reflected the individual biases and worldview of particular actors. For example, the public 
officials and private philanthropists who handed out welfare assistance used their own 
middle-class criteria to categorize someone as deserving or undeserving of assistance. 
Alcohol use, frowned upon by middle class reformers, was used to classify someone as 
undeserving. Anti-immigrant proponents used such vices to classify peoples and to imbue 
these classifications with meaning. People in need of welfare assistance who drank were 
considered undeserving of that assistance because they were immoral, unwilling to help 
themselves, and might use that assistance to continue engaging in their immoral vices. 
Thus, particular groups were classified as “strangers” and such groups were ascribed 
certain “natural” or “inherent” qualities that were then interpreted as inherent to these 
groups, these people, and not the result of some other circumstance or disease.
21
 “By 
mistaking socially constructed categories for natural distinctions, we reinforce inequality 
and stigmatize even those we set out to help.”
22
 These assumptions disadvantaged certain 
groups of immigrants by stereotyping them as undeserving, criminal, or welfare 
recipients, which had the effect of marginalizing them within the majority society and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
discourse. See Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 5. 
 
21 For example, these nineteenth century reformers would argue that “the Irish were drunkards” 
rather than investigate the root cause of that individual’s affinity for alcohol. 
 
22 Katz, Undeserving Poor, 5-6. 
 
12 
 
branded them with negative stigma.
23
 Historians have generally focused on how race and 
gender have affected social welfare policy, with little attention paid to the reality that 
post-1965 American society increasingly did not fit within the static black-white racial 
binary.
24
 I focus on how state and national policy such as Proposition 187 and the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) combined with rhetoric 
by politicians such as Ronald Reagan and anti-immigrant groups such as the Federation 
                                                             
23 Census officials also marginalized minority groups through sampling errors that consistently 
resulted in undercounts of African American populations, which affected Congressional reapportionment 
despite efforts to mitigate such errors after 1950. See Margo J. Anderson and Stephen E. Fienberg, Who 
Counts? The Politics of Census-Taking in Contemporary America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1999); In Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities, Mary Waters examines 
how racism and anti-immigrant stereotypes institutional and societal racism affects the real opportunities 
for and success of West Indian immigrants. See Mary C. Waters, Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant 
Dreams and American Realities (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
 
24 Linda Gordon examined social welfare policy in the United States within a race and gender 
framework. See Linda Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-
1935 (New York: Free Press, 1994), 1-3, 6; Ira Katznelson examined social welfare policy using a race-
based analysis. See  Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold Story of Racial 
Inequality in Twentieth Century America (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2005); I add immigration status 
to these frameworks. Jill Quadagno looked at the American welfare state using a race-based analysis, as 
well. Quadagno envisioned the American welfare state, particularly means-tested entitlements, as a way to 
shore up and perpetuate racial divisions and inequality in American society. Therefore, racial inequalities in 
American society and the desire to perpetuate them, have exerted a negative influence on the ability of the 
social welfare state in American society to effectively ameliorate economic or class-based inequalities. 
Thus, in Quadagno’s analysis, the implementation of a social welfare system in the United States was 
influenced more by racial considerations than by economic ones. See Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: 
How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Quadagno’s 
privileging of racial over economic considerations in social welfare policy analysis is particularly useful 
framework when examining the trope of the “welfare queen” and President Clinton’s promise to “end 
welfare as we know it.” See Robert Pear, “The Welfare Bill: The Overview: Clinton to Sign Welfare Bill 
That Ends U.S. Aid Guarantee and Gives States Broad Power,” The New York Times, August 1, 1996;  In 
their analyses of the welfare state, Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward also privileged the influence 
of perceptions of race in their analysis. Piven and Cloward argued that social welfare spending targeted 
toward the poor was the most negatively perceived and the most susceptible to attack. They found that 
social welfare programs perceived to be largely targeted toward minorities were the most vulnerable parts 
of social welfare spending. Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, “The Contemporary Relief 
Debate,” in The Mean Season: The Attack on the Welfare State, Fred Block et. al. (New York: Random 
House, 1987), 48; These examinations of social welfare policymaking, what/who influenced this 
policymaking and the discourses surrounding them are useful in my study of the convergence of social 
welfare and immigration policy in the 1990s because they provide valuable examinations of the relative 
importance of race, class, gender, and the media within policymaking.  
 
13 
 
for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). The combination of important aspects of both 
anti-welfare and anti-immigrant stereotypes in public policy such as Proposition 187 and 
PRWORA reflected the intersection of a racialized and gendered stigma, on the one hand, 
and a stigma toward immigrants on the other.  
Michael Katz contextualized social welfare policy within a longer time period, but 
used a largely class-based analysis, analyzing the division between public assistance and 
social insurance. Katz also examined the move toward a private welfare state in the 
United States, and its role in weakening public social welfare policy.
25
 In The Price of 
Citizenship, Katz displayed the complex economic impact immigrants have on the 
American economy and society. Through the mid-1990s, immigrant populations 
concentrated in the “gateway cities” of Los Angeles, Miami/Dade County, New York 
City, and San Francisco. Therefore, the impact of immigrants and immigration were not 
equally dispersed throughout the geographic area of the United States. While immigrants 
benefited the nation economically, they did place strain on state and local economies and 
resources. This was because the federal government benefited the most from taxes paid 
by immigrants, while state and local governments were forced to pay the bills for 
overcrowded schools, emergency healthcare, and other assistance. Hispanic immigrants 
became increasingly associated with this economic strain on local resources because they 
had an increasing rate of poverty as compared with other immigrant groups. On a local 
level, anti-immigrant sentiment increased along with anti-welfare sentiment and the two 
became linked. This linkage was largely a result of the disproportionate economic 
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pressure placed on state and local governments in the “gateway cities” because of the 
large numbers of immigrants settling there. Anti-immigrant groups targeted individuals 
and groups by profiling them using perceived cultural and ethnic differences.
26
   
Mae Ngai added citizenship and immigration policy to the framework, 
specifically the precarious existence of illegal aliens within American society. 
Concentrating on the years 1924 to 1965, Ngai examined immigration policy, arguing 
that race influenced the creation, implementation and enforcement of immigration 
restriction and was simultaneously constructed by it, even today. Ngai also analyzed the 
role of business, particularly agricultural businesses in the Southwest, in the creation and 
perpetuation of negative racial stereotypes about Mexicans and Mexican-Americans and 
in the belief that there existed a “Mexican problem” in the form of high numbers of 
illegal Mexican immigrants. According to Ngai, both labor and foreign policy interests 
were the driving forces behind policies restricting Mexican immigration. For example, in 
order to ensure that it had a cheap oversupply of on demand labor, agribusiness lobbied 
for Mexican exclusion from citizenship on legal grounds. Through its actual use of illegal 
immigrants, its preference against Mexican American citizens and its refusal to use and 
follow the laws of the bracero program, agribusiness made clear that its intention was a 
cheap, exploitable oversupply of on demand labor. This profits-oriented agribusiness 
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practice aided in the creation of the idea of Mexicans as non-white and therefore 
unassimilable.
27
  
The character of the pauper in American history has embodied America’s worst 
fears about immigrant or alien society. Native-born Americans’ fears about immigrants 
centered around pauperism, Catholicism, and immoral behavior such as drunkenness. 
This fear of the foreign or alien pauper can be traced back to the eighteenth century. 
Historian David H. Bennett asserted that, “Antialien enmity was part of the heritage of 
the colonial experience.”
28
 Initially, this “antialien enmity” centered on religion. 
Reflective of England’s post-Reformation anti-Catholicism, “no-Popery” laws, and 
limited sanctuary for Roman Catholics existed in England’s American colonies.
29
 In the 
mid-eighteenth century, the Great Awakening and English wars against Catholic France 
and Spain stirred this hatred of Catholics and fear of Catholicism as a political threat, as 
well. Nativists viewed Catholics as subversive enemy agents of the Spanish and French 
governments. The renowned preacher of the Great Awakening, George Whitfield, warned 
of “swarms of monks … and friars like so many locusts … overspreading and plaguing 
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the nation.”
30
 This anti-Catholic strain of nativism existed alongside nativist efforts to 
prevent paupers and criminals from settling in colonial America. Legislation designed to 
prevent paupers from immigrating to colonial America began in the seventeenth century 
and has informed nativist rhetoric and legislation in the interim. 
Immigration in general and Irish Catholic immigration in particular to the United 
States increased dramatically from 1827 to 1844. This was a time of significant change 
and upheaval in America, including the transportation revolution, the Industrial 
Revolution, movement westward, urbanization, as well as economic uncertainty, as 
evidenced by the Panic of 1837. During this era, nativist calls had religious, ethnic, and 
class undertones. In the rhetoric of the nineteenth century, inventor Samuel Morse 
exemplified this great antipathy toward immigrants and immigration in general. Morse 
feared that immigration could bring with it a threat to America’s political, social, and 
economic fabric. Morse argued that, “We are the dupes of our hospitality. The evil of 
immigration brings to these shores illiterate Roman Catholics, the tools of reckless and 
unprincipled politicians, the obedient instruments of their more knowing priestly 
leaders.”
31
 Morse further feared that, “our very institutions are at the mercy of a body of 
foreigners.”
32
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A number of different political parties in the nineteenth century used anti-
immigrant and nativist rhetoric. These included the Anti-Masonic Party, the Whig Party, 
the National Republican Party, and the American Party. However, until the 1840s, 
nativist legislation was not passed on a national level because of political fears of 
alienating immigrant voters. The immigrant voting bloc was a formidable political force. 
An immigrant voting bloc would again flex its political muscles in the mid-1990s.  
As a result of the Irish potato famine, 1.75 million people emigrated from Ireland 
from 1846 to1854, many of whom came to America. Most of these new Irish immigrants 
remained in urban areas on the East coast in what became known as “gateway cities,” 
most notably New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. These new Irish immigrants were 
destitute, lacked skills, and were noticeably younger than other immigrant groups such as 
Germans. As increasing numbers of these Irish immigrants concentrated in urban centers, 
they became ever more reviled by the native population as unassimilable. Within this 
anti-immigrant rhetoric the concepts of “Catholic,” “immigrant,” and “pauper” were 
joined.
33
  
Continuous throughout nativist rhetoric were the beliefs that immigrants caused 
crime, required a disproportionate amount of aid, were drunkards, and were physically 
and mentally weak. Native-born Americans saw immigrants as endangering their way of 
life. Congressional reports categorized the immigrant as “vicious foreigners … paupers 
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and criminals without character, morality, religion, industry.”
34
 After the depression of 
the 1870s, nativists attempted to exclude immigrant paupers through what was essentially 
a head tax as well as through 1882 legislation such as the Chinese Exclusion Act and 
legislation forbidding entry to anyone likely to become a public charge. This legislation 
was influenced by fears that immigrants were a drain on society and resources and were 
unfair job competitors for native workers.
35
  
Native whites feared that the mere entrance of paupers such as freedmen, Native 
Americans, and southern and eastern European immigrants into particular labor forces 
degraded that labor or profession. Native whites feared the unscrupulous labor practices 
of the agricultural, industrial, and lumber industries that preyed on the poor, weak, and 
illiterate people with few choices.
36
 Whether through the peonage system’s abuses of 
African Americans and Native Americans or through agriculture’s exploitation of 
temporary worker programs to exploit Mexican labor, native white workers saw such 
laborers as unfair job competitors, driving down wages, and using a disproportionate 
share of resources (such as welfare). In the 1880s, anti-immigrant proponents saw 
immigrants as importing a dangerous brand of radicalism into the United States, as 
“foreign” and “immigrant” became associated with political and economic radicalism. 
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During the late 1880s and 1890s, the American Protective Association (APA), 
founded in 1887, briefly came to prominence as a mass movement, reflective of the 
ability of economic crisis to fuel nativism. The APA was anti-Catholic, anti-Irish, and 
generally anti-immigrant. It also sought to prevent the displacement of native workers by 
immigrants as well as to protect native workers from immigrants driving down wages and 
generally degrading labor. As was apparent in the twentieth century as well, economic 
and labor anxiety was inherent in the nativist (in this case, APA) argument.
37
 
Throughout the period between World War I and World War II, many nativists 
feared the increasing immigration from southern and eastern Europe and the demographic 
repercussions of such “non-white” mass immigration. These fears helped to influence 
immigration policy in the form of the 1924 National Origins Quota Law. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) replaced the National Origins Quota Law 
in a seemingly liberal egalitarian victory, removing the national origins quota system 
from United States immigration law. However, the explicitly racial national origins 
hierarchy INA replaced was simply replaced in turn by other hierarchies, such as 
economic and skill desirability. The potential of post-1965 immigration to alter 
significantly the demographics of the United States had an impact on popular sentiment 
in favor of the restriction of alien rights. Further, the perception that mass immigration 
(including an influx of illegal immigrants) had caused a glut of low-skilled workers, 
driven down, or at least stagnated, wages, and increased job competition contributed to 
popular anti-immigrant sentiment in the mid-to-late twentieth century as it had in earlier 
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eras. Aliens continued to be seen as a burden on taxpayers largely because they were 
perceived to be disproportionately high consumers of government assistance. Through 
efforts by politicians such as Ronald Reagan, anti-immigrant activists such as John 
Tanton, and anti-immigrant interest groups such as FAIR, the hierarchical structures of 
the undeserving poor (or “welfare queen” as popularized by Ronald Reagan in the 1970s 
and 1980s) and that of the immigrant as a drain on society and governmental resources 
converged in the mid-1990s. In this dissertation, I examine differing narratives about 
immigrants’ impact and usefulness to American society beginning in the eighteenth 
century through the political culture that emerged in the latter part of the twentieth 
century that allowed for anti-immigrant activists to combine the legislative answer to the 
immigrant question and the welfare question in rhetoric and policy. Both positive (or at 
least sympathetic) immigrant narratives and negative immigrant narratives coexisted in 
the eighteenth through twentieth century American political culture, proponents of each 
vying to insert their narrative as the dominant narrative of immigrants in America. 
The political culture of the 1980s was fraught with contradictions, which were 
evident both in legislation and rhetoric. Of particular policy importance here was 
legislation in the late 1970s and late 1980s that began to take away the rights to access to 
government resources from non-citizen aliens, as well as to reorient welfare away from 
entitlement status and toward attachment to the workforce, the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), and the Immigration Act of 1990. These legislative actions 
revolved around a central contradiction of asserting an increasingly open immigration 
policy while at the same time restricting immigrant rights. This contradiction in policy 
21 
 
reflected the contradictions inherent in the dominant discourses about immigrants and 
welfare recipients in American society – that we were a society of immigrants, on the one 
hand, and that immigrants were a drain on the society and economy on the other. It also 
reflected the influence of business interests such as growers on legislation, as it proved 
more profitable to have immigrants without rights, providing growers and restaurants 
with a cheap, readily available, and easily exploitable workforce. 
The political culture of immigration policy in the 1980s revolved around the 
belief that United States’ borders were “porous and inadequately regulated” leading to 
what some feared was a “foreign invasion.”
38
 IRCA 1986 came about in response to these 
fears of an immigration “invasion.” The impetus behind IRCA 1986 was the pressure on 
congress to deal with the issue of illegal aliens and the nation’s porous borders, but, 
reflecting the contradictions inherent in the dominant immigration and welfare narratives, 
this legislation resulted in expanded immigration and the legalization of approximately 
three million illegal immigrants.
39
  
Welfare policy in the late 1970s and 1980s began to move toward the idea of  
 
workfare, with the imposition of time limits on receipt of welfare and efforts to  
 
drastically reduce welfare rolls by moving people into the workforce.
40
 One impetus  
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behind this move was the depiction of welfare recipients as lazy and undeserving.  
 
Beginning in 1976, Ronald Reagan popularized the image of the “welfare queen.”
41
 This  
 
racialized and gendered figure became the most recognizable symbol of welfare  
 
recipients and the undeserving poor in American society. Reagan explained: 
 
 
There’s a woman in Chicago. She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security 
cards and is collecting veterans’ benefits on four nonexisting deceased husbands. 
And she’s collecting Social Security on her cards. She’s got Medicaid, getting 
food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free 
cash income alone is over $150,000.
42
  
 
 
That the so-called facts Reagan used in creating this symbol of the “welfare queen” were  
 
false was largely irrelevant. The imagery stuck within the popular psyche that welfare  
 
recipients were undeserving and taking advantage of the system and of hardworking  
 
American taxpayers.
43
  
 
In 1979, with the creation of the Federation for American Immigration Reform  
 
(FAIR) by John Tanton, environmentalists emerged as part of a new anti-immigration 
lobby that argued that immigrants were placing significant strain on scarce United States 
resources.
44
 Conservative publications such as the National Review also entered the 
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debate.
45
 In the 1990s, articles in the National Review began to blast the INA for what it 
saw as the INA’s role in not only increasing the numbers of immigrants, but in ensuring 
that almost all of these immigrants lacked “useful” skills, were poor, and were from third 
world countries.
46
 In this dissertation, I examine the role of these organizations, their 
leaders, and their publications in contributing to the anti-immigrant narrative and 
mainstreaming the anti-welfare and nativist Right.  
The ultra-conservative John Birch Society also entered the immigration debate in 
the 1980s. Through their anti-immigration rhetoric, the Birchers depicted immigration as 
an “ongoing invasion” that had been escalating for over a decade.
47
 This “invasion” 
rhetoric was common within the anti-immigration and anti-immigrant camps. The 
increasing immigration to the United States post-1965 as a result of the INA and, most 
recently, IRCA, which William Jasper asserted was a “disaster” and “full of fraud,” 
heavily influenced this “invasion” rhetoric.
48
 The Birchers viewed the welfare state as a 
“magnet,” drawing aliens into the United States. They also argued that the extension of 
social services and educational benefits to legal and illegal aliens was very costly. The 
Birchers linked their restrictionist sentiment toward immigration and alien rights to their 
anti-welfare rights stance. To the Birchers, these were all examples of the failures of the 
Rights Revolution. The Birchers were reflective of many grassroots conservative 
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organizations, which were very influential at the state and local level. One example of a 
grassroots conservative organization that became considerably influential at the state and 
thereby national level was the California Coalition for Immigration Reform (CCIR), 
which pushed Proposition 187.
49
 
Groups such as the Birchers were reacting to an actual and significant increase in 
immigration. Pre-IRCA, in 1985, there were 570,000 immigrants to the United States. By 
1989, the number of people immigrating to the United States increased to 1,090,924. By 
1991, the number of immigrants to the United States increased yet again to 1,827,167.
50
 
The overall impact of the IRCA 1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990 was mass 
immigration to the United States.
 
These immigrants changed the demographics of the 
United States, significantly and rapidly. Changing public sentiment was restrictionist 
toward immigration, as well as toward the rights of both legal and illegal aliens. 
Immigration policy remained relatively expansionist despite this public opinion largely 
because of the role of special interest groups on the policymaking process.
51
 It was only 
policy regulating immigrant rights that was particularly responsive to public opinion. 
Through analysis of conservative publications, newspapers, and congressional hearings, 
this study identifies the main opinion shapers within the conservative coalition and how 
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they managed to mainstream their anti-welfare and anti-immigrant imagery within the 
context of the multiculturalist debate in American society. 
Backlash against both legal and illegal aliens increased after IRCA and the 
Immigration Act of 1990, which was particularly evident in California’s Proposition 187 
and the 1994 elections. Because Proposition 187 was a policy dealing directly with the 
implications of illegal immigration on social welfare policy, immigration and welfare 
policy converged on a state level within the political culture surrounding Proposition 187. 
Republican California State Assemblyman William J. Knight circulated throughout the 
state legislature a racist poem given to him by a constituent, “Everything is mucho 
good./Soon we own the neighborhood/We have a hobby—it’s called breeding./ Welfare 
Pay for baby feeding.”
52
 This poem typified some of the racist rhetoric in support of 
Proposition 187, which combined anti-welfare and anti-immigration symbols. Proposition 
187 made all government services, including public education, inaccessible to illegal 
aliens. It also mandated reporting of suspected illegal immigrants by schools, teachers, 
doctors, etc.
53
 Proposition 187 did not come from the fringe of immigration discourse. In 
fact, it largely echoed the recommendations of the United States Commission on 
Immigration Reform (CIR).
54
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Ravi Mehta, deputy appointments secretary for California Governor Pete Wilson, 
stated, “The illegals don’t have a right to be in this country and they are a drain on 
California’s economy.”
55
 That was the crux of the conservative Right’s narrative about 
immigrants, that they were a drain on the American society and economy and took jobs 
from native workers. This coalition included a rather odd mixture of bedfellows: 
environmental organizations, grassroots conservative organizations such as Save Our 
State, and the John Birch Society, as well as the mainstream national Republicans as 
evidenced in their 1994 “Contract With America.” Party entrepreneurs such as Newt 
Gingrich and Pete Wilson hoped to capitalize on the populist anti-welfare and nativist 
sentiment because they believed it was a win-win proposition because “immigrants don’t 
vote.”
56
 Republican Pat Buchanan, a supporter of Proposition 187 asserted that, “it’s 
outrageous that American taxpayers, as hard-pressed as they are … have to provide social 
welfare benefits for those whose accomplishments are to break the laws to get into the 
United States and to get on welfare.”
57
 Here was the articulation of the idea, by a 
perennial conservative Republican presidential candidate, that immigrants were criminals 
and that the welfare state was a magnet drawing in illegal immigrants.
58
 I explore how 
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this imagery and the sentiment behind it became enshrined in the “Contract with 
America” and the PRWORA. 
Proposition 187 had a majority support of Asian Americans, African Americans, 
and Whites in the California electorate. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was least popular 
amongst Hispanics in California.
59
 In this dissertation, I examine the demographic 
electoral breakdown in California related to Proposition 187’s passage.
60
 California 
Republican Governor Pete Wilson centered his reelection campaign in 1994 around 
support for Proposition 187. Despite this overall public support evidenced by its passage, 
the U.S. District Courts placed an injunction against the enforcement of Proposition 187 
and in 1999 the courts struck the majority of Proposition 187 from the legal code.
61
 
Foreshadowing the influence that Proposition 187 would have on the PRWORA, 
Republican political consultant Edward Rollins, in the 1994 lead-up to the Proposition 
187 California vote, stated that California is “two years ahead of the country.”
62
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Despite, or rather because of, Proposition 187’s influence on the national political 
immigration and welfare debate, this marked the beginning of Hispanic counter-
mobilization began in the 1990s. Hispanic immigrants were faced with the legislative 
legacy of the hardening of the distinctions between citizen and alien that had begun in the 
1950s.
63
 These Hispanic immigrant activists attempted to reframe the debate within the 
context of social citizenship and human rights and take control of the immigrant 
narrative. This Hispanic counter-mobilization in the mid-1990s signified a realization of 
the truth behind Supreme Court chief justice Earl Warren’s reference to citizenship as 
“the right to have rights.”
64
 Hispanics mobilized in an effort to “have rights.” 
The impact that Proposition 187 had on immigration and welfare legislation at the 
national level and the power of the symbol of immigrants as a drain on American society 
and economy had a significant impact on policy. Edward Rollins was correct, and 
Proposition 187 significantly influenced national immigration and welfare legislation two 
years later in the PRWORA.
65
 According to Diana Aviv, Washington Director of the 
Council of Jewish Federations, “All immigrants now tend to be viewed as a financial 
burden regardless of their contribution, and that is because of what’s happened in 
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California.”
66
 This sentiment was part of a larger liberal critique of and pushback from 
multiculturalists against such anti-welfare and anti-immigrant legislation. Because of the 
ineffectiveness of earlier attempts to decrease legal and illegal immigration, congress 
moved toward punishing immigrants who were here legally but who had not yet been 
naturalized.
67
  
In August 1996, with the passage of PRWORA and the legislative and rhetorical 
backing of conservatives such as Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and Lamar Alexander (R-TN), 
the backlash toward immigrants and toward the larger Rights Revolution reached its 
culmination. The PRWORA signaled the linkage of immigration and social welfare 
policy. In both the text of the legislation and the political culture surrounding its passage, 
the resounding answer to the immigration and welfare problems of the United States were 
one and the same. Limiting alien access to government assistance would both decrease 
governmental welfare expenditures and stem the tide of “undesirable” immigrants to the 
United States.  
This negative immigrant and welfare narrative was continuously reflected in the 
immigrant and welfare narratives in American society and polity that have been 
competing for supremacy since the eighteenth century. PRWORA supporter, Florida 
Republican E. Clay Shaw, said that this linkage of anti-immigrant and anti-welfare 
discourse in the PRWORA “is not a departure from traditional immigration policy 
because we have always required that people come here because they can get ahead 
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through hard work, not because they can go on welfare.”
68
 This act (PRWORA) was 
punitive toward legal aliens, making most legal immigrants ineligible for food stamps 
and Supplemental Security Income as well as making legal immigrants ineligible for five 
years after entry for receiving benefits from “all means-tested federal programs.”
69
 In 
fact, “It should be made clear to immigrants that the taxpayers of this country expect 
them to be able to make it in this country on their own.”
70
 These harsh measures were 
aimed at limiting immigrants’ (legal and illegal) rights and access to resources. However, 
in the late 1990s, many of these measures that were so punitive and restrictive toward 
immigrants’ rights were scaled back by the courts and even by Congress itself.
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Immigrant advocacy groups were particularly able to capitalize on images of how 
PRWORA negatively affected children and the elderly. There was backlash against what 
was seen by an increasing number of Americans as harsh and unfair treatment of 
immigrants. Perhaps most importantly, these punitive restrictions on immigration and 
immigrants’ rights politicized the Hispanic community in the United States.
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I explore this Hispanic counter-mobilization in the mid-1990s. According to  
 
Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-immigration National Immigration Forum: 
 
 
It seemed to me that in ’94, when Prop 187 passed, the consensus was that 
immigrants don’t vote and the people who do vote are angry about immigration. 
The consensus in ’97 is that the people who are angry about immigration don’t 
vote on that issue and that immigrants do vote and vote on that issue alone.
73
  
 
 
The 1994 elections captured a growing conservative anti-immigrant rights 
sentiment; however, this movement generated considerable backlash against it. 
Republican Congressman Peter King argued that, “The Republican Party is going to 
needlessly run the risk of antagonizing immigrant voters, especially in terms of people 
who should be voting Republican.”
74
 Congressman King was right. The naturalization 
rate for immigrants began significantly increasing in 1996, as a result of cost-benefit 
analysis by immigrants. As a result of increasing anti-immigrant rhetoric, immigrants 
feared losing access to government benefits. Even those immigrants not accessing 
government benefits feared losing the ability to access them and also the potential long-
term consequences of the anti-immigrant rhetoric swirling around them. Immigrants 
articulated these fears within a discourse of citizenship and human rights. To many 
aliens, this debate was not about collecting benefits. Rather, it was about fairness and 
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equality and basic human rights. Immigrants began to view citizenship as the only way to 
“have rights.”
75
  
Levels of alien naturalization and politicization, particularly among Hispanics, 
increased as a result of the passage of Proposition 187 and the PRWORA. Stigma and 
contempt usually reserved for illegal aliens now became blanket characterizations of all 
immigrants, regardless of their status, which affected the Hispanic community and 
alienated many conservative Hispanic immigrant citizens from the Republican Party. The 
fact that all Hispanics, regardless of citizenship status, were subject to these negative 
stigma helped to break down walls or competition between different class and statuses of 
Hispanic immigrants and replaced them with mirrors in which Hispanics began to see 
their interests and fates inextricably intertwined with their fellow Hispanics.
76
 Chung-
wha Hong, executive director of the National Korean American Service and Education 
Consortium recounted this phenomenon within the Korean American community. “They 
told us they used to be Republican but they had to vote Democratic. They had no 
choice.”
77
 This study explores why these immigrants realigned their political affiliation 
and what led them to believe that political realignment was their only choice to retain 
rights and power. Through immigrant advocacy groups, they staked claim on social 
citizenship and offered an effective counter-narrative to the prevailing stereotype that was 
the impetus behind PRWORA. 
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This study employs a discursive approach that cuts across political campaigns, 
media coverage, and interest group advocacy in order to capture the bottom-up 
opposition to the conservative immigration and welfare narrative. I examine the 
mainstreaming of anti-immigrant sentiment in American society and the continuities in 
nativist responses to immigrants. Tied to this was the multiculturalism debate in 
American society. This debate revolved around the question of whether the United States 
was an Anglo-western culture or a nation of immigrants. I explore the continuities 
integral to the basic eighteen through twentieth century anti-immigrant narrative. The 
continuous components of the anti-immigrant narrative included the beliefs that 
immigrants were degrading labor; were unfair job competitors; were driving down 
wages; were using a disproportionate share of resources; and were a burden on taxpayers. 
The specifics of this anti-immigrant narrative changed over time, but the basic outlines 
remained the same. Through the study of subaltern opposition voices such as those 
groups such as FAIR and politicians such as Governor Wilson attempted to marginalize, I 
examine how immigrants and immigrant advocacy groups (particularly Hispanic 
advocacy groups) attempted to take control of the immigrant and welfare narratives and 
portray themselves as hard-working, contributing, and deserving members of American 
society. Liberal and pro-immigrant rights forces had been mobilizing throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, but the context of the mid-1980s through late-1990s 
changed the constellation of these forces as the walls between immigrants that reinforced 
their differences and encouraged competition and rivalry were increasingly replaced by 
mirrors that emphasized their common interests, thus encouraging them to rally together 
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for immigrant rights as they saw themselves and their own interests reflected in fellow 
immigrants.
78
  
I use four main types of sources throughout this dissertation. The first is 
congressional documents. Congressional hearings and debates assist me in locating the 
major players and issues within these immigrant narratives. The second source consists of 
demographical information and surveys, which allow me to ascertain some of the factors 
contributing to anti-immigrant and anti-welfare rhetoric. The third is comprised of 
documents from organizations, anti-immigrant and nativist groups, as well as immigrant 
advocacy groups. These sources allow me to locate the outlines of the dominant 
immigrant discourses, their competition for supremacy within American political culture, 
and how the players attempted to articulate them. The fourth is made up of newspapers 
and journals in order to explore the role of rhetoric from both sides of the debate in 
shaping these discourses and the reactions to them. 
In Chapter Two, I examine the different narratives about immigrants from first 
wave immigration through the INA in order to locate the continuities in these discourses. 
I explore how the trope of the immigrant pauper informed major policymaking at the 
same time as positive immigrant discourses remained a part of the American narrative. I 
use governmental sources such as congressional debates, legislation, and hearings to 
locate these continuities as well as the major players within the political culture. I 
examine the religious, ethnic, and class overtones of eighteenth to twentieth century 
nativism and why many considered immigrants a threat to America’s political, social, and 
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economic fabric. This fear of immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was intimately tied to fear of the “native underclass,” which heightened fears 
that increasing immigrant concentration in urban areas would result in optimal breeding-
like conditions for the spread of unsanitary conditions and disease, poverty, drunkenness, 
crime, and other immoral behavior and spread such epidemics throughout society.
79
 I 
explore how nativist rhetoric was used by political parties and organizations and examine 
how this nativism in American political culture culminated legislatively in the 1924 
National Origins Quota Act. To do this, I examine the documents and writings of nativist 
individuals and organizations such as the American Protective Association and Samuel 
Morse as well as government documents ranging from eighteenth and nineteenth century 
debates over immigration to the twentieth century Dillingham Commission. I analyze 
demographic and census information in order to understand the makeup of native born 
Americans and the new immigrant populations in an attempt to uncover what drove this 
sentiment. This negative discourse about immigrants was not an orthodoxy within 
American society and politics; however, and was challenged by an alternative narrative 
that depicted immigrants as hardworking members of American society, integral to the 
nation’s growth and success. Further, urban political machines were able to harness an 
immigrant voting bloc, which benefited both the individual political machines and 
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immigrants, as the machines gained supporting votes and immigrants were able to 
prevent significant nativist legislation from being passed on a national level into the 
1840s.
80
 I examine Congressional testimony and writings from pro-immigration 
individuals and groups in order to display how this positive immigrant discourse helped 
to bring about the INA in 1965. Post-1965, American immigration policy dramatically 
changed into a relatively open, egalitarian policy. This open immigration policy 
contributed to America’s changing demographics and created a backlash to these open 
immigration policies and to immigrants themselves. 
 In Chapter Three, I assess the legacy of political culture in the 1980s, examining 
the central contradiction of American immigration policy, that is, an increasingly open 
immigration policy on the one hand and a move toward restricting immigrant rights on 
the other. I analyze the documents of organizations such as FAIR and its leader John 
Tanton, the John Birch Society and William Jasper, as well as conservative publications 
such as William F. Buckley’s National Review, and the writings of prominent anti-
immigration and anti-immigrant rights activist Peter Brimelow in order to determine the 
role of these organizations, their leaders, and their publications in mainstreaming the anti-
welfare and nativist Right. I scrutinize the rhetoric of government leaders such as Ronald 
Reagan and his evocation of the “welfare queen” in order to determine how and why this 
symbol of welfare recipients as undeserving con artists informed and linked immigration 
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and welfare policy throughout the next decade. How were politicians such as Reagan able 
to effectively mainstream this image of welfare recipients imbued with anti-female, anti-
black, and anti-immigrant imagery? Despite these anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric, 
why did American immigration policy remain relatively open? The key to this was the 
impact of special interests groups on the legislative process, particularly that of the 
growers and restaurant lobbies. I also explore how these groups reacted to a real and 
significant increase in immigration as a result of IRCA and the Immigration Act of 1990, 
which were still relatively liberal policies, and how the backlash from this increased 
immigration set the stage for the anti-alien sentiment and legislation of the mid-1990s.  
 In Chapter Four, I examine California political rhetoric surrounding Proposition 
187 as a stage leading to the 1996 PRWORA. I explore how and why this state-level 
initiative influenced national immigration and welfare legislation. I investigate how this 
fear of immigrant dependency and of social welfare programs creating a “welfare 
magnet” led to particular reforms in the PRWORA, such as the exclusion of most aliens 
from participation in SSI and food stamps. I analyze this fear of alien dependency and its 
convergence with fear of the native underclass and how this led to real and concrete 
reforms in the PRWORA. This was a turning point in the history of liberalism, reversing 
many of the ideals of the New Deal and War on Poverty programs, particularly the ideal 
of entitlement. It was within the context of the Proposition 187 campaign and passage 
that the backlash against legal and illegal aliens became increasingly clear. I scrutinize 
the more mainstream recommendations of the CIR and its similarities to Proposition 187 
as well as the electoral breakdown of Proposition 187’s passage to explain how and when 
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this mainstreaming of anti-immigrant sentiment occurred on a state level and to display 
its linkage with anti-welfare sentiment. California Republican Governor Pete Wilson 
staked his political career on Proposition 187. I examine the rhetoric of Wilson and his 
supporters as well as that of the Save Our State campaign itself. I investigate how 
national political leaders such as Newt Gingrich and Pat Buchanan used Proposition 187 
and its rhetoric and mistakenly calculated that this issue would be a winning national 
strategy long-term.  
 In Chapter Five, I examine the impact that Proposition 187 had on immigration 
and welfare legislation at the national level, most notably in the “Contract with America” 
and the PRWORA. Through analysis of the text of legislation and the Congressional 
hearings and debates surrounding it, I locate how and why the PRWORA signaled the 
linkage of immigration and social welfare policy at the national level. I explore how this 
shows the power and effective mainstreaming of the negative immigration and welfare 
narratives and why there was this growing conservative anti-immigrant rights sentiment 
in the first place. Using newspaper articles, testimony by immigrants and immigrant 
advocacy groups such as the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) and League of United 
Latin American Citizens (LULAC), as well as advocacy group literature, I probe the 
immigrant and specifically, Hispanic, backlash to the PRWORA. I examine how and why 
the PRWORA politicized Hispanics and the consequences of this Hispanic politicization. 
I ascertain what issues in particular about the restrictions on alien welfare entitlements in 
the PRWORA galvanized ethnic communities and how these issues were publicized.  
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In Chapter Six, I examine this immigrant mobilization, particularly within the 
Hispanic community. I explore the role of political culture in creating the mobilization of 
Hispanic advocacy groups. Using Congressional and INS documents, demographic 
information, newspaper articles and interviews, as well as documents from immigrant 
advocacy groups such as NCLR and LULAC, I analyze the roles that Citizenship USA, 
the green card changeover to electronic cards, IRCA amnesty, and anti-alien rhetoric and 
legislation played in this upsurge in naturalization rates. What was the effect of the 
restrictions of alien rights in the PRWORA on immigrant citizens who were restrictive 
toward immigration but were turned off by the punitive restrictions on alien rights in 
these reforms? Why did these immigrants and native-born ethnics realign their political 
affiliation and what led them to believe that political realignment was their only choice to 
retain rights and power? How did Hispanics, through advocacy groups, stake a claim on 
social citizenship in the aftermath of the PRWORA? I assess the effectiveness of their 
campaigns. How did they offer a counter-narrative to the negative immigrant stereotype 
that was behind the PRWORA? I investigate how Hispanic advocacy groups were able to 
successfully create this political awakening and countermovement and effectively bridge 
the gap between complex policy debates and the street-level kinds of consciousness-
raising that was behind this mobilization. 
 The roots of the mid-1990s debate over immigration and welfare lay much earlier 
in American history. The study of the opposing discourses over immigration in American 
political culture underscores the deep contradictions inherent in American immigration 
policy at the end of the twentieth century. American society welcomes workers but resists 
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their claims to rights and citizenship. The path of an alien worker to citizenship has 
always been rocky, as evidenced by earlier temporary worker programs such as the 
Bracero program and the growers’ rampant abuses of them. The fact remains that for 
businesses that place profits above people, it is extremely profitable to employ immigrant 
workers who do not have rights. The mid-1990s saw a significant pushback by 
immigrants in an effort to stake claim on such rights. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT RHETORIC, 1676-1965 
 
 
What then is the American, this new man? He is either an [sic] European, or the 
descendant of an [sic] European…. I could point out to you a family, whose wife 
was Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose present four sons 
have now four wives of different nations. He is an American…. He becomes an 
American by being received in the broad lap of our great Alma Mater. Here 
individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men…. The American is a 
new man, who acts upon new principles; he must therefore entertain new ideas, 
and form new opinions. From involuntary idleness, servile dependence, penury, 
and useless labour, he has passed to toils of a very different nature, rewarded by 
ample subsistence. This is an American.
1
 
Crèvecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer, 1782. 
 
 
“What then is the American?” This question is at the crux of immigration 
discourse from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. J. Hector St. John de 
Crevèceour pointed to the importance of multiculturalism, of the melting pot, in creating 
this new American. Others viewed America as an Anglo-Saxon nation and emphatically 
refuted the idea of the melting pot.
2
 Those proponents of maintaining a pure Anglo-Saxon 
race as the proper and ideal American incorporated anti-Catholicism, racial hierarchies, 
and ideas about social and economic desirability in order to articulate their vision for the 
“true American.” In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both largely 
positive and negative immigrant narratives in American political and popular culture 
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advanced the idea that early immigration was good and necessary to build up the strength 
of the young nation. However, the themes that immigrants were unfair job competitors, 
drove down wages, degraded labor, corrupted American society, and used a 
disproportionate share of resources are evident in eighteenth century immigration 
discourse just as they are in the political economy of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. These negative immigrant narratives have informed major policymaking in 
America at the same time as positive immigrant discourses have remained a part of the 
American immigrant narrative. These contrasting narratives have been hotly debated 
throughout the course of American history, with particular analogues evident between the 
late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. 
One common theme in nativist discourse throughout American history links 
immigrants with criminality and pauperism, which was also evident during the colonial 
period as colonies such as Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware attempted to 
pass laws that excluded convicts and paupers. A 1676 Maryland act stated that, “No 
master of a ship, merchant, sailor or any other person whatsoever shall presume to import 
into this province any such convicted felons or malefactors whatsoever.”
3
 
These fears of pauper and convict immigration continued and intensified in the 
eighteenth century, becoming increasingly heightened. A 1740 Delaware statute reflected 
the concern that ship captains (for profit) and foreign governments essentially dumped 
undesirables, “who, by reason of age, impotence or indigence, have become a heavy 
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burden and charge upon the inhabitants thereof” on the shores of North America.
4
 Local 
officials in port towns believed that ship captains and foreign countries dumped criminals 
and to paupers in North America, “who soon after their coming into this government, do 
often commit many felonies, robberies, thefts and burglaries.”
5
 Colonial Americans fears 
that ship captains and European countries essentially dumped convicts and debtors in 
North America were not unfounded. Beginning with the Transportation Act of 1718, 
England began sending convicts, debtors, and paupers to the New World. These English 
outcasts consequently helped to populate the North American colony of Georgia until 
1775 and the outbreak of the American Revolution.
6
 
Anti-immigrant proponents saw themselves as protecting the “American Dream” 
from both real and perceived threats. Many of these threats related to the growing 
disorder (or at least perception of it) that occurred in the midst of rapid change.
7
 This 
theme of disorder will continue to appear throughout nativist rhetoric, displaying that the 
anti-immigrant rhetoric of the late twentieth century was clearly rooted in earlier nativist 
rhetoric from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries.  
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 Many of these anti-immigrant ideas were based on the belief of American 
supremacy and of America as a special land made up of chosen people. Nativists believed 
that both this chosen land and people were being threatened by immigration. This concept 
evolved throughout the seventeenth through twentieth centuries. During the Colonial Era, 
it was the alien religion of Catholicism that threatened America and its people with 
undesirable “foreign influences” and whose adherents were deemed unassimilable. The 
question at the source of this conflict was America a nation of Anglo-Saxon peoples or a 
multicultural, multi-ethnic society?  
The United States began regulating immigration with the Naturalization Act of 
1790. This law stated that any “free white person” who resided in the United States for 
two years and was “a person of good character” was eligible for naturalization.
8
 The 
Naturalization Act of 1790 was replaced with the Naturalization Act of 1795, which 
increased the required period of residence from two years to five years. Anti-alien 
legislation began in the late eighteenth century with the Alien Act of 1798, which 
lengthened the period of time before an immigrant could naturalize from five to fourteen 
years and preserved citizenship only for those deemed “worthy.”
9
 It also placed aliens in 
a precarious legal position prior to naturalization should the United States end up at war 
with their native country. In such an instance, alien residents of the United States would 
be deemed hostile alien enemies.
10
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Several states, such as Virginia and Kentucky, challenged the constitutionality of 
the Alien and Sedition Laws.  In a May 1798 letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison 
wrote that, “The Alien bill proposed in the Senate is such a monster that must forever 
disgrace its parents.”
11
 In response to the Alien and Sedition laws, Thomas Jefferson 
helped craft the Kentucky Resolution, which called the Alien and Sedition Acts 
unconstitutional and an infringement on states’ rights.
12
 Immigration legislation was 
contentious from the start. 
 Economic crisis in 1819 caused a decline in immigration to the United States that 
lasted until 1827 and resulted in an increase in the fervor of immigration and legislation 
surrounding it. Similar economic declines caused by a recession in 1835 and the crash of 
1837 also resulted in decreased numbers of immigrants for those years. Real economic 
opportunity (i.e. jobs) attracted immigrants to the United States and a decline in 
economic opportunity translated into a decline in numbers of immigrants. America 
became an increasingly attractive and popular destination for the poor in Europe, 
particularly to the poor Irish, facing famine in the summer of 1832 and the 
Disfranchisement Act of 1829. A growing majority of these new immigrants were 
Catholic. In this time of rapid change and increasing immigration, Catholicism was 
synonymous with alien or foreign. Catholicism was associated with the rapid influx of 
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unskilled Irish immigrants who were rapidly changing the demographic makeup of 
northern urban centers. Nativists viewed these Irish Catholic immigrants as clannish, 
violent, and their Catholic beliefs were seen as compatible with absolutist monarchies 
and authoritarian governments and therefore inconsistent with democracy and the 
American way of life. In short, they were viewed as unassimilable. 
 This increase and change in immigration occurred in a time of rapid change in the 
United States, from 1824 to 1840. During this time period there was rapid population 
growth, movement westward, increasing urbanization, and the industrial and 
transportation revolutions. In the 1830s, particularly in the northern urban centers such as 
Boston where poor Irish immigrants concentrated, anti-alien sentiment erupted into 
frequent violence, such as in the Broad Street Riots of 1837. This violence was viewed as 
examples of immigrant criminality and the corruption of American society. One of the 
most prominent nativists of the nineteenth century was Samuel F. B. Morse, the famous 
inventor. Morse argued that the underlying cause of the violence of the 1830s was the 
“moral character, and condition” of immigrants, as well as the “immense and alarming 
increase” in immigration.
13
 Morse asked, “Can one throw mud into pure water and not 
disturb its clearance?”
14
 Morse’s fear of the corrupting influence of immigrants was one 
reason why urban slums were of particular concern for Protestant urban reformers, who 
melded temperance and other such reform movements with nativism in an attempt to 
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bring order to the urban slums and tried to impose middle-class notions of respectability 
on the diverse urban poor and working-class areas.
15
 
 In the mid-nineteenth century this anti-alien and nativist sentiment coalesced into 
a political movement. Most notably, the American Republican Party was founded in 
1841. The national program of the American Republican party asserted, “Foreign hearts 
and lips overthrow with insolent impieties toward our constitution. Foreign populations 
are festering and impoisoned with the impulse of disorderly appetites.”
16
 The American 
Republican Party boasted a cross-class membership. Its goals included the reading of the 
bible in public schools, making immigrants and naturalized citizens ineligible for public 
office, extending the naturalization waiting period from five to twenty-one years, and to 
“use every means in our power to diminish foreign influences.”
17
 The American 
Republican Party displayed many common elements in American anti-alien sentiment 
through the twentieth century by depicting itself as the savior of the true American 
culture. Members of the American Republican Party were not proponents of a 
multicultural society or of cultural pluralism in any form. Instead, they viewed true 
Americans as native born adherents of Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture and wanted to 
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restrict both immigration and alien rights. American Republican Party members argued 
that their political stances were rooted in objective evidence, citing the election and 
voting abuses by machine politicians who facilitated voting by noncitizens by procuring 
them fake citizenship papers and obtained bloc voting by immigrant paupers by 
promising/providing them with alms in exchange for votes.
18
 
 Nativist rhetoric was successfully mainstreamed among the American populace in 
the 1840s through Protestant churches and organizations by depicting immigrants as 
threatening moral and educational standards within American society. The American 
Republican Party was very careful to disassociate itself from racism or bigotry by rooting 
its goals within what it deemed to be rational arguments. The American Republican Party 
also blamed immigrants for crime. It cited instances of rioting by immigrant laborers on 
canals and railroads in 1834 and 1839 as well as massive riots in the spring and summer 
of 1844 in Philadelphia.
19
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Within this fertile ground for nativism of the mid-nineteenth century, several 
nativist secret fraternities emerged, the most notable of which was the Order of the Star 
Spangled Banner (OSSB), which was founded in 1850 in New York City. The OSSB was 
a secretive political organization, which is how they received their nickname – the Know-
Nothings. Within this time of political and social fracture that was the build up to the 
Civil War, nativism was a unifying force bringing people on all sides of the slavery 
debate together in scapegoating immigrants.  It was also during the prelude to the Civil 
War that politicians began to realize the many political benefits and uses of nativism as a 
versatile political and rhetorical weapon, one that was saturated with a nationalism that 
was particularly potent during this period of civil unrest.
20
  The Know-Nothings 
attempted to garner this powerful nationalist rhetoric for their cause: 
 
let it be looked to that paupers and criminals are no longer shipped on us by 
foreign states. Let it be looked to…. that the public laws and schools of the 
country are printed and taught in the language of the land…. America for the 
Americans!
21
 
 
 
In the 1850s gang violence was rampant on the streets of northern urban centers. 
This gang violence centered on gangs comprised of ethnic immigrants groups, such as 
Irish gangs, and gangs such as the West Side gang, made up of nativists, loosely 
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connected to organizations such as the Know-Nothings. In 1855, the leader of the West 
Side gang, Bill the Butcher, was murdered as a result of this gang warfare. His rumored 
last words were a rallying cry for nativists, “Good-bye boys; I die a true American!”
22
 
Bill the Butcher’s last words exemplify the crux of this rhetorical battle between gangs of 
ethnic immigrants and nativists. They were fighting over who were the “true” Americans. 
Is America/should America be a multiethnic pluralist society, a “melting pot,” or is it and 
should it remain an Anglo-Saxon nation?
23
 
The mass immigration that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century stirred up this 
anti-alien sentiment. These new immigrants were largely from Ireland and Germany, 
were Catholic, young, and unskilled. The sanitary conditions on the ships bringing these 
new migrants, particularly the Irish, to the United States were horrible at best. The fact 
that so many immigrants arrived sick contributed to native born Americans’ fears about 
immigrants and calls for protection from immigrants. Further, immigrants were accused 
of fraud and deception for their efforts to get past immigration screeners at the ports and 
gain entry to America.
24
 By concentrating in northern cities, these new Irish and German 
immigrants significantly changed the demographics of the cities in which they settled.
25
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With this rapid increase in population came an uptick in urban problems in the  
 
mid-nineteenth century.
26
 These new immigrants became associated with these new  
 
urban problems such as crime, moral decay, poverty, and disease, which solidified the 
nativists’ characterizations of aliens (particularly the Irish) as inherently debauched, 
degraded, and unassimilable. It is here that the concepts of immigrant and pauper became 
inextricably linked in the minds of the populace. Nativists pointed to the 1850 census to 
back up their beliefs. That is, the 1850 census showed that approximately 50 percent of 
poor relief recipients were immigrants, despite the fact that immigrants only comprised 
10 percent of the overall United States population.
27
 Nativists feared that these immigrant 
paupers were both degrading to the “national character” and a financial burden. 
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Individual immigrants were blamed for their economic situation, “If one could not earn 
his daily bread in a land as prosperous as the United States, then the individual himself 
was primarily at fault.”
28
 In the mid-nineteenth century, Massachusetts officials stated 
that: 
 
Our almshouse paupers are nearly all foreigners…. Aliens and their children 
embrace five-sixths of all who become chargeable… the greater proportion are 
lazy, ignorant, prejudiced, unreasonable, receiving charity of the State as a right 
rather than a favor.
29
 
 
 
This rhetoric illustrated nativist fears that the United States should be an Anglo-Saxon  
 
nation and not a multicultural society and that immigrants were a disproportionately high  
 
percentage of recipients of public assistance. An anonymous naturalized citizen who  
 
emigrated from England called this increased immigration “a glaring and grievous  
 
evil.”
30
 He furthered the argument that immigrants took jobs from native born Americans  
 
and drove down wages: 
 
 
This unlimited and unrestricted admission of foreign emigrants is a serious injury 
to the native laboring population…. socially, by overstocking the labor market 
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and thus keeping wages down; morally and religiously, by unavoidable contact 
and intercourse; and politically, by consequence of want of employment and low 
wages, making them needy and dependent, whereby they become the easy prey or 
willing tools of designing and unprincipled politicians.
31
 
 
 
In contrast, an 1855 New York Daily Times editorial asserted that immigration 
was of significant benefit to the United States and argued against immigration restriction 
asserting that, “The German immigration … has been generally a useful one to the 
country.” However, even as this New York Daily Times editorial writer defended German 
immigrants from the charges of nativists such as the Know-Nothings, he classified and 
divided immigrants into categories of “desirable” and “undesirable,” asserting that, 
“Whatever may be the case with other classes of immigrants, of the Germans it cannot be 
said that they fill our almshouses and prisons; or that they are idle and begging, or that 
their work is the poorest and least profitable.”
32
 Interestingly, another 1855 New York 
Daily Times editorial on “The Value of the Immigrant” used some of the same arguments 
in favor of immigrants, arguing that “wages would double without immigration” and that 
“without immigration … farmers would pay double for their workmen.”
33
  
Many politicians, particularly Republican politicians, feared the immigrant vote. 
They feared that immigrants and poor working class men could be easily manipulated by 
their social betters or offered material gains in exchange for their votes. Thus, they 
restricted the franchise for the poor and working classes through mechanisms such as poll 
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taxes and literacy tests, which significantly excluded immigrants and non-whites. Racial 
and class-based efforts to contest voting rights continued well into the twentieth 
century.
34
 Reflective of this class and ethnic antagonism, an 1856 congressional report 
referred to crime and pauperism as “the bane of a republic” and asserted that, “The 
immigration of foreign paupers and criminals ... is the chief source of intemperance ... a 
prolific source of crime, and that to it the enormous increase of crime may almost wholly 
be attributed.” Within this congressional report, immigrants were also determined to be 
“ignorant” and immoral people “inimical to our free institutions and our social 
organization” who “flooded our country with irreligion, immorality, and licentiousness.” 
This same 1856 House report also referred to immigrants as “vicious foreigners … 
paupers and criminals without character, morality, religion, industry…the dregs and 
scourings of alien peoples.”
35
 Here, nativists framed the language and debate into one in 
which they were protecting native Americans and the government and land of the United 
States from this immigrant invasion of undesirables. Nativists were fearful about their 
shifting role and status in this ever-changing society and economy. They also worried that 
their influence and status would be watered down by the rapid increase in immigrants and 
the rapidity at which these immigrants were reproducing as compared to the native-born 
population. 
 As a result of nativist fears, immigrants, specifically Irish immigrants, were 
scapegoated in the Great Chicago Fire of 1871. The fire began in the barn of Catherine 
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and Patrick O’Leary, working class Irish immigrants. Though the fire commissioners did 
not attribute blame to the O’Leary’s, the Chicago press and public did. The O’Learys, 
and by extension Irish immigrants, were vilified in the press. In the public relief efforts in 
the wake of the conflagration, immigrants were viewed as undeserving. Mrs. O’Leary 
was branded as a welfare cheat. Ethnic and class-based prejudices intertwined to create 
particularly dire circumstances for poor and working-class immigrants.
36
  
 The negative view of immigrant participation in stimulating the American 
economy did not go unopposed. In an 1880 speech before Congress, Congressman Levi 
Morton emphasized both the tangible and intangible benefits that immigrants brought to 
the United States, asserting that, “It is impossible fully to appreciate the value of 
immigration to this country without recalling to some extent the number of immigrants 
who have served to swell our population, and the skill, energy, and genius which they 
have added to the body politic.”
37
 Congressman Morton was not alone in placing 
significant value on immigrant contributions to the United States.  
Despite these efforts, the trope of the immigrant pauper remained fixed on the 
American psyche. The head tax on immigrants passed by Congress in 1882 was an 
attempt to curb pauper immigration to the United States. However, there was significant 
opposition to this legislation. This opposition centered on the concept of fairness and the 
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belief that immigrants had been a net positive for the United States. According to The 
New York Times, “It is generally conceded that this country has been built up by 
immigrants from Europe, and it has been our boast that here a free asylum is offered to 
the oppressed and downtrodden of all nations.”
38
 The debate over immigration and 
immigrant rights that raged in the late nineteenth century was evident in the media and in 
Congressional debates. This debate was continued through to the late twentieth century 
debate over immigration policy and immigrant rights in the United States.  
 “Desirable” immigrants were members of white northern and western European 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant society, peoples with skills and means, who immigrated as 
family units to attach themselves to the United States.
39
 An 1890 Washington Post 
editorial argued that immigration restriction and classifications did not make one anti-
immigrant and reiterated the distinction in United States immigration discourse between 
perceived “desirable” and “undesirable” immigrants: “Our door should always be open 
wide enough to admit all worthy comers, but our immigrants should be ‘of such a 
character morally, intellectually, and physically as would make them more or less 
valuable additions to the body politic.”
40
  
Despite the prevalence of anti-immigrant rhetoric linking aliens with paupers, this 
anti-immigrant sentiment was by no means a consensus view, as displayed by this 1894 
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Washington Post article title, “NOT ALL ARE PAUPERS: Many Immigrants Arrive 
with Both Money and Brains.” This article captures the attempts to combat nativists’ 
negative stereotypes of immigrants by displaying the educational and socio-economic 
diversity of immigrants.
41
 
 The end of the Civil War brought the expansion of railroads and manufacturing as 
well as increased coal production into West Virginia, Missouri, Illinois, and across the 
Great Plains. Large-scale immigration helped to fuel the expansion of these industries by 
providing the much-needed labor force. By 1887, these immigrant laborers were coming 
largely from new locales, particularly southern and eastern Europe. Significant numbers 
of these new immigrants were from Italy, the Russian Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. These new immigrants represented almost one quarter of the United States 
population. They helped to create a population explosion in the United States between 
1880 and 1915, when the United States’ population practically doubled in size, from 50 
million to 100 million people.
42
 
There was significant anti-immigrant rhetoric during these years, which resulted 
in anti-immigrant legislation in 1878, 1882, and 1891.
43
 Once again, this rhetoric did not 
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go uncontested, as Congressman Morton warned the House Chamber in 1880, “Our 
present national disregard of the interests of those who seek a home in our land is a 
discredit to humanity and to the honor of the nation.”
44
 Immigrants were viewed both 
positively and negatively within American political culture. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, nativists began to introduce legislation that was 
anti-immigrant and targeted specific nationalities such as the Chinese and Japanese. 
Immigration from Asia was spurred by the building of the railroads to the Pacific and by 
the California gold rush in 1849. This Asian immigration resulted in efforts to both 
prevent further immigration from Asia and to prevent those already in the United States 
from becoming citizens and having political and civil rights. For example, the 
Naturalization Act of 1870, designed to only extend American citizenship to freedmen, 
limited citizenship to “white persons and persons of African descent.”
45
 In 1882, the 
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Chinese Exclusion Act significantly restricted Chinese immigration to the United 
States.
46
  
Economic and employment issues contributed to the nativist sentiments directed 
at these new immigrants, particularly toward the Chinese and Japanese laborers arriving 
in California. Native workers in California feared that Japanese and Chinese immigrant 
laborers were taking their jobs, lowering wages, and degrading labor itself. This influx of 
Asian labor was coming at a time of 30 percent unemployment in California, 
exacerbating an already hot button issue. It is here that we see the anti-immigrant 
activists begin using terms such as “invasion” to refer to these immigrant newcomers. 
They were derided as unassimilable. Labor leaders as well as the Democratic and 
Republican parties decried what they viewed as Asians stealing American jobs. Even 
local officials joined the nativist outcries as the San Francisco mayor asserted that, “The 
Chinese and Japanese are not bona fide citizens. They are not the stuff of which 
Americans … can be made.”
47
 President Theodore Roosevelt was able to stem this tide of 
Asian laborers through the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907, in which Japan agreed to 
not issue passports to Japanese laborers going to the continental United States in 
exchange for the United States agreeing to not formally restrict such immigration.
48
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Some of the same factors motivating anti-immigrant sentiment toward laborers 
from Japan and China in California also influenced anti-immigrant sentiment against 
European immigrants arriving in the Eastern United States. The late nineteenth century 
was a time of significant anxiety for native Americans. This was the time of 
Reconstruction, Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis” asserting the closing of the 
American frontier as a result of the information in the 1890 census, the economic crisis, 
radicalism and labor strife such as exemplified by Haymarket Square in 1886, and the 
increasing prevalence of a racial hierarchy based civilizations discourse. The Industrial 
Revolution continued to cause rapid economic and social change as urbanization began to 
creep over increasing parts of the nation. With this rapid change came increased 
economic anxiety and economic uncertainty. Nativists again cast themselves as the 
protectors of “true” Americans and the “true” American political, economic, and social 
ways of life.
49
 Nativists were reacting to this significant transformation and upheaval that 
America was undergoing. 
As a response to increased uncertainty and change both caused by and reflected in 
the mass immigration of the late nineteenth century, nativist fraternities re-emerged. The 
most significant of these new nativist fraternities was the American Protective 
Association (APA). The nativist strand of anti-Catholicism was evident in the APA oath, 
in which members were forced to swear that they would, “use my utmost power to strike 
the shackles and chains of blind obedience to the Roman Catholic church from the 
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hampered and bound consciences of a priest-ridden and church-oppressed people….”
50
 
The APA drew on fears and anxiety resulting from economic crisis, which the APA 
blamed on Catholics. This rhetoric helped the APA to reach one-half million members by 
1895 and became a mass movement, albeit briefly. The APA was anti-Irish, anti-
Catholic, anti-Jewish, and anti-immigrant, in general. The APA also feared the dreaded 
immigrant pauper, calling immigrants “scum” and the “pauper and criminal riffraff of 
Europe.” The APA called for the United States to “Shut the Gates” to mass immigration. 
They portrayed themselves as protecting American jobs and the degradation of labor 
from immigrants. The APA declined by the turn of the century, unable to effectively 
exploit native fear of immigrants within this context of rapid social and economic 
change.
51
 
The struggle over whether or not the “true” American culture should be 
homogenously Anglo or multicultural, a “melting pot,” per se, continued. At a Patri Club 
meeting on the problem of immigration in 1892, Frederic Taylor argued that, “We want 
the Anglo-Saxon and not the Slavic civilization, and I know of nothing in the realm of 
sentiment or in the code of ethics or in the principles of economics that requires us to 
degrade our life in the scale of being.” Taylor categorized immigration restriction and 
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restrictions on alien rights as a form of national “self defense.” “If we would preserve our 
civilization uncontaminated; if we would keep our labor on the American standard of 
intelligence and living; if we would maintain our social ideals and political safeguards, 
we must regulate and restrict the flood of immigration.”
52
  
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century political culture was captivated by a 
debate about poverty and immigration, with the immigrant pauper front and center. 
Essentially this debate pitted Social Darwinists, who viewed immigrants as racially 
inferior and favored immigration restriction, against proponents of Americanization 
efforts toward immigrants, who viewed immigrant paupers as being in need of both 
material charity and cultural and social assimilation.
53
 Within the context of heightened 
anti-immigrant and restrictionist rhetoric, President Theodore Roosevelt pandered to 
nativist public opinion (in 1904 and 1905) by also differentiating between so-called 
desirable and undesirable immigrants. Roosevelt was in favor of immigration restriction 
in the case of the “wrong” sort of immigrant.
54
 Roosevelt believed the desirability of 
individual immigrants was related to the “individual quality of the individual man” and 
was not a product of ethnicity or religion.
55
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The early twentieth century was the time of the Progressive’s influence on the 
political culture. In fact, Progressive Senator William Paul Dillingham led the 
government’s examination of immigration to America. Mass immigration to the United 
States was increasing as the twentieth century dawned and showed no signs of abating. In 
1903, immigration to the United States totaled 857,046, the highest immigration levels to 
date.
56
 This number continued to increase, surpassed one million by 1905, and reached 
1,285,349 in 1907. Relief from immigration came only when an economic depression 
began in the spring of 1907.
57
 
In 1906, the Dillingham-chaired Senate Committee on Immigration (the 
Dillingham Commission) produced a report that symbolized the brunt of the nativist 
rhetoric evident in American political culture since the seventeenth century. For example, 
in recognition of the problems of pauper immigrants and their causal role in America’s 
myriad of urban social problems, the Dillingham Commission voted to increase the head 
tax on immigrants from two to five dollars and to increase restrictions on 
“unaccompanied children under 17 years of age,” the “physically defective,” “imbeciles,” 
and the “feebleminded.”
58
 Dillingham was clearly influenced by the eugenics and 
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Constitutional Medicine movements of the early twentieth century, led by those such as 
Nicholas Draper.
59
 
Within this climate, there was support in the Senate for restrictions on 
immigration, such as a bill that included a literacy requirement for those over sixteen 
years of age. This new literacy requirement denied admission to immigrants over the age 
of sixteen who were “physically capable of reading but could not read the English 
language or some other language.”
60
 For example, the head tax was reduced to three 
dollars (a net increase of one dollar from prior to the bill) and immigrants seeking asylum 
from political or religious persecution were exempted from the literacy test 
requirement.
61
  
One of the most significant parts of this bill was the eventual inclusion of a list of 
undesirable classes of immigrants. The final version of the bill included the listing of 
undesirable immigrant classes, and a four dollar head tax. The bill also gave presidential 
authority for the exclusion of laborers of particular ethnicities and included the 
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establishment of a joint congressional investigative committee into immigration.
62
 This 
commission was Roosevelt’s idea, who told House Speaker Joseph Gurney Cannon, “I 
would want a commission which would enable me … to put before Congress a plan 
which would amount to a definite solution to this immigration business.”
63
 When 
Roosevelt signed the bill on February 20, 1907, he invoked the clause of the bill 
empowering him to exclude Japanese laborers, which allowed him to formalize the 
Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan in 1907-1908, in which the Japanese voluntarily 
limited the issuance of passports to workers while exempting students, travelers, and 
businessmen.
64
 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this bill was the provision that called for the 
creation of a joint, bi-partisan Congressional Commission on Immigration, of which 
Dillingham was elected chairman.
65
 This commission proceeded to examine and collect 
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immigration statistics along with economic and sociological data on the immigrants, both 
in the United States and Europe.
66
 Through this data, the Commission compiled a listing 
of immigrant groups and their undesirable traits that was heavily influenced by the 
pseudo-scientific cultural anthropologists and Constitutional Medicine fads of the time.
67
 
On January 24, 1911, Dillingham submitted the Commission’s final conclusions. 
This report reinforced the idea, through seemingly quantifiable data, that Anglo-Saxon 
America was being threatened by mass immigration from southern and eastern Europe.
68
 
Now, the idea that America should be an Anglo-Saxon country and that immigration was 
the cause of a myriad of social and economic ills in the United States had an increased air 
of respectability to it. After all, it had been “proven” through Progressive science as well 
as through statistical and economic studies. The solution to the immigration and pauper 
problems in the United States could now be more easily identified as being the restriction 
of immigrants from undesirable areas, as well as the restriction of immigration overall. 
The commission’s conclusions also reinforced the division of immigrants into desirable 
and undesirable groupings, favoring older immigration over newer immigration. There 
was a racial component in the commission’s conclusions, as well. “Old immigration” was 
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composed of immigrants from northern and western Europe, people of Anglo-Saxon 
origin while “new immigration” was comprised of southern and eastern Europeans, who 
were decidedly not Anglo-Saxon. If the United States was an Anglo-Saxon country and 
not a multicultural country, then immigration from northern and western Europe must be 
favored over immigration from southern and eastern Europe. The immigration 
“problem,” then, arose from “new” and not “old” immigration. The commission used its 
data to show that these new immigrants were unassimilable, had a negative economic 
impact on natives, and contributed to racial inferiority by corrupting the true American 
Anglo-Saxon race.
69
  
 The committee’s recommendations were influenced by Progressive notions of 
science and social justice. Committee recommendations included restricting immigration 
from southern and eastern Europe while maintaining open immigration policies to those 
from northern and western Europe, increased enforcement of Asian exclusion, policies to 
attract rural agricultural laborers, and legislation to disincentivize the practice of 
immigrants sending money to their home country.
70
 The commission called for literacy 
tests and racial quotas in order to limit “the number of each race arriving each year to a 
certain percentage,” the exclusion of unskilled and unmarried laborers, increasing entry 
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fees, and creating a sliding scale head tax that would favor male immigrants with 
families.
71
 
 The conclusions of the Dillingham Commission became the impetus behind the 
nativist call for “one hundred percent Americanism” in the early twentieth century. 
Immigrant ideas, dress, and behavior deemed foreign were increasingly viewed as 
national security threats in the wake of World War I. Largely because of a pro-nativist 
frenzy that was fueled by war propaganda and wartime nationalism, Dillingham managed 
to get enough support to override President Wilson’s veto of a bill calling for literacy 
tests of immigrants.
72
 The Immigration Act of 1917 included this provision for a literacy 
requirement for immigrants, requiring immigrants to be able to read a minimum of forty 
words in their native language. This act also reiterated America’s disdain for Asian 
immigration in particular by prohibiting immigration from Asia, with some exceptions 
for Japan and the Philippines.
73
 
 In 1920, Dillingham introduced a bill in the Senate that called for a national 
origins quota system that would limit immigration to 3 percent of the number of each 
nationality present in the United States in 1910. This bill was to be a one-year emergency 
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measure to return immigration levels to that of pre-war numbers and to prevent a glut of 
unskilled labor depressing industry. This national origins quota bill passed Congress with 
large majorities in May 1921.
74
 The introduction of immigration restriction through the 
implementation of national origins quotas marked a significant reversal in United States 
immigration policy, marking the end of relatively open immigration policies.  
 Still, there was debate within Congress concerning the acceptableness of using  
 
such a quota system and whether the quota system amounted to racism. One vehement  
 
opponent of the quota system was Robert H. Clancy, who argued that the United States  
 
has a regrettable history of discrimination against immigrants that should not be  
 
continued: 
 
 
Since the foundations of the American commonwealth … vigorous complaint and 
more or less bitter persecution have been aimed at newcomers to our shores…. To 
me real Americanism and the American flag are the product of the blood of men 
and of the tears of women and children of a different type than the rampant 
“Americanizers” of to-day…. I can not stultify myself by voting for the present 
bill and overwhelm my country with racial hatreds and racial lines and 
antagonisms drawn even tighter than they are to-day.
75
 
 
 
This emergency quota system was renewed in 1922. The national origins quotas  
 
were more permanently enshrined in United States immigration law in the Immigration  
 
Act of 1924 (Johnson-Reed Act). In this law, quotas were reduced to 2 percent of the  
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numbers of a nationality present in the United States in 1890. This movement of the date  
 
of residence back by twenty years was an effort to further limit non-Anglo-Saxon  
 
immigration. The Immigration Act of 1924 had the effect of further restricting  
 
immigration from southern and eastern Europe while keeping immigration from northern  
 
and western Europe open. The Immigration Act of 1924 also specifically addressed  
 
immigration by people from Asia or of Asian descent by barring aliens from entering the  
 
United States if they were considered ineligible for citizenship because of race or  
 
nationality. This new law extended Asian exclusion even to Japanese not barred under the  
 
Gentlemen’s Agreement.
76
 In response to the debate over whether America was an  
 
Anglo-Saxon country or a multicultural country, the Immigration Act of 1924 issued a  
 
resounding response the United States was, and would remain, an Anglo-Saxon country.  
 
The United States Congress forcefully “shut the door” on the idea of the United States as  
 
a melting pot. South Carolina Senator Ellison Durant argued in favor of the United States  
 
shutting the door to non-Anglo-Saxon immigration in a speech during congressional  
 
debate over the Immigration Act of 1924: 
 
 
Thank God we have in America perhaps the largest percentage of any country in 
the world of the pure, unadulterated Anglo-Saxon stock…. It is for the 
preservation of that splendid stock that has characterized us that I would make 
this not an asylum for the oppressed of all countries, but a country to assimilate 
and perfect that splendid type of manhood that has made America the foremost 
Nation in her progress and her power … let us shut the door and assimilate what 
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we have and let us breed pure American citizens … and keep what we have for 
what we hope our own people to be.
77
 
 
So, who were these new immigrants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries who were being shut out? These immigrants were significantly younger than 
earlier immigrants. Many were forced to flee their homelands because of pogroms (in the 
case of Jews) and for economic reasons for others. Many were unskilled and illiterate 
farmworkers who lacked the capital to push westward to the interior of America and so 
settled in urban areas of the East and Midwest. The growth of anti-Semitism at this 
juncture is linked to this rise in nativism. 
The second incarnation of the nativist organization the Ku Klux Klan reached its 
peak in the 1920s. Their anti-immigration rhetoric was rooted in a strong nativist and 
anti-Catholic sentiment. Like the other organizations discussed in this study, the Klan 
also defined “foreign” and “alien” and crafted their anti-immigration rhetoric in such a 
way as to encompass the people, ideas, and institutions that they felt threatened their 
traditional power and status in society.
78
 In fact, the Klan placed itself at the pinnacle of 
“true America” and positioned themselves and their rhetoric such that, “Those who 
opposed the Klan were by definition opposed to America.”
79
 Fraternal organizations, 
including nativist fraternities and the KKK, gave people a sense of community during a 
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tumultuous time in America, in which people lamented the loss of community that 
accompanied the rise of industrialization and urbanization. There was a significant 
upsurge in membership in fraternal organizations in the 1920s and the Klan particularly 
benefited from this growth.
 80
 
During the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Mexican  
 
immigrant labor became a significant target of nativists’ ire, which continued  
 
throughout the twentieth century. Citizens held protests against the presence of large  
 
numbers of Mexican laborers and submitted petitions to Congress, desiring “legal steps  
 
be taken to prevent an influx of Mexican laborers to compete with American laborers.”
81
  
 
A 1920 letter from Galveston Texas asserted that: 
 
 
this class of immigrants are of no benefit whatever to the country…. American 
citizens should not be forced to compete with this class of cheap labor and lower 
the standard of living of the average American laboring man to that of pauper 
labor from any other country.
82
 
 
 
Despite the cheap labor that Mexican laborers were willing to engage in, an editorial in 
the Dallas News in 1921 argued that “It is a tax on charitable resources that are not 
sufficient to satisfy the needs of our own citizens.” Here was the fear that immigrants 
were a drain on a finite supply of charitable and governmental resources, while driving 
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down wages and threatening to lower the standard of living for native American workers. 
Apart from the job competition these Mexican laborers represented to native workers and 
the costs charities were forced to expend on their behalf, there were also considered to be 
“social, sanitary, and hygienic consequences of letting in large numbers of Mexicans.”
83
 
In the 1920s, southern agriculture underwent a “structural transformation” that 
dramatically altered both the method and labor of agriculture. Farms became extensions 
of big business, and this reorganization and increased efficiency forced laborers into a 
migratory workforce. Agribusiness became a powerful Washington, D.C. power broker, 
significantly influencing immigration legislation through the twentieth century. The role 
of business, particularly agricultural businesses in the Southwest,  in the construction of 
negative racial stereotypes about Mexicans and Mexican Americans and in the belief that 
there existed a “Mexican problem” in the form of high numbers of illegal Mexican 
immigrants, cannot be underestimated. Labor and business interests helped to drive 
immigration policy. For example, in order to ensure that they had a cheap oversupply of 
on demand labor, agribusiness lobbied for Mexican exclusion from citizenship on legal 
grounds.
84
  They successfully lobbied to exclude agricultural workers, significantly made 
up of poor blacks, Mexicans, and Mexican Americans, from New Deal programs. Thus, 
they were denied basic rights such as the right to organize and collectively bargain, 
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collect social security, and rely on a minimum hourly wage for work.
85
 Despite their 
desire for a foreign guestworker program such as the Bracero Program, agribusiness 
simultaneously exploited the labors of illegal workers, displaying their desire for a cheap 
and exploitable labor force. This is turn aided in the construction of the idea of Mexicans 
as illegal and also as non-white and therefore unassimilable. And, since the American 
race was now codified as a white race as a result of National Origins Quota Law, this 
centrality of race within immigration policy justified the exclusion of Mexicans from 
citizenship and also, through a variety of ways, barred Mexican Americans who were 
citizens from full civic and social membership and full citizenship.
86
 
The 1930s saw a significant number of deportations of migratory workers. These 
deportations were part of an anti-immigrant campaign designed to intimidate Mexican 
American citizens, legal workers, and illegal workers into leaving the United States 
during the Great Depression. In all, approximately four hundred thousand Mexicans and 
Mexican Americans were deported, including citizens who were illegally deported.
87
 The 
context of the Great Depression and economic crisis for this targeting of legal and illegal 
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immigrants was key. Yet these agricultural workers’ labor was still desired by 
agribusiness in large part because of their vulnerable position within American society. 
Agribusiness made their preference for easily exploitable labor clear through their hiring 
choices through the 1950s. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, agribusiness continued 
showing a preference for illegal workers, which helped to bring about Operation Wetback 
in 1954, an effort to stop the migration of undocumented workers from Mexico into the 
United States. The position of migratory workers in U.S. society continued to become 
increasingly precarious even as the rest of U.S. immigration policy became more 
egalitarian. 
World War II and the Cold War exerted significant influence over U.S. 
immigration policy by discrediting radicalism and introducing the use of refugee policy 
as an anticommunist tool. National origins quotas continued to be the crux of United 
States immigration policy as the U.S. shifted into the Cold War. The Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act) reaffirmed the national origins quota 
system. The McCarran-Walter Act also had two more at least seemingly egalitarian 
components to it. This 1952 act ended the exclusion of Asian immigrants from the United 
States and put in place an immigration preference hierarchy based on skill sets and family 
reunification as priorities. This preference system, without national origins quotas, would 
become the basis of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA 1965). The 
apparent lifting of the exclusion of Asian immigrants from the United States was more 
symbolic than real. While the former exclusions barring immigration and naturalization 
were in fact repealed, each Asian country was allotted a quota of one hundred visas per 
76 
 
year. These visas were distributed based on race, not on national origin. Therefore, a 
person with one or more Asian parents but born in a northern or western European 
country would still be counted toward the quota for either the Asian country from which 
his or her parents were born or toward a generic “Asian Pacific Triangle” quota.
88
 Clearly 
the driving force behind United States immigration policy remained the impulse to 
protect this “Anglo-Saxon” nation from becoming a multicultural “melting pot.” 
Another important component of United States Cold War immigration policy 
involved the use of refugee policy as a tool against communism, which resulted in 
significant numbers of Latinos and Asians being granted refugee status. 1965 was a 
watershed year in immigration history because of the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act, or 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. This act dismantled the national origins 
quota system and was an attempt to remove racial and ethnic discrimination from official 
United States immigration policy. Ending the racial hierarchy enshrined within the 
national origins quota system and replacing it with an immigration policy based on the 
premise of family reunification, asylum, and driven by foreign policy imperatives was a 
part of the 1960 Democratic Party platform.
89
 It was the Democratic Party, through John 
F. Kennedy, that called for lifting immigration restrictions enshrined in national origins 
quotas and affirmed the idea that the United States was a multicultural society. 
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This platform also called for the termination of the Bracero Program, which 
ended in 1964. Upon JFK’s assassination, Lyndon Johnson attempted to recreate 
American society and dismantle the inegalitarian, racial, and economic hierarchies and 
barriers that existed within it, particularly within the form of racial and ethnic 
discrimination, through his “Great Society.”
 90
 1964 saw the passage of the landmark 
Civil Rights Act. 1965 brought the passage of the Voting Rights Act. Further, the Cold 
War was raging. It was within this context that the United States tried to portray itself to 
the world as a shining moral example, where citizens enjoyed true equality and freedom. 
How could that image be reconciled with the nativist racial hierarchies embedded in 
United States immigration policy through the 1920s immigration laws and reaffirmed in 
the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, particularly in light of the potential consequences of 
racism as revealed in World War II and the Holocaust?
91
 
 Since the 1940s, there had been a rising consciousness and renewed debate in the 
United States over the meanings of freedom and equality in America. Of course, a 
significant underlying cause for this debate was the Long Civil Rights Movement. This 
debate helped to bring about the Rights Revolution, which is generally dated as occurring 
between the 1940s and 1980s. Not coincidentally, this era was the time period during 
which significant landmark and ultimately expansive immigration legislation was 
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white, female, and unmarried immigrants.  
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enacted. The Rights Revolution helped to foster a debate within American society about 
the meaning of equal rights. Does moving toward equal rights for all decrease the rights 
of some? Do some groups have more claims to rights than others? These questions 
festered within the discourse of the Rights Revolution (and within the immigration 
debates that were a part of it) and were one factor that led to a backlash against the Rights 
Revolution, as well as a backlash against immigration and immigrants. 
The very results and implications of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 
were paradoxical. It both ended the explicitly racial immigration quotas that had existed 
since Johnson-Reed, thereby seemingly opening up immigration to more people from 
outside of northern and western Europe, and severely restricted immigration from the 
Western hemisphere by placing numerical quotas on this group for the first time. In 
placing numerical quotas on immigration from the Western hemisphere, The Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA 1965) helped to increase illegal immigration, 
particularly from Mexico and Central America, which had the effect of stereotyping the 
ethnicity of illegal immigrants as Mexican.
92
 
President Johnson explicitly linked national origins immigrations laws and  
 
racism, making immigration reform a part of his Great Society reforms. Upon signing the  
 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Johnson remarked: 
 
 
for over four decades the immigration policy of the United States has been 
twisted and has been distorted by the harsh injustice of the national origins quota 
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system…. This system violated the basic principle of American democracy … It 
has been un-American in the highest sense.
93
 
 
 
INA 1965 caused a significant increase in immigration, both legal and illegal and 
shifted the policy debate over immigration toward illegal immigration, reorienting it 
toward a race, class, and status-based issue, reaffirming the general inegalitarian nature of 
the 1924 Johnson Reed Act. The 1965 reform reaffirmed the concept of numerical 
immigration quotas themselves. Its supporters simply took issue with the explicit use of 
racial hierarchies as the basis of such numerical quotas. Quotas remained (and were for 
the first time placed on the Western hemisphere), and racial hierarchies were replaced 
with other hierarchies (occupation, family, etc.).
94
  
Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the legal distinction 
between alien and citizen hardened. One place this distinction was particularly clear was 
in the courts. Supreme Court chief justice Earl Warren referred to citizenship as “the right 
to have rights.”
95
 In his dissenting opinion in Perez v. Brownell, Warren essentially set up 
the alien as the opposite of citizen.
96
 The “rights” discussed within the context of 
immigration reform most frequently referred to the rights of citizens. This decision 
                                                             
93 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965. Volume II, 
entry 546, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966), 1037-1040. 
 
94 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
and for Other Purposes), Public Law 89-236, U.S. Statutes at Large 79 (1965): 911; House Committee on 
Ways and Means, Summary of Welfare Reforms Made by Public Law 104-93, the Personal Responsibility 
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95 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 
96 Warren also referred to citizenship as “man’s basic right.” Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64-
65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); See Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 229. 
 
80 
 
underscores why there was increasing Hispanic political mobilization in an effort to 
“have rights” in the late twentieth century. 
The anti-immigrant themes that the presence of immigrants materially hurt 
citizens economically, lowered wages, created unfair competitors for jobs and housing, 
and spread an ethos of criminality throughout American society and culture that existed 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were muted somewhat by the 
egalitarian rhetoric of the INA 1965. However, largely as a result of the demographic 
consequences of this very same law (INA 1965), these anti-immigrant themes were 
strengthened once again in the late twentieth century and surged to the forefront of 
American political culture in the mid-to-late 1990s as a result of Proposition 187 and the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE IMMIGRANT AS A DRAIN, 1965-1990 
 
 
It is the American people who suffer because of illegal immigration. American 
workers are hurt by being forced into competition with illegal immigrants who 
work hard and are scared and sometimes ‘off the books,’ who don’t complain 
about unsafe conditions or low pay. American businesses are hurt by being forced 
into competition with exploiting employers who cut prices by hiring illegal 
immigrants. Teen-agers, women and minorities – people looking for entry-level 
jobs to get onto the work ladder – are hurt by being edged out of those jobs. 
Taxpayers are hurt by having to pay more for social services, and those receiving 
the services of the government are hurt by having to compete for resources spread 
ever more thinly as more people need help.
1
 
   Roger Conner, “Not Everyone Can Come Here,” St. Petersburg  
        Times, March 1, 1980 
 
 
One of the major themes of anti-immigrant rhetoric in the post-INA world was 
that of an immigrant “invasion.” This “invasion” was largely an “invasion” of illegal 
immigrants, though legal immigrants did not escape the ire of these anti-immigrant 
polemicists. This “invasion” was believed to be, at least in part, a consequence of “out of 
control” borders. It was this concept of an immigrant “invasion” that had become so 
mainstream that it became entrenched in the political debate over immigration in 
Washington, D.C., in the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 
(SCIRP) report in particular.
2
 This idea of a crisis caused by an immigrant “invasion” 
                                                             
1 Roger Conner, “Not Everyone Can Come Here,” St. Petersburg Times, March 1, 1980. At the 
time he penned this article, Conner was the Executive Director of the Federation for American Immigration 
Reform (FAIR). 
 
2 U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations of 
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy with Supplemental Views by Commissioners, 
March 1, 1981, (Washington, D.C: The Select Commission, 1981), 1-12. SCIRP was created in the 1978 
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resounded even in the halls of the federal agency responsible for immigration. Harold W. 
Ezell, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) Commissioner for the Western 
Region, stated that “our borders are out of control” and that his “mission is to stop the 
“invasion” of illegal aliens entering the United States from Mexico and other countries.”
3
 
There were two simultaneous policy movements within the United States 
government at this time. The first was a move toward more expansionist immigration 
policy, through the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA 1986). The 
second was a move toward restricting immigrant’s rights and welfare recipients’ rights. 
The two movements were linked in the 1990s, first with California’s Proposition 187 and 
then on a national level in 1996 with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).
4
 But it was the legacy of the political culture of the 
1970s and 1980s that created the necessary conditions for this conjuncture to occur. 
As a result of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, the demographics of 
America changed as did the make-up and stereotypes of the poor and immigrants within 
American society.
5
 INA 1965 opened the door to non-quota “chain migration” under the 
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3 Special to the New York Times Marcia Chambers, "Immigration Chief on West Coast Pressing 
Fight on Illegal 'Invasion'," The New York Times, December 4, 1986. 
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(Sacramento, CA: Senate Office of Research, 1994); Larry M. Eig, California's Proposition 187 a Brief 
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J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton: Princeton 
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preference system. These non-quota immigrants in turn opened the door to a virtually 
unlimited stream of “chain” migration, allowing for immediate relatives of United States 
citizens to enter the United States as non-quota immigrants. As American society became 
increasingly diverse and distinctly less-white, as fears of an immigration “invasion” took 
root, as the collective skill-set of immigrants changed, and as the bottom 50 percent of 
American society scrambled to hold and maintain a share of a dwindling piece of the 
American dream, immigrants became increasingly scapegoated.
6
 At first, only illegal 
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immigrants were feared and scapegoated. However, during the late 1980s and 1990s, the 
fear and disdain previously reserved for illegal immigrants was extended to include all 
immigrants (legal and illegal) who were recipients of any type of public assistance. 
The legacy of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 created growing 
discontent among the American populace with increasing legal and illegal immigration.  
By imposing a 20,000 per country cap on the Western hemisphere for the first time, INA 
1965 left many Mexicans desiring to immigrate to the United States for work, family or 
other reasons with little option other than illegal entry. This was largely a result of the 
120,000 person ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration, the 20,000 person per 
country quota, as well as the termination of the Bracero Program. Immigrants, who 
previously could have immigrated legally, with visas, were now forced to enter the 
United States illegally if they chose to enter at all. By making it more difficult for 
immigrants from the Western Hemisphere to legally enter the United States, the INA 
encouraged “‘back door’ illegal immigration.” This is precisely what occurred as the 
avenues for legal immigration to the United States from the Western hemisphere 
decreased significantly. One of the many paradoxes of United States’ immigration policy 
in the twentieth century was that INA 1965 was “restrictive for the Western Hemisphere 
and liberalizing for most nations in the Eastern one.”
7
 In 1978, INA amendments 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
proposal and 1985 Wilson proposal, in ignoring practical considerations such as “job protections, program 
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combined the separate immigration ceilings per hemisphere into a total ceiling of 290,000 
under a single preference system.
8
 
 As a result of INA 1965, new immigrants to the United States were decidedly 
non-white and their countries of origin were no longer significantly European. The 
changing demographics of new immigrants was extremely important to the anti-
immigrant sentiment of the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Peter Brimelow, a prominent 
anti-immigrant rights proponent, argued that, “By allowing its borders to vanish under 
this vast whirlwind of illegal immigrants, the United States is running on the edge of a 
demographic buzz saw. One day, it could suddenly look down to find California or Texas 
cut off.”
9
 In 1964, 41.78 percent of immigrants to the United States were born in Europe, 
7.47 percent were born in Asia, and .99 percent were born in Africa. Post-INA, in 1978, 
12.17 percent of immigrants to the United States were born in Europe, 41.53 percent 
were born in Asia, and 1.92 percent were born in Africa. By 1985, 11.06 percent of 
immigrants came from Europe, 46. 44 percent came from Asia, and 3 percent were born 
in Africa.
10
 The percentages of European “white” immigrants were significantly 
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decreasing while the percentages of non-white immigrants from Asia and Africa were 
increasing. This demographic change was only possible because of the policy changes 
enacted in INA 1965.
11
 
In the 1970s, immigration policy grew more expansionist through refugee 
admissions and parole. Parole powers and refugee admissions were used as a tool in 
America’s efforts to combat communism. Cold War presidents tended to favor a 
definition of “refugee” that emphasized people seeking asylum from communist regimes. 
These presidents tended to use their parole powers as a form of anti-communism. The 
definition of “refugee” within INA 1965 emphasized people who fled from “communist 
or communist-dominated countries” or the Middle East.
12
 
The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 reaffirmed the use of asylum for refugees as a 
tool or weapon within the United States’ arsenal in the war against communism, 
essentially granting all Cubans who reached United States soil refugee status.
13
 The 
numbers of Cuban refugees coming to the United States decreased after 1973 but 
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increased again in 1980.
14
 The number of Indochinese refugees during the 1970s was 
higher than those of Cubans as a result of events in Vietnam.
15
  
The Refugee Act of 1980 resulted in the separation of different forms of 
immigration – legal, illegal, and refugee.
16
 It also set a fifty thousand numerical quota for 
refugees, though this number was also significantly exceeded.
17
 One of the important 
future implications for immigration numbers that stemmed from these increased refugee 
admissions, was that this stream of refugees opened another stream of immigration that, 
as a result of family reunification preferences, allowed for increasingly larger numbers of 
immigrants from these countries to legally emigrate to the United States, which opened a 
whole unforeseen new stream of immigration to the United States, that was 
simultaneously largely non-white and from the Third World.  
Another important theme of anti-immigrant/anti-immigration rhetoric during the  
 
1970s and 1980s was that immigrants took jobs from native-born Americans and drove  
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down or stagnated wages.
18
 As such, immigrants were viewed as a drain on the  
 
economy. This was echoed in a 1976 New York Times article which asserted that, “One  
 
of the major problems with the New Jersey economy may be illegal aliens.”
19
 The article  
 
further argued that illegal immigrants: 
 
 
usually work for less and now hold 200,000 to 210,000 jobs in the state. They 
send an estimated total of $250 million or more a year to some other country, in 
most instances they do not pay state income tax, and they are said to hold so many 
jobs that freeing those positions would do away with two-thirds of New Jersey’s 
unemployment problem.
20
 
 
 
Interestingly, it was Congressional liberals who were at the forefront of the 
campaign against illegal immigration (but not against illegal immigrants) in the 1960s 
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and 1970s. Fighting illegal immigration was seen as an explicitly liberal or progressive 
position in the 1960s and 1970s. This had a lot to do with labor’s influence on liberals 
and liberals’ desire to ensure good working conditions and wages for domestic workers. 
Liberals believed that illegal immigration resulted in negative effects on working 
conditions and wages for domestic workers because illegal immigrants were more easily 
exploited by their employers. However, liberals had a track record that was strong on 
rights for illegal immigrants. They wanted to stop illegal immigration, largely through 
employer sanctions, but believed illegal immigrants’ rights should be protected once they 
arrived.
21
  
In the political culture of the 1970s and 1980s, the image of the welfare recipient  
 
was being colored brown and black. At the same time as the image of the welfare  
 
recipient was being racialized, gendered female, and stigmatized, welfare policy began to  
 
slowly move away from the idea of entitlement and toward the idea of workfare to  
 
include the imposition of time limits on receipt of welfare benefits. Welfare recipients  
 
were cast as lazy and undeserving, which was inextricably tied to their racialization.  
 
Ronald Reagan began popularizing the image of the “welfare queen” in 1976, and he was  
 
ultimately successful in casting this depiction of a welfare recipient as the image most  
 
forefront in political and popular culture. Reagan’s “welfare queen” hailed from Chicago  
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and was consciously trying to game the system for her own benefit: 
 
 
There’s a woman in Chicago. She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security 
cards and is collecting veterans’ benefits on four nonexisting deceased husbands. 
And she’s collecting Social Security on her cards. She’s got Medicaid, getting 
food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free 
cash income alone is over $150,000.
22
 
 
 
This image of the black female welfare recipient, or “welfare queen,” criminally 
bilking the government and taxpayers while irresponsibly reproducing, was combined 
with the image of the female Hispanic immigrant over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. 
In a 1986 New York Times / CBS News Poll, 47 percent of the respondents believed that 
most new immigrants were welfare recipients. The association of immigrants with 
welfare recipients has been an enduring element of the anti-immigrant/anti-immigration 
element of American immigration discourse. Yet even this belief that immigrants were 
placing a drain on governmental welfare resources was contradictory. Reverend Leroy 
Vickerstaff, a respondent in the aforementioned poll, asserted that immigrants “helped 
build the country” yet also claimed that immigrants were placing “stress on employment 
and housing.” Echoing the idea that immigrants were a drain on United States society and 
resources, Vickerstaff argued that, “The welfare rolls are filled with the names of 
immigrants who have little education. With the economy now, immigrants are a greater 
drain than a help.” There Vickerstaff combined the ideas that new immigrants were 
uneducated and low-skilled, likely to be welfare recipients, and an overall drain on 
society, the economy, and resources. Respondent Barbara H. Kooch differentiated 
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between immigrants that she personally knew, who she deemed “a blessing to our 
society” and immigrants in general, asserting that, “There is a limit to how many can be 
absorbed without taking opportunities away from our own people.” These respondents 
echoed the anti-immigrant rhetoric that saturated the political culture of the post-INA 
1965 United States. This rhetoric largely revolved around a type of protectionist idea, that 
resources and jobs were scarce and must be reserved first for the native-born. Respondent 
Howard Jones argued that, “Immigration should definitely slow up till the economy 
improves. We still have a lot of our own people hungry, not making a satisfactory living.” 
Perhaps most telling about the extent of saturation within American society this anti-
immigrant rhetoric had achieved was the types of words and concepts respondents to this 
poll associated with immigrants. There was essentially an even split between positive 
associations with the term “immigrant” as there were negative associations such as “take 
jobs away.”
23
 The debate over immigration remained highly contested. 
To restrictionists such as John Tanton, President of Zero Population Growth 
(ZPG), it seemed as though these “undesirables” were the ones having large families and 
potentially dooming the future of the country and planet. The debate over immigration in 
the 1970s brought population control and environmental concerns to the table. Tanton 
began viewing immigration within the context of environmentalism’s concerns about 
unimpeded population growth and the pressures this placed on a country’s resources. 
Eugenics entered the anti-immigrant arena through efforts to control the reproductive 
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rights of poor immigrant and minority women. Eugenic solutions were considered by the 
new environmental restrictionist movement, specifically by Paul and Anne Ehrlich. Anne 
Ehrlich explained that she “can imagine a situation where forced sterilization might be 
necessary.”
24
  
Ehrlich would not have to imagine too hard. Throughout the late 1960s and early  
 
1970s, Mexican American women of both legal and illegal status were the victims of a  
 
coercive sterilization campaign. Poor African American women were subject to coercive  
 
sterilization, as well.
25
 Race, immigrant status, and poverty were all factors in the  
 
targeting of these women for such coercion as occurred in forced sterilizations. In these  
 
forced sterilizations the linkage between immigrants and minorities as welfare recipients  
 
and immigrants as a drain on society was clear. In his 1974 decision in Relf v.  
 
Weinberger, Federal District Judge Gerhard Gessel asserted that: 
 
 
there is incontroverted evidence in the record that … an indefinite number of poor 
people have been improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization operation 
under the threat that various federally supported welfare benefits would be 
withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible sterilization.
26
  
 
 
One of the ways that states justified and rationalized such coercive tactics was by arguing  
 
that the immigrant women subjected to these coerced sterilizations were “not really  
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American” and were a financial drain on the country.
27
  
 
Tanton and ZPG’s concern with population control built throughout the late 1960s  
 
into the 1980s. In 1974, ZPG asserted that “immigration poses a serious threat to the  
 
achievement of population stabilization” and called for the government to completely halt  
 
illegal immigration and decrease legal immigration by 90 percent.
28
 Tanton was installed  
 
as president of ZPG in 1975 and immigration was thus pushed to the forefront of ZPG’s  
 
lobbying and public relations efforts.
29
 ZPG lobbied for employer sanctions for the  
 
willful hiring of illegal immigrants (which was included in IRCA 1986).
30
 
 
This anti-immigration rhetoric of environmentalist and population control groups  
was saturated with anti-welfare rhetoric, virtually conflating immigrant with poverty.  
These concerns, couched in environmentalist and population growth language seemed to  
be, at their heart, fear that demographic change could result in the subjugation of a new  
white minority in the same manner that the black and brown minorities had previously 
been subjugated. This racialized rhetoric was increasingly utilized by anti-
immigrant/anti-immigration and anti-welfare advocates in the 1980s. Tanton questioned,  
“can homo contraceptivus compete with homo progenitiva if borders aren’t  
controlled?”
31
 The uteruses of Mexican immigrants seemed to always be at the forefront  
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of the anti-immigrant and anti-immigration rhetoric of ZPG and FAIR.  
 In the 1978 INA Amendments, Congress created SCIRP with the charge “to study  
 
and evaluate … existing laws, policies, and procedures governing the admission of  
 
immigrants and refugees to the United States” and “to make appropriate legislative  
 
recommendations.”
32
 The SCIRP final report, published in March 1981, issued four  
 
main recommendations intended to help frame immigration policy debate in the future.  
 
The SCIRP report argued that expansive immigration promoted by pro-immigration  
 
governmental policies was in the United States’ national interest. SCIRP summarized  
 
their recommendations as follows: 
 
 
We recommend closing the back door to undocumented/illegal migration, opening 
the front door a little more to accommodate legal migration in the interests of this 
country, defining our immigration goals more clearly and providing a structure to 
implement them effectively, and setting forth procedures that will lead to fair and 
efficient adjudication and administration of U.S. immigration laws.
33
 
 
 
SCIRP followed in the liberal tradition of President John F. Kennedy and Senator  
 
Philip A. Hart (D-MI) by calling for relatively open legal immigration but restrictions on  
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illegal immigration. At the same time, the language of the SCIRP final report echoes the 
immigration “invasion” rhetoric that was so rampant throughout the highly contested 
immigration debate and displays the sense that illegal immigration had caused a crisis. In 
their final report, the members of SCIRP cautioned, “This is not the time for a large-scale 
expansion in legal immigration … because the first order of priority is bringing 
undocumented/illegal immigration under control.”
34
  
In a nod to public opinion, the SCIRP commissioners asserted that they were  
 
“well aware of the widespread dissatisfaction among United States citizens with an  
 
immigration policy that seems to be out of control.”
35
 They stated in their final report  
 
that they recognized that illegal immigration caused “serious problems” and echoed the  
 
anti-immigrant rhetoric prominent in American political culture in the 1970s and 1980s,  
 
though carefully framing these “serious problems” to be solely caused by illegal  
 
immigration, by asserting that: 
 
 
Some U.S. citizens and resident aliens who can least afford it are hurt by 
competition for jobs and housing and a reduction of wages and standards at the 
workplace….widespread illegality erodes confidence in the law generally, and 
immigration law specifically, while being unfair to those who seek to immigrate 
legally.
36
 
 
 
Thus, enshrined in American political culture in the SCIRP final report were the ideas 
that the presence of immigrants materially hurt citizens economically, lowered wages, 
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created unfair competition for jobs and housing, and spread an ethos of criminality 
throughout American society and culture. At the same time as the SCIRP report 
perpetuated this negative immigrant narrative, the SCIRP report echoed Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson’s great liberal desire for more open immigration, displaying that 
there was not a consensus that immigration was harmful. The debate over immigration 
policy and immigrant rights continued to be just that, a highly contested debate that 
revolved around the central question of whether American society was a multicultural 
society of immigrants versus the idea that immigrants were a drain on the society and 
economy. 
Nativists lost several major battles in the post-INA world as they were forced to 
come to terms with an increasingly open United States immigration policy. Two of the 
most significant immigration policies enacted during the 1980s were IRCA (1986) and 
the Immigration Act of 1990. These laws were expansive at a time the social and political 
forces at play seemed to point toward the enactment of restrictionist laws. Daniel 
Tichenor astutely argues that it was the result of political fragmentation, the influence of 
special interest groups, and a few well positioned politicians that created these 
immigration policies in the 1980s and 1990s, which were largely ambiguous, had 
contradictory measures, and resulted in largely expansive outcomes during a time of 
significant restrictionist sentiment.
37
 
Illegal immigration seemed a battle which nativists thought they could win, and 
they increasingly moved in that direction in the 1980s. Pushing these rhetorical and 
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policy themes in the 1980s was the belief that the United States borders were “porous and 
inadequately regulated,” leading to what some feared was a “foreign invasion.”
38
 This 
“foreign invasion” filled the United States, and in particular the gateway states of New 
York, California, Texas, and Florida with non-white immigrants, who many believed 
were corrupting American society and culture, were a drain on the American society, 
economy and resources, were unassimilable, took jobs from native-born Americans, 
stagnated or lowered wages, and introduced a criminal underclass element to American 
cities.
39
 This belief in an increasing “foreign invasion” directly fed into anti-immigrant 
rhetoric that immigrants were a drain on American society, economy and resources.
40
 In 
1981, Democratic Colorado governor, Richard Lamm, echoed these beliefs that the 
increasing presence of immigrants was materially hurting native-born Americans, 
asserting, "the unchanging pie dramatically alters an issue like immigration, for now 
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additional people will have to take from that pie rather than contribute to it…. Who needs 
additional people when we cannot employ our own citizens?"
41
 
 Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) and Representative Roman Mazzoli (D-KY) put 
forth a number of failed immigration reform proposals in the House and Senate in the 
1980s. Immigration policy has always garnered seemingly strange coalitions surrounding 
the debate, and IRCA (1986) was a prime example of this. Largely as a consequence of 
these coalitions with very different interests, immigration policy in the United States has 
frequently had very different outcomes than intended. Much of the 1980s was spent by 
Simpson and Mazzoli attempting to pass immigration reform. In the spirit of liberalism 
and in an effort to not punish illegal immigrants themselves, a liberal consensus emerged 
around the idea of employer sanctions. The idea was that by punishing businesses for 
hiring illegal immigrants they could circumvent the calls for crackdowns on immigrant 
rights. Also in this liberal tradition was a call for amnesty to be granted to illegal 
immigrants who had resided in the United States for a set period of time. 
From the outset, immigration restrictionist groups such as FAIR were concerned 
about the possibility that without adequate enhanced border security, the result of this 
immigration reform bill would be millions more legal immigrants, and eventually, 
citizens, drawn in by the promises of amnesty and welfare benefits. Yet, in 1984, FAIR 
still supported the Simpson-Mazzoli immigration bill. Roger Conner, FAIR’s Executive 
Director recognized the potential pitfalls of this bill. “I am terribly concerned…we could 
end up with toothless employer sanctions and then no money for enforcement. The bill 
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will be a failure unless there is money and the will for enforcement at the border.” 
Conner recognized the very real possibility that the competing interests of the coalition 
members advocating for and against portions of this bill would end up creating in the end 
something that appealed to no one. He explained why FAIR still supported bringing the 
bill to the House floor, “At present, this bill represents the best chance for immigration 
reform, but also the greatest risk for immigration catastrophe that you can imagine.”
42
 
 These coalitions were continually realigning themselves and growing in number. 
In fact, a lobbyist for the citrus growers who was also a former House immigration staffer 
joked that “the National Academy of Sciences recently studied the number of illegal 
entrants and decided the number of immigration lobbyists is greater.” The most powerful 
special interest involved in immigration lobbying was the western produce growers’ 
lobby. Immigration policy was crucial to their business models and profitability as they 
relied on a readily available oversupply of cheap and exploitable labor as seasonal 
employees to do the time-sensitive job of harvesting produce. The growers were 
vehemently opposed to the employer sanction portions of the immigration bills 
continually being introduced in Congress in the 1980s, and they spent heavily to 
influence this legislation to include a temporary foreign guestworker program.
43
 
However, this proposed amendment put the growers at odds with other powerful 
interests who also supported the bill, namely labor, Hispanic and civil rights groups, and 
business. While the national AFL-CIO favored the immigration overhaul bills passing 
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through Congress, many of their locals did not (such as the United Farmworkers Union). 
With the AFL-CIO merger, the organized labor movement moved away from the 
restrictionist camp and toward the expansionists. Organized labor also shifted their stance 
on employer sanctions in the early 1970s and joined forces with liberal Democrats, civil 
rights groups, and some religious organizations (such as the U.S. Catholic Conference) in 
favor of employer sanctions because it was believed to be a more humane way to solve 
the illegal immigration problem than restrictions of rights and mass deportations. Again, 
this pro-employer sanctions stance was because of their strong pro-civil and human rights 
positions. They believed that employer sanctions would stop the demand for illegal 
workers in the United States. This strong stance of civil rights groups in favor of 
employer sanctions foreshadowed some of the tensions to come between the Hispanic 
community and African American community regarding job competition. Yet, the issue 
of employer sanctions did cause some division within the Democratic Party in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Congressmen Herman Badillo (D-NY), Edward Koch (D-NY), and Edward 
Roybal (D-NY) all opposed employer sanctions because they believed the restrictions 
would result in increased discrimination against Hispanics and others who might be 
potentially perceived as foreign. These liberal Democrats who opposed employer 
sanctions because of its potential to foster civil rights violations were joined in their 
opposition by the so-called “iron triangle.” The “iron triangle” consisted of the INS, 
Southwestern growers, and Senator Eastman. Senator Eastman’s power was evident by 
his ability to frustrate any efforts to hold any hearings on immigration within the 
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Judiciary Committee from the 1960s to 1977.
44
 The fact that employer sanctions garnered 
at least tepid support in the 1980s is therefore significant. Of course, this support came at 
the cost of effective enforcement mechanisms for these sanctions. For example, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce generally opposed employer sanctions, but ended up giving their 
support for the measure in return for employer record-keeping remaining voluntary. 
45
  
Public opinion was divided over the issue of immigration, though Americans were 
slightly in favor of decreasing immigration levels. A 1986 New York Times / CBS News 
Poll discovered that 49 percent of American adults were in favor of decreasing 
immigration levels while 42 percent favored increasing immigration levels. The poll had 
a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points, displaying that there was a 
slight majority of Americans favoring decreased levels of immigration to the United 
States. In this same 1986 poll, 45 percent answered that immigrants worked harder than 
native-born Americans, displaying the entrenchment of the idea that immigrants were 
hardworking productive members of American society. Public opinion polls such as this 
display the paradoxical nature of American immigration discourse. In this same poll, 47 
percent of respondents believed that most new immigrants were welfare recipients. 1/3 of 
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respondents believed that immigrants took jobs away from Americans. Forty-nine percent 
of respondents believed that most new immigration to the United States was comprised of 
illegal immigrants while only 32 percent believed that legal immigrants comprised the 
majority of new immigrants.  A significant majority of respondents supported the 
employer sanctions and legalization components of IRCA (1986), yet 58 percent opposed 
the provisions of IRCA (1986) allowing for a temporary farmworker classification.
46
 
From these results, the efforts by nativists to portray a crisis of illegal immigration 
appeared to be effective. The respondents also displayed pragmatism about those already 
in the country but showed the prevalence of economic concerns related to job 
competition from worker programs. 
 Given public opinion on the proposed components of IRCA (1986), just before its 
passage New York Congressman Hamilton Fish Jr. argued that IRCA (1986) could 
precipitate a backlash against immigrants from within the American populace, warning, 
“The American public will demand a repressive response.”
47
 Congressman Fish 
foreshadowed the anti-immigrant backlash that did, in fact, occur and resulted in 
Proposition 187 in California and PRWORA on a national level. 
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In the end, the Simpson-Rodino Act of 1986, or the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was essentially a policy compromise.
48
 Though the intent 
behind it was to restrict immigration, it resulted in immigration expansion. The impetus 
behind the IRCA (1986) was the pressure on Congress to deal with the issue of illegal 
aliens and the nation’s porous borders.
49
  IRCA (1986) extended amnesty to 
approximately three million legal immigrants who met specific criteria. With this 
legalization, exacerbated by the chain of family immigration enshrined in INA 1965, 
came more legal immigrants (and eventually more citizens). These increasing numbers of 
aliens and their ability to naturalize increased fears among the native white populace of 
an “immigration invasion.”
50
 It also eventually helped to set the stage for the Hispanic 
political mobilization of the 1990s. IRCA (1986) also included an employer sanction 
component to discourage the employment of illegal aliens, as well as an agricultural 
guestworker program.
51
 For example, amnesty was given to illegal immigrants at the 
same time as employer sanctions were placed on employers to stop the concrete monetary 
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factors pulling illegal immigrants into the United States. However, as a result of the 
influence of growers within these coalitions, the sanctions lacked effective enforcement 
mechanisms and were consequently ineffective at stemming the influx of illegal 
immigrants into the United States. Employer sanctions was a difficult political issue. 
Hispanic and immigrant groups feared discrimination and thus lobbied against sanctions. 
Employers also lobbied against employer sanctions, fearful of any potential consequences 
or of public policy interfering with their bottom line or hiring decisions. The agricultural 
guestworker program combined with the amnesty given to approximately three million 
illegal immigrants already within the United States, increased immigrant totals in the 
United States yet again, while still giving the politicians seemingly restrictive policy 
measures with which they could use to attract the anti-immigrant sectors of the 
electorate.
52
  
Despite the conflict over its enactment, the concept behind such amnesties was 
not entirely new to United States immigration policy. Since the Registry Act of 1929, 
immigrants in the United States illegally could apply through the “Registry” program to 
legalize their status.
53
 Throughout the twentieth century, Congress consistently moved 
forward the required residency date to apply for legalization. IRCA (1986) moved 
forward the date that an alien must have been present in the United States since to 1972. 
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IRCA (1986) also created two new categories for amnesty: the general program and the 
Seasoned Agricultural Workers (SAW) amnesty program. These IRCA (1986) programs 
combined to legalize over three million illegal aliens. While the registry program 
garnered little public attention, there was significant conflict over these IRCA (1986) 
legalizations, which would have profound consequences on American political discourse 
in the 1990s.
54
   
The great hope that many restrictionists had for the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was that it would stop or at least slow illegal immigration to 
the United States. Alas, IRCA did not result in sustained decreased levels of illegal 
immigration to the United States. According to the General Accounting Office of the 
United States, “Despite a brief drop in the estimated number of illegal entries to the 
United States after IRCA was enacted, the inflow of illegal alien populations is now 
estimated to have increased once more to pre-IRCA levels.”
55
 Peter Brimelow echoed 
this GAO finding, arguing that, “Whatever else the IRCA legislation was supposed to do, 
it has quite clearly failed to control illegal immigration.”
56
 The problem, there seemed to 
be agreement on, resided in the weak enforcement mechanisms behind the employer 
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sanctions. In 1986, FAIR President Roger Conner assessed the potential consequences of 
IRCA in the following manner: “We wanted a Cadillac, we were promised a Chevy, and 
we got a wreck.”
57
  
  Some groups who wanted to restrict immigration made this argument that 
immigrants were a drain on society a part of their arguments in favor of immigration 
restriction. They argued that the welfare state was a magnet drawing in “undesirable” 
immigrants who would eventually become (if they did not begin as such) a drain on 
society, the United States’ economy, on governmental resources, and further become 
absolutely dependent on government services.
58
 Three such groups are the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform (FAIR), the American Immigration Control Foundation 
(AICF), and the John Birch Society. According to prominent anti-immigration activist 
Peter Brimelow, “Post-1965 immigration does not seem to be affected very much by 
economic conditions in the United States” because: 
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Firstly, the emphasis placed by the 1965 Act on ‘family reunification’ rather than 
importation of workers to fill specific labor needs. Secondly, the magnet of the 
American welfare state. Both have served to uncouple immigration from 
American economic conditions … and, not coincidentally, from American 
economic needs. Let alone political or cultural needs.
59
 
 
 FAIR and AICF were part of a new restrictionist lobby that became active in the 
1980s and early 1990s. FAIR and AICF were otherwise seemingly liberal 
environmentalist groups that emphasized the linkage between the environment, 
population numbers, and immigration. These groups were influenced by books such as 
Paul Ehrlich’s Population Bomb, as well as by the 1969 Commission on Population 
Growth and the American Future. FAIR and AICF saw immigrants as using up scarce 
resources that they believed should be reserved for the native born.
60
 
Debate over competition for scarce resources brought environmentalists into the 
immigration policy debate arena in the 1980s. Their concern was largely over scarce 
national (and natural) resources and the negative impact of potential overpopulation and 
increased competition for these resources. The immigration debate really split the 
environmental movement, as established, mainstream environmental groups such as the 
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immigration as a threat to national sovereignty. 
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Sierra Club grappled with the potential negative political and consequently public 
relations and fundraising implications of entering such a contentious debate. Generally, 
national environmental organizations generally attempted to avoid the immigration 
debate as much as possible. Though Sierra Club members such as Tanton themselves 
became prominent within the anti-immigration/anti-immigrant debate, the Sierra Club 
itself attempted to distance itself from such activity, fearing the taint of racism charges.
61
 
 Many in this new restrictionist lobby, such as AICF, were careful to try to  
 
distance themselves from anti-diversity arguments or from charges of racism despite the  
 
fact that they were arguing against multiculturalism. Each group attempted a variant of  
 
the argument that they were not racist, that instead they were attempting to place the good  
 
of the nation and of the native-born first. For example, Laurence Auster of AICF  
 
asserted: 
 
 
There is no question that many of today’s new immigrants are making valuable 
contributions to this country and are assimilating into American society. But…. 
the movement to tear down our national heritage in the name of a vaguely defined 
‘multiculturalism’ – is beginning to make many Americans realize...that 
America’s ability to perform this alchemy of souls is not infinite.
62
 
 
 
 The anti-immigrant and anti-immigration rhetoric of the AICF was really an  
 
argument against the benefits of multiculturalism, similar to late nineteenth and early  
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twentieth century arguments in favor of an Anglo-Saxon America. Auster believed that  
there was a distinctive Anglo-American culture and believed that this unique culture was 
being threatened by immigrants. Beliefs such as this were at the root of English-Only 
initiatives in schools, businesses, and other public places, including the push to insert an 
amendment to the Constitution making English the official language.
63
 In fact, this was 
what Auster and the AICF really feared, a demographic transformation in which whites 
became the minority: 
 
Indeed, by the year 2089 America will be in large part a Hispanic and Asian 
society in which whites will be a minority—a revolution in the nation’s character 
that will dwarf the changes brought by earlier waves of European immigrants. 
This ethnic transformation is already being reflected in a multiculturalist 
ideology.
64
 
 
 
To Auster and AICF, America must and should be a white majority country; anything 
else would be a perversion of the natural order and potentially remove white Americans’ 
advantages within American society. 
 Anti-immigrant activists such as Auster, John Tanton, and Roger Conner believed 
that the white Anglo-Saxon America they envisioned should also be a purely English-
speaking country. English-Only initiatives were very much a part of the anti-
immigration/anti-immigrant rights movement despite the fact that their leaders denied 
such involvement. Speaking of reported connections between FAIR, U.S. English, and 
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the Population Environment Balance (PEB), Tanton claimed that, “There is no tie 
between these organizations other than the fact that I am on their boards.” Yet, Tanton 
co-founded U.S. English and FAIR. In 1986, he was chairman of both organizations. 
Tanton was also a board member of PEB. There were numerous other connections 
between the groups, including between the political action committees for these groups, 
the English Language Political Action Committee (ELPAC), and the Immigration 
Political Action Committee (ImmPAC). These groups all shared common donors.
65
 
Despite Tanton’s protestations that efforts to restrict immigration, control population 
growth, and mandate English as the official language in the United States were discrete 
and separate efforts, this was clearly not the case, even according to Tanton himself. “The 
language question is derivative of immigration policy. Large numbers of immigrants are 
coming from the same (non-English) language backgrounds. They create communities 
where English is not spoken.”
66
 
There was a popular perception that immigration restrictionists, population 
control groups and U.S. English and its state affiliates were intertwined because efforts to 
restrict immigrant rights largely centered around the stigmatization or exploitation of 
immigrants lacking fluency in English. A Republican Senator from California, Samuel 
Ichiye Hayakawa, one of the founders of U.S. English and California English, said that an 
“individual who asked if we were planning on the ‘forced sterilizations of targeted 
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minorities’ must have been kidding – but the tone of the question…clearly indicated that 
he was not. One wonders how severe minority group paranoia has become.”
67
 For poor 
women of color who lacked citizenship, this was not a question of paranoia but 
something that they, their mothers, sisters, friends and neighbors had experienced either 
firsthand or through community members. U.S. English’s outright disavowal that forced 
sterilization existed and reference to such fears as “severe paranoia” betrayed their 
“severe” efforts to appear mainstream and distance themselves from the racism and fear-
mongering associated with earlier nativist groups. Immigration restrictionist sentiment 
was becoming increasingly difficult to extricate or differentiate from anti-immigrant 
rhetoric. Immigration restrictionist groups increasingly engaged in and supported efforts 
to restrict not just immigration, but also immigrant rights. These efforts significantly 
affected the political culture in the 1990s through Proposition 187 and The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).
68
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In a leaked memo to the FAIR Board of Directors from July 11, 1986, (prior to 
IRCA’s passage), FAIR Executive Director Roger Conner articulated the goals behind 
FAIR’s founding as, “to stop illegal immigration and to conform legal immigration 
policies to the realities of the 1980s.”
69
 Conner also listed the objectives necessary to 
reach those goals: “make the idea of limiting immigration acceptable, develop policy 
ideas on how to curtail immigration, and build a strong and enduring organization to 
implement them.”
70
 
 Evident in FAIR’s leaked WITAN Memos is the use of fear, and specifically  
 
racially charged fear, as a tactic to achieve their stated goals. This approach is particularly  
 
evident in Tanton’s October 10, 1986, memo to WITAN IV attendees, in which he  
 
questioned: 
 
 
Is apartheid in Southern California’s future? The demographic picture in South 
Africa now is startlingly similar to what we’ll see in California in 2030….In 
California of 2030, the non-Hispanic Whites and Asians will own the property, 
have the good jobs and education, speak one language and be mostly Protestant 
and “other.” The Blacks and Hispanics will have the poor jobs, will lack 
education, own little property, speak another language and will be mainly 
catholic.
71
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
69 Crawford, “Anti-immigrant Bias of U.S. English Revealed,” 94-96; Southern Poverty Law 
Center, “‘WITAN Memo’ II,” Intelligence Report, no. Summer 2002, no. 106 (1986). 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2002/summer/the-
puppeteer/witan-memo-iii (accessed August 27, 2011). 
 
70 Crawford, Anti-immigrant Bias of U.S. English Revealed,” 94-96; Southern Poverty Law 
Center, “‘WITAN Memo’ II.” 
 
71 Crawford, Anti-immigrant Bias of U.S. English Revealed,” 94-96; Southern Poverty Law 
Center, “‘WITAN Memo’ III.” 
 
113 
 
Politically savvy and sensitive to the black/brown tensions in the United States,  
 
Tanton wondered, “Will Blacks be able to improve (or even maintain) their position in  
 
the face of the Latin onslaught?”
72
 Tanton revealed his racial concerns and recognized  
 
the need for political sensitivity when writing of census demographic questions: 
 
 
Ethnicity is a more acceptable term than race. It should also be noted that 50% of 
all Hispanic surname people on the census forms designate themselves as White. 
So perhaps we should speak of Hispanic Whites and non-Hispanic Whites, to 
further diffuse the issue. Is Anglo a better term than White? LANGUAGE is  
VERY important here.
73
  
 
 
Tanton’s concern with race or ethnicity concerning immigration reveals itself here 
as a form of racial profiling. What about the immigrant with the non-Hispanic surname? 
Or the non-immigrant with the Hispanic surname? Racial and demographic concerns 
were paramount to Tanton and FAIR; economic concerns were completely subjugated to 
those primary issues, as Tanton himself stated, “I don’t think we should dwell too much 
on the economy.” FAIR’s bread and butter was “non-economic issues” of immigration.
74
  
Tanton and FAIR were concerned with the inclusion of illegal immigrants in 
census numbers. FAIR even unsuccessfully filed suit against the Census Bureau alleging 
such inclusion occurred and resulted in unfair and illegitimate congressional 
reapportioning, resulting in “gateway states” such as California, New York, and Illinois 
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receiving undeserved congressional seats.
75
 This issue of congressional reapportioning 
became particularly politically salient in the lead-up to the 1990 census. Politicians from 
states that tended to benefit from the inclusion of illegal aliens, such as Representative 
Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), tended to favor the inclusion of illegal aliens in the Census count. 
Representative Kolbe argued that, “A very clear reading of the Constitution says that we 
shall count all those who are present.” Displaying the importance of regional politics for 
this issue, Representative Thomas Ridge (R-PA) argued that, “You end up diluting the 
vote when you start including illegals.” Pennsylvania stood to lose a seat in the House if 
illegal immigrants were included in the Census. FAIR was present in this debate, 
asserting that, “Illegal aliens are taking representation away from Americans.” The 
Census Bureau pointed to the impracticability of ascertaining immigration status and the 
potential for it to drastically reduce participation. The outcome of this debate was so 
important because, as Representative Ridge noted, “The primary purpose of the census is 
to distribute political power.”
76
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Use of Cold War imperatives and reaction to the Rights Revolution continued to 
influence debate over immigration policy into the 1980s and 1990s. One example of this 
line of thinking came from the John Birch Society. The intricate conspiracy theories of 
the John Birch Society and its founder, Robert Welch, were initially laid out in The Blue 
Book. These theories revolved around an ever-present threat of the destruction of Western 
civilization, most specifically as a result of communism.
77
 This communist threat was 
articulated using the language of civilizations discourses and of Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Darwinism, allowing the Far Right to bind seemingly disparate ideas and goals together 
into an integrated worldview. By the late 1980s, Birchers’ anti-immigration rhetoric 
depicted immigration as an “ongoing invasion” that had been escalating for over a 
decade.
78
  
The Birchers cited IRCA (1986) as contributing to the invasion. The Birchers 
argued that the welfare state in America was what drew immigrants in. Immigration 
policy was very important to the Birchers and they took particular exception to IRCA 
(1986). In fact, William F. Jasper referred to the IRCA (1986) as a “disaster.”
79
 Jasper 
cited the three main parts of the IRCA (1986): amnesty, employer sanctions, and 
enhanced enforcement. First of all, he saw all components as full of fraud. Second, Jasper 
and the Birchers opposed the employer sanctions portion of the IRCA (1986) because 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
77 This communist threat included threat from both “sincere” communism and ambitious 
individuals using this ideology as a means to gain power and wealth. Robert Welch, The Blue Book of the 
John Birch Society (Appleton, WI:American Opinion Books, 1961). 
 
78 The John Birch Society, Out of Control. Part 1 & 2 the Immigration Invasion, (Blemont, MA. : 
General Birch Services Corp., 1988), Visual Material. 
 
79The John Birch Society, Out of Control.  
 
116 
 
they believed that it unfairly placed the blame on businessmen and the burden of proof on 
businesses. Jasper and the Birchers referred to the IRCA (1986) as a “sell-out” to special 
interests and “professional agitators” such as the ACLU, the Communists, and labor 
unions.
80
  
The John Birch Society claimed that any efforts made to provide governmental 
assistance to illegal immigrants or information about how to access such resources was 
evidence that the welfare state was what had truly attracted immigrants to the United 
States. The Birchers, in part, blamed literature such as “El Otro Lado,” a booklet 
published by The Resource Center for Illegal Aliens in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and 
the “Bill of Rights for Undocumented Workers,” for what they saw as the magnet effect 
of the United States’ welfare state, because both booklets attempted to assist illegal 
immigrants in accessing resources and networks available to them.
81
 It is significant that 
the Birchers did not make a real distinction between legal and illegal aliens. Birchers also 
opposed bilingual education because they asserted that the extension of educational 
opportunities to aliens led to school overcrowding and bilingual education hindered 
assimilation efforts. Further, they argued that this “invasion” of aliens caused an increase 
in crime and that within these immigrant populations was a “sizable criminal element.”
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So, with this immigrant “invasion” came subversive political ideas such as communism, 
increased crime, and decreased resources for citizens. Immigration, to the Birchers, 
resulted in a net loss for citizens. To them, the inclusion of illegal aliens in the census 
was an example of this. Bircher support of English-Only initiatives, restrictions on 
immigrant rights, and the portrayal of immigrants as criminal and welfare recipients 
placed it within the mainstream of the 1980s and 1990s nativist backlash. On immigration 
policy, the Birchers were in the mainstream of the restrictionist camp and part of a 
growing trend of blaming the Rights Revolution for perceived problems. 
Competition for economic and governmental resources sometimes pitted minority 
groups against each other. It was with the IRCA (1986) that we started to see division 
between the black and Hispanic caucuses. There was a divide between African 
Americans’ opinions on immigration and that of black congressmen. Most African 
Americans tended to oppose immigration, while black congressmen tended to be 
expansionist. These divisions between the black and Hispanic caucuses and the care with 
which they were dealt underscore the importance of political unity between blacks and 
Hispanics within American society and politics.
83
 What was the reason for this split on 
immigration between the black populace and black congressmen? For the black populace 
it largely had to do with job competition, and for Hispanics it was largely about fear of 
discrimination as a result of employer sanctions.
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Black congressmen tended to be expansionist when it came to immigration for a 
number of reasons. First, the 1965 immigration reforms increased black West Indies 
immigration. The Immigration Act of 1990 increased immigration from Africa. Further, 
black leaders criticized the government’s policy on Haitian immigrants and their refugee 
status as opposed to the generous refugee status generally granted to other non-black 
groups such as Cubans.
85
 This debate between black and Hispanic leaders over the varied 
treatment given to Cuban versus Haitian immigrants is a potent example of race entering 
the immigration debate, through the race of the potential immigrants. 
The NAACP split with Hispanic groups over employer sanctions was largely 
because of job and resource competition and blacks’ fears that immigrants were taking 
their jobs. This spli was a tension filled situation and was reflected in riots in 1980 and 
1989 in Miami and Los Angeles. These riots showed black hostility toward Hispanic 
immigration and immigrants. Further, the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles showed 
African Americans’ violence against Asian immigrants. In general, violence toward 
immigrants increased after 1980.
86
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 There was palpable tension and division within the Mexican immigrant 
community between legal and illegal as well as between United States born and recent 
immigrants. In many ways, these relationships were full of conflict. The conflict was 
largely centered on economic competition and the depressive effect that illegal 
immigration and recent immigrants (to a lesser extent) had on the wages of Mexican 
Americans in general. Consequently, there tended to be ambivalence toward new 
immigration from Mexico even from within the Mexican American community.
87
 This 
division shows that immigration was not a concrete issue, even for those within the 
immigrant community themselves. This split in the Mexican American community 
between newer and older immigrants and citizens and non-citizens was also manifested in 
attitudes toward employer sanctions, which also shifted over time. In the early 1970s, for 
example, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) was in favor of 
employer sanctions because illegal immigrants were in direct competition with Mexican 
Americans for jobs and helped to stagnate or lower wages. Particularly during times of 
high unemployment, employers’ practices of hiring illegal aliens were an easy target, as 
were the illegal aliens themselves. To some, employer sanctions were a part of the same 
fight as the earlier struggle won in 1964 with the termination of the Bracero Program. At 
the same time as they endorsed employer sanctions, LULAC representatives and other 
Mexican American organizations also endorsed amnesty programs for illegal aliens,
 
which underscores the liberal Democratic position of attempting to curb illegal 
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immigration while maintaining their stance on civil rights.
 88
 They wanted to be tough on 
illegal immigration without being tough on illegal immigrants. However, the United 
Farmworkers (UFW) and LULAC, influenced by the rising tide of new Hispanic political 
and civil rights organizations, by 1976 switched their positions on employer sanctions. 
They made this charge largely on the grounds that such sanctions would cause 
discrimination toward Mexican Americans in hiring. Particularly concerned with civil 
rights issues for Hispanics was the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund (MALDEF), which had close ties to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Another 
important player within Hispanic groups with significant policymaking roles and stakes 
was the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), which was a significant lobbying machine 
and also opposed employer sanctions.
89
 These immigrant advocacy groups and their 
efforts to protect immigrant political, civil, and economic rights in the wake of anti-
immigrant legislation and rhetoric will be examined in Chapter Six. 
 After IRCA (1986), immigration increased from 601,708 in 1986 to 1,090,924 in 
1989.
90
 This legislation resulted in an increase in immigration and consequently rhetoric 
expounding an immigration “invasion” and the claim that immigrants were a drain on the 
economy, society, and resources was only exacerbated and heightened. With the 
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Immigration Act of 1990 came increased ceilings on immigration, as well as efforts to 
change the increasingly brown demographic of recent immigrants through employment 
and diversity visas that significantly aided immigration by white Europeans, namely the 
Irish.
91
 Immigration to the United States reached 1,536,483 in 1990, increasing to 
1,827,167 in 1991.
92
 The increased immigration caused by the increase in immigration 
caps in the Immigration Act of 1990 only served to fuel the anti-immigration and anti-
immigrant rhetoric of the 1990s. This rhetoric revolved around the assertion that the 
policies of the 1980s had failed to stop the “out of control” illegal immigration and had 
resulted in increased levels of both legal and illegal immigration and even rewarded 
illegal immigration through amnesty. This frustration was amplified by the recession in 
the early 1990s. In 1990, there was a slight decrease in the number of people responding 
that fewer immigrants should be allowed to enter the United States, but by 1992 and 1993 
the numbers responding that fewer immigrants should be allowed to enter the United 
States had increased to 55 percent and 61percent, respectively.
93
 People felt that they 
were being materially hurt by immigrants. Further, the thin, shaky distinction that had 
existed between legal and illegal immigrants began to show more and more cracks and 
began to crumble, a process that would be helped along by California’s Proposition 187. 
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The process was completed in the 1996 PRWORA with its denial of most governmental 
resources to even legal aliens.
94
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CHAPTER IV 
PROPOSITION 187: ANTI-IMMIGRANT LEGISLATION ON THE STATE LEVEL 
AS A STEPPING STONE TO THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK 
OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996 
 
 
We need leaders who’re willing to tell Washington the truth about illegal 
immigration. The truth is, it’s out of control and it’s harming California. 
Guaranteeing health care, education and welfare for the families of illegal 
immigrants isn’t just wrong, it’s making the problem worse.
1
 
      Governor Pete Wilson (R-CA), 1994 
 
 
 In response to the dominant theme within the political culture of the 1980s and 
early 1990s that immigrants were a drain on society and resources, Proposition 187 (Save 
Our State initiative) emerged in California as a means for native-born Americans to “take 
back” their country from the (illegal) immigrants who they believed were plunging the 
state and nation into economic and social turmoil. Again, restrictionists pointed to the 
changing demographics of the United States as a result of INA 1965 as the cause of this 
“welfare drain” on the United States’ economy. According to labor economists George J. 
Borjas and Stephen J. Trejo, “A single factor, the changing national origins mix of the 
immigrant flow, accounts for much of the increase in welfare participation rates.”
2
 From 
1901-1910, immigrants from Italy, Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire accounted 
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for the majority of immigrants to the United States. Between 1921 and 1930, Mexico, 
Italy, Canada, and Germany accounted for approximately half of all immigrants to the 
United States. Between 1921 and present-day, Mexican immigrants comprised an 
increasing percentage of all immigrants to the United States. At the same time as 
immigration from Mexico increased, immigration from Europe decreased. By 1981, the 
countries sending the largest number of immigrants to the United States did not include a 
single European country. Between 1981 and 1990, the country of origin for most new 
immigrants was (in descending order) Mexico, Philippines, China, Korea, Vietnam, 
Dominican Republic, and India. El Salvador broke into the list of countries sending the 
largest number of immigrants to the United States between 1991 and 2000.
3
 Then, the 
fact that American society had become increasingly less white as a result of immigration 
was the reason for increased welfare participation rates. Such analysis, by prominent 
restrictionist scholars, emboldened anti-immigrant/anti-immigration activists to 
essentially conflate immigrants and non-whites from Third World countries with welfare 
recipients. In the National Review, Borjas essentially laid out this argument, asserting 
that, “It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that the welfare problem in California 
is on the verge of becoming an immigrant problem.”
4
 
 The welfare problem, as it was, had historically been associated with African 
Americans, and more specifically, African American females. Thus, initially in California 
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and then across the nation, the immigration debate became racialized in the immediate 
historical context of the negative stereotyping of African Americans and females as 
welfare recipients such as in Reagan’s “welfare queen” trope. This depiction of welfare 
recipients as being largely comprised of African American females contributed to the 
delegitimizing of welfare. The immigration debate continued this racialization of the 
welfare debate and incorporated these negative “welfare queen” stereotypes into the 
stereotypes of immigrants. Thus, both the immigration and welfare debates in the United 
States became racialized and linked. Of course, the reality was that neither African 
Americans nor immigrants constituted a majority of welfare recipients. The majority of 
welfare recipients were white. In 1993, the GAO estimated that there were approximately 
6 million overall SSI recipients within the United States population who received almost 
$24 billion in benefits. In 1993, there were approximately 14.1 million AFDC recipients 
within the overall United States population who received a total of over $22 billion in 
AFDC payments from both state and federal sources. Approximately 6 percent of all 
immigrants received either SSI or AFDC, yet more than one-half of all immigrants 
receiving AFDC or SSI lived in California in 1993. It is important to remember that these 
statistics include people living in mixed status households (households containing a 
combination of citizens and non-citizens). Further, refugees made up a large number of 
immigrants receiving welfare. In 1993, refugees made up one-third of immigrants 
receiving AFDC. About 683,000 immigrants received SSI benefits in 1993 out of 6 
million overall SSI recipients. Immigrants received about $3.3 billion out of the overall 
$24 billion spent on SSI in 1993. Immigrants received $1.2 billion of the $22 billion 
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spent on AFDC in 1993.
5
 In 1990 approximately two-thirds of welfare recipients in the 
United States were white and only 15.9 percent of welfare recipients in California were 
African American.
6
 This statistical reality did not impede the fact that misrepresentations 
of black majority reliance and/or immigrant (non-white) majority reliance on welfare 
drove both the immigration and welfare debates in the 1990s. This assertion became 
increasingly important in Republican efforts to dismantle welfare and restrict immigrant 
rights, which will be explored later in this chapter.
7
 
Why did immigration become such a hot button issue in California in the early  
 
1990s? What was the constellation of forces that converged to make California the  
 
launching pad for anti-immigrant rhetoric and legislation on a federal level? Theresa A.  
 
Parker, Chief Deputy Director of the Department of Finance and UnderSecretary of the  
 
Health and Welfare Agency for the state of California, listed three reasons for this  
 
occurrence in her testimony on the “Impact of Immigration on Welfare Programs” before  
 
the House: 
 
 
First, immigration has been at historically unprecedented levels of people coming 
into this country. Second, immigrants, both legal and illegal, are locating 
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disproportionately in relatively few states. In fact, about 85 percent of all illegal 
immigrants are in five States. And third, unlike previous waves of immigration, 
the Federal Government now provides for mandates … services be provided to 
immigrants that are eligible for public assistance and service programs that 
heretofore in previous waves of immigration were not required upon States.
8
 
 
 
Parker also cited the impact of IRCA (1986), particularly the amnesty program and the 
high costs of administering resources to those newly legalized residents without the 
federal funds that had been promised to the states but never materialized.
9
 
Proposition 187 began at the grassroots level with the efforts of the California 
Coalition for Immigration Reform (CCIR), which was founded in 1993. Its founding 
members included accountant and anti-immigration activist Ron Prince, Republican 
assemblyman Richard L. Mountjoy, Yorba Linda mayor Barbara Kiley, and civilian 
police employee Barbara Coe, along with former INS officials Harold Ezell and Alan 
Nelson. These members, particularly Nelson and Ezell, drafted the initiative that became 
Proposition 187, dubbed the Save Our State (SOS) campaign.
10
 These initial advocates of 
the SOS campaign fell within a group that Daniel Tichenor refers to as the “Classic 
Exclusionists,” people or groups who are restrictive both toward alien rights and 
immigration. This group includes people such as Patrick Buchanan, Republican 
Congressman Edward Gallegly (who played a prominent role in bringing this fight 
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against immigrants and welfare to the national arena, discussed in Chapter Five of this 
dissertation), Peter Brimelow, John Tanton, Wayne Lutton, FAIR, and SOS. SOS 
envisioned Proposition 187 and its restrictions on illegal immigrants as the first step 
toward restricting both legal and illegal immigrants and immigration. A high-ranking 
SOS official asserted that “it made sense to target the most objectionable recipients first – 
illegals. Then we could put the issue of too much legal immigration on the table.”
11
 
Proposition 187 capitalized on the increasing rhetoric and corresponding perception that 
immigrants were a drain on society, the economy, and resources; that immigrants took 
jobs from native-born Americans, that immigrants stagnated or lowered wages; that they 
introduced a criminal element to American society; and that they were overall a negative 
and dangerous subclass. 
Many in the media accused Proposition 187 proponents of racism. One of the 
most problematic associations for the Proposition 187 proponents was FAIR, and 
particularly FAIR’s association with the eugenicist Pioneer Fund. The Pioneer Fund was 
established in 1937 and its first President was Harry Laughlin, a prominent anti-
immigration lobbyist and author of the Model Eugenical Sterilization Law, which was 
used as a model by thirty states in the United States and by the Nazis in Germany. In 
1936, Laughlin lobbied the American Eugenics Society to make Adolf Hitler an honorary 
member of the society. Laughlin ascribed to the pseudo-scientific belief that minorities 
were racially inferior and was a staunch opponent of integration in the United States, 
fighting against Brown v. Board of Education and calling for the colonization of 
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American blacks in Africa. Following Laughlin’s example, the Pioneer Fund advocated 
and provided funding for eugenics and race-IQ theory research. In addition to funding 
FAIR to the tune of $1.1 million between 1982 and 1992, the Pioneer Fund also granted 
AICF approximately $200,000.
12
 This close association with race-based eugenic theories 
made it very problematic for those Proposition 187 proponents to extricate race from the 
debate.  
Proposition 187 opponents attempted to frame the problems of illegal immigration 
within a law and order, economic, and fairness context, rather than an explicitly racial 
one. Harold Ezell, co-author of Proposition 187 and former INS Commissioner of the 
Western Region asserted that, “The issue of illegal immigration is color-blind; it is not a 
racial but a legal issue. It is an issue with taxpayers, who have seen our tax dollars 
squandered on programs that have nothing to do with America citizens or legal aliens.”
13
 
Ron Prince, a Proposition 187 co-sponsor, asserted that this initiative was not backed by 
racial animus. Instead, Prince argued that Proposition 187 was intended to fix “a present 
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system that adds up to discrimination against United States citizens and legal residents of 
California” by using their tax money to pay for services to illegal aliens.
14
  
The overarching theme behind this rhetoric was that it was (white) taxpaying  
citizens who were being discriminated against and materially harmed, not immigrants (or  
minority groups). In Alien Nation, Peter Brimelow, a respected conservative and an 
English immigrant, attempted to render fellow conservatives and restrictionists 
impervious to charges of racism by arguing that, “The term ‘racist’ is now so debased, I 
usually shrug such smears off by pointing to its new definition: anyone who is winning 
an argument with a liberal.”
15
 Brimelow devoted significant time in Alien Nation to 
refuting what he termed the “double standards” toward different actors within the 
immigration debate, highlighting what conservatives termed “reverse discrimination.” 
The fact that this colorblind rhetoric so charged the Proposition 187 debate helped to 
usher in attacks against affirmative action, as well, in California’s Proposition 209, which 
was on the ballot in 1996. Within conservative logic, these arguments all fit neatly within 
the post-INA 1965, post Voting Rights Act and post-Civil Rights Act world of what they 
believed was a systematic institutionalized pattern of discrimination against whites, and 
even more specifically, against white males. This growing white male resentment of the 
rapidly changing country and fears about their ability to maintain and enhance their 
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positions within it helped to spread what many, including Bill Clinton, referred to as “the 
politics of resentment.”
16
  
The goal of Proposition 187 was to prohibit illegal aliens from receiving any type 
of governmental resources, including both welfare and educational benefits. Effectively, 
this measure aimed to bar illegal aliens from California’s public educational systems, 
receipt of welfare benefits, and non-emergency medical care. One of the most 
controversial components of the measure was that it also made educators, medical 
personnel, and social workers mandatory reporters, requiring them to report people 
suspected to have illegal status to the INS and California’s attorney general.
17
 This 
mandatory reporting requirement was a heavy burden to place on these medical and 
educational providers and caused significant uproar. The California Medical Association 
opposed Proposition 187, as did the American Medical Association, which issued a 
statement saying that Proposition 187 constituted “a breach of physician ethics and 
patient confidentiality.”
18
 Dr. Brian Johnston, secretary of the Los Angeles County 
Medical Association, argued against Proposition 187 on public health grounds, asserting 
that, “If we do not immunize undocumented children, we will increase the incidence of 
measles, whooping cough, mumps, rubella, diphtheria and hepatitis B in all children, not 
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just the undocumented.” David Langness, Vice President of the Hospital Council of 
Southern California, cautioned that passage of Proposition 187 would result in “medical 
apartheid.” Leading medical professionals such as Dr. Johnston pointed to the fiscal 
responsibility of preventative care, “Every dollar spent on prenatal care saves between $3 
and $10 later on in caring for babies who are born with medical problems that could have 
been prevented. Every dollar spent on immunizations saves between $10 and $14 in 
future disease and disability costs.”
19
 The inference here is clear. Proposition 187 was not 
fiscally responsible and would, in effect, actually cost the taxpayers a significant amount 
of money in the long run. That is, unless the illegal aliens did what Governor Wilson 
proposed they would do when such services were no longer available to them: “self-
deport.” Governor Wilson claimed, "If it's clear to you that you cannot be employed, and 
that you and your family are ineligible for services, you will self-deport."
20
 
Labor unions generally opposed Proposition 187, including the California State 
Council of the Service Employees International Union, California Teachers Association, 
California Labor Federation, and the AFL-CIO.
21
 This support of illegal immigrants was 
a progression of the turn-around labor had done in recent years toward illegal immigrants, 
following Cesar Chavez’s lead in viewing illegal immigrants as a part of their 
constituency instead of a group to fight against. Of course, Governor Wilson’s support of 
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Proposition 187 also influenced labor’s stance, as Governor Wilson was largely regarded 
as an anti-union governor.
22
 
After the passage of Proposition 187, schools and social services agencies 
generally adopted a strategy of non-implementation while waiting for the courts to decide 
the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the initiative. School officials in 
particular were concerned that undocumented students or students with undocumented 
family members would stop coming to school. After Proposition 187’s passage, La 
Quinta High School Principal Mitch Thomas tried to calm students’ fears over the school 
PA system, “School has, and will be, a place where you’ll get an education. We are not 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. We are educators. Continue to come to 
school.” The Santa Ana, California, School Board distributed a statement to parents the 
day after the election telling them to, “Keep your children in our schools. This has been 
an emotional, divisive issue that has confused many people. We now need to put those 
feelings aside and keep children in the secure, nurturing environment of our schools.”
23
 
Proposition 187 was a direct challenge to the Supreme Court’s 1982 Plyler v. Doe 
decision, in which a 5-4 majority Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection clause applied to education and that public education could not be denied to 
children who were illegal immigrants.
24
 Plyler v. Doe was based on challenges to a 1975 
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Texas law that said that illegal alien children did not qualify for free public education. 
The case originated when an undocumented third-grader named Laura Alvarez was 
expelled from school as a result of this 1975 Texas law. Civil rights lawyers sued on 
behalf of her and fifteen other children. In the Plyler v. Doe decision, the Supreme Court 
justices asserted that “by denying these children a basic education, we deny them the 
ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic 
possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our 
nation.” The educational portion of Proposition 187 would necessitate a judicial revisiting 
of Plyler v. Doe, and with the increased conservative nature of the court, Proposition 187 
supporters hoped that this review would result in this “bad decision” being overturned.
25
 
According to Ezell, “This bad decision [Plyler v. Doe] allows any 5-year-old, here legally 
or not, to get a free, 12-year education plus college. We can’t afford this. Proposition 187 
would force the Supreme Court to revisit the issue.”
26
 Proposition 187 proponents were 
optimistic about the chances the Supreme Court would overturn Plyler v. Doe for several 
reasons. First, they argued that the number of illegal children present in California was 
much higher than had existed in Texas in the mid-1970s. Further, Proposition 187 
supporters argued that since school officials were made mandated reporters by the 
initiative, which would ideally facilitate the prompt return of illegal children to their 
home country where they would be able to get an education, they were not denying such 
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children the right to an education and thus not countering the Plyler v. Doe decision in 
this regard. Finally, proponents of Proposition 187 were confident they would prevail 
because of the conservative shift the Supreme Court had undergone between the 1982 
Plyler decision and 1994’s Proposition 187. Alan C. Nelson, a co-author of Proposition 
187 and a former INS Commissioner, explained that, “Only one member who voted with 
the majority is still there.” The only remaining active Supreme Court justice from the 
Plyler v. Doe decision who voted with the majority (striking down the Texas law denying 
education to illegal alien children) was John Paul Stevens. There were two remaining 
Supreme Court justices who dissented on the Plyler v. Doe decision, Sandra Day 
O’Connor and William H. Rehnquist. Rehnquist was the chief justice in 1994.
27
 
Discussion over the implications of Proposition 187’s passage was not confined to 
the adults. Prior to the election, students held massive walk-outs and rallies. These were 
substantial student walkouts, with a November 2, 1994, student walk-out numbering 
approximately 10,000 students. “It is not fair to take education away from the kids. We 
could be the future leaders. We could be the ones sitting right where you are someday. 
You’ve got to give everyone a chance.”
28
 One student at Saddleback High School in 
Santa Ana, which is in Orange County, California, asserted that, “The pledge of 
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allegiance ends with the words ‘with liberty and justice for all.’ It doesn’t say ‘with 
liberty and justice for white people.’”
29
  
Civil Rights groups such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC) also participated in demonstrations and rallies in opposition to Proposition 187. 
Joe Hicks, the executive director of SCLC stated, “We’ve got to send a message to the 
rest of the nation that California will not stand on a platform of bigotry, racism and 
scapegoating.” Demonstrations against Proposition 187 drew substantial crowds, up to 
70,000 people. The demographic make-up of the demonstrators reflected the diversity of 
California’s population.
30
 
California school districts were very concerned that if forced to implement the 
educational measures of Proposition 187, then they would lose federal funding, most of 
which went to programs for disadvantaged and at-risk students. Orange County alone 
received $69.4 million in federal funds during the 1993-1994 school year, comprising up 
to 5 percent of some school districts’ total budgets.
31
 The Los Angeles County school 
district received $450.5 million of its $4.2 billion budget from federal funds. All told, 
school districts in the state of California stood to lose up to a combined $2.3 billion if the 
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federal government withheld funds from the state because of Proposition 187.
32
 Anaheim 
City Elementary School District Superintendent Meliton Lopez asserted, “That money is 
what gives us the resources to provide extra help to kids who have some deficiencies in 
learning. I would miss it. It would be a detriment to children.”
33
 Further, the economic 
impact of losing federal funds would invalidate any economic gains made by not 
educating undocumented children. In fact, the school districts in the state of California 
would lose more money from federal funds being withheld than they would save by 
withholding educational benefits from the 300,000-400,000 out of the state’s 5.2 million 
students who were estimated to be undocumented. On top of this component of the fiscal 
argument, the California Department of Education estimated that it would cost the state 
between $78 million and $104 million the first year and $12 to $19 million in subsequent 
years to verify the legal status of students. Bill Rivera, Los Angeles school district 
spokesman said, “We’d lose a hell of a lot of money. We’d lose a lot more revenue than 
we’d save.”
34
  
In addition to actually costing the state money in the long-run, opponents of  
 
Proposition 187 argued that it would result in upticks in crime because children would be  
 
on the streets with nothing to do instead of being in school. Los Angeles County District  
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Attorney Gil Garcetti said that: 
 
 
At a minimum, we will see a substantial increase in crime with those youngsters 
who are not permitted to go to school. The reason we works so hard at getting 
truants into school is we know that if they stay in school they are much, much less 
likely to be involved in crime and the criminal justice system.
35
  
 
 
On election night, Los Angeles Unified School District’s Board of Education announced, 
“We stand firmly with all of our students and their parents in opposition to this disruptive 
and divisive proposal” and continued asserting that they would join in suit against the 
initiative if it passed.
36
 
Proposition 187 did not represent only the fringes of society, despite the fact that  
SOS was founded in the ultra conservative bastion of Orange County, California. In fact,  
The measure echoed many of the findings in the reports of the Commission on 
Immigration Reform (CIR), “U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility.” The CIR 
was commissioned in the Immigration Act of 1990, as a bipartisan commission 
comprised of five Democrats and four Republicans, none of whom were currently serving 
as elected officials. The chair was former Congresswoman Barbara Jordan (D-TX), who 
was appointed by President Clinton. Despite its bipartisan nature, critics argued that it 
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was not open to all ideas. Maria Jimenez of the American Friends Service Committee 
claimed that, “Four of its commissioners are linked directly to anti-immigrant groups.”
37
  
For example, CIR member Harold Ezell was a co-author of Proposition 187. 
The CIR clearly distinguished between legal and illegal immigrants. While the  
CIR advocated strongly against denying means-tested entitlements to legal aliens, Jordan  
and her colleagues took a very strong stand against illegal immigration, vehemently  
arguing for increased use of deportation powers and more effective employer  
sanctions, which brought resounding criticism from immigrant advocacy groups.
 38
  
LULAC general counsel Rick Dovalina asserted that CIR recommendations had “great  
 
potential for providing avenues of discrimination.” Jimenez also claimed that they  
 
displayed a “callousness toward the concerns of the Latino community.”
39
 This CIR  
 
report stated that, “Immigration policy must take into account social concerns,  
 
demographic trends, and the impact of added population on the country’s  
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environment.”
40
 This inclusion of this in the CIR report validated the concerns of groups  
 
such as SOS and FAIR, who were concerned about just such things. CIR  
 
recommendations included: 
 
 
that illegal aliens should not be eligible for any publicly-funded services or 
assistance except those made available on an emergency basis or for similar 
compelling reasons to protect public health and safety … or to conform to 
constitutional requirements … benefits policies should continue to send this 
message: if aliens enter the U.S. unlawfully, they will not receive aid except in 
limited instances. Federal legislation should permit states and localities to limit 
eligibility of illegal aliens on this same basis. Should illegal aliens require other 
forms of assistance, their only recourse should be return to their countries of 
origin.
 41
 
 
 
 Governor Pete Wilson backed Proposition 187 and the Republican Party  
 
eventually backed it as well. Embroiled in a tough, uphill battle for re-election and  
 
ambitious for a national political career, he essentially staked his political career on the  
 
success of Proposition 187, as did the Republican Party in general.
42
 The Republican  
 
Party of California supported Proposition 187, declaring that, “We must stop the  
 
enormous burden illegal immigration puts on California’s economy, schools, and  
hospitals.”
43
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Patrick Buchanan also backed Proposition 187. Buchanan clearly linked anti-
immigration sentiment to race and demographic change in the United States, calling for 
an immigration “time out” and stating that a “non-white majority is envisioned if today’s 
immigration continues.”
44
 Buchanan further mused, “What do we want the America of 
the years 2000, 2020 and 2050 to be like? Do we have the right to shape the character of 
the country our grandchildren will live in? Or is that to be decided by whoever, outside 
America, decides to come here?”
45
 President Clinton opposed Proposition 187 despite the 
fact that he had endorsed the CIR recommendations. Clinton asserted that, “There is 
some racial energy there, some element to it, but I think what is mostly going on here, it’s 
part of the politics of resentment.”
46
 President Clinton pointed to the political use of 
popular white resentment toward change that was increasingly energized by opposition to 
the Rights Revolution and harnessed by Republicans such as Buchanan and, in the case 
of Proposition 187, Wilson.  
Many national organizations and newspapers opposed Proposition 187, including  
 
the California state-level Parent-Teacher Association, Organization of Police and  
 
Sheriffs, School Boards Association, and the State Employees Association. The Mexican  
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American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) opposed Proposition 187 and successfully  
 
sued to stop its enforcement. The League of Women Voters, American Jewish Congress,  
 
Sierra Club, and several major newspapers, including the Wall Street Journal, Los  
 
Angeles Times, and USA Today all opposed Proposition 187.
47
 In the Los Angeles Times  
 
editorial urging voters to vote no on Proposition 187, the Los Angeles Times editorial  
 
writers noted two main flaws with the initiative: that it may, in fact, end up costing rather  
 
than saving the state money and the unsettled questions concerning how citizenship or  
 
legal immigration status would be verified. They concluded “Yes, let’s get control of  
 
U.S. borders, but let’s not lose sight of our principles or abandon all reason. Vote ‘no’ on  
 
Proposition 187.”
48
 The Los Angeles Times editorial writers endorsed  
 
Governor Wilson for re-election despite his all-out support of Proposition 187, which was  
 
the first time they had endorsed a gubernatorial candidate in almost two decades.
49
 This  
 
endorsement prompted the deputy editor of the editorial pages, Frank del Olmo, to  
 
threaten to resign in protest. Instead of resigning, del Olmo published a scathing editorial  
 
about Wilson and his support of Proposition 187, arguing that Wilson and Proposition  
 
187 were inextricably linked. Del Olmo publicly voiced his disagreement with the  
 
Times’ endorsement and couched the fight against Proposition 187 within the larger civil  
 
rights struggle, linking Wilson and Proposition 187 proponents to segregationists. Del  
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Olmo argued that: 
 
 
By aligning himself with the immigration issue in its most nativist form, he 
[Wilson] has given legitimacy to an ugly streak of bigotry in California. And 
Latinos everywhere will never forgive him for that. We can no more forget what 
Wilson has done in the 1994 campaign than African Americans can forget how 
segregationist governors like Arkansas’ Orval Faubus tried to keep black children 
from getting a decent education in public schools…. Wilson’s pro-187 campaign 
will stick in our craws for generations.
50
 
 
 
The flaws the Los Angeles Times editorial writers cited with regards to 
Proposition 187 did not address the fundamental problem of fairness and humanity raised 
by the specter of Proposition 187’s passage, nor did they address the very real business 
practices that drew in illegal immigrants. In accepting the premise of Proposition 187 
proponents that illegal aliens were a financial burden on the state, the Los Angeles Times 
recognized the need for an initiative that addressed the same general directives as 
Proposition 187. The problems that they noted with Proposition 187 were a difference of 
degree, not type.
51
 
Jesse Jackson, a Democrat, also opposed Proposition 187, as did Republicans  
 
William Bennett and Jack Kemp. Bennett and Kemp were the first and most prominent  
 
national Republicans to break ranks over Proposition 187. They were later joined in their  
 
opposition by prominent members of conservative think tanks such as Milton Friedman,  
 
Steve Moore of the CATO Institute, members of the Heritage Foundation, the American  
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Enterprise Institute, and the Christian Coalition.
52
 Bennett and Kemp issued a joint  
 
statement asserting that, “For some, immigrants have become a popular political and  
 
social scapegoat. But concerns about illegal immigration should not give rise to a series  
 
of fundamentally flawed, constitutionally questionable ‘solutions’ which are not  
 
consonant with our history.” Kemp went even further, asserting that, “I am concerned  
 
that, if this passes in California, it will be introduced in other states and people will want  
 
to put it in the 1996 platform. It corrodes the soul of the party.”
53
 Kemp’s fears proved to  
 
be quite prescient. Both Kemp and Bennett noted the potential for a dangerous upsurge in  
 
nativism as a result of such government initiatives. “Once a thing like this gets started,  
 
the kinds of brushes that are going to be used tend to be way too broad. It is wrong in  
 
itself, but it is also going to label all immigrants, it is going to turn into a war of colors, a  
 
war of races. It’s bad stuff. It is poison in a democracy.”
54
 Bennett and Kemp’s main  
 
point of contention with Proposition 187 was not its attempt to deny welfare benefits to  
 
illegal aliens. Instead, the two Republican stalwarts took issue with what they viewed as  
 
its “anti-conservative” attempt to mandate schools and hospitals to report suspected  
 
illegal immigrants. They asserted that: 
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charging teachers and nurses with the duty of reporting people they suspect to be 
illegal immigrants is profoundly anti-conservative; it relies on a highly intrusive 
Big Brother approach. It is also a mandate for ethnic discrimination. Does anyone 
seriously doubt that Latino children named Rodriquez would be more likely to 
‘appear’ to be illegal than Anglo children named, say, Jones?
55
  
 
 
This discrimination was not something that anti-immigrant activists such as Peter  
 
Brimelow saw as a problem, of course. Finally, in an astute bit of political  
 
foreshadowing, Kemp and Bennett also asserted in their statement on Proposition 187  
 
that the Republican Party would face potentially disastrous political consequences if they  
 
continued supporting anti-immigrant measures such as Proposition 187: 
 
 
The Republican Party helped to create a Democratic base in many of America’s 
cities with its hostile stand toward the last generation of immigrants from Italy, 
Ireland and the nations of Central Europe. Can anyone calculate the political cost 
of again turning away immigrants, this time…. Asians, Hispanics and others?
56
 
 
Their solution was enhanced border enforcement, restructuring of the INS, and increased 
efforts to ferret out and punish those found in possession of or manufacturing fraudulent 
immigration documents.
57
 Kemp, Bennett, and other Republican anti-nativists ultimately 
failed to sway the Republican Party away from their increasing gravitation toward 
nativist politics and policies. Many Republicans believed it politically advantageous to 
co-opt this surging popular nativism, but more importantly, this nativism allowed 
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Republicans to achieve something they had been trying to achieve for the better part of 
thirty years, the dismantlement of anti-poverty programs. By scapegoating two 
marginalized and resented groups, immigrants and black women, Republicans were able 
to gain overwhelming support to end entitlements within the United States welfare 
system.
58
 
On a federal level, Proposition 187 also lacked support from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. INS Commissioner Doris Meissner argued that it was work 
opportunity and not welfare benefits that was the magnet drawing in immigrants: “We do 
not believe that the proposition is an effective way of enforcing the law against illegal 
aliens. The incentives for illegal immigration are to work in the United States, not to sign 
up for welfare.”
59
 
 The rhetoric of Proposition 187 proponents has been described by many as mean-
spirited, at best. Bette Hammond, an SOS organizer complained “They come here, they 
have their babies, and after that they become citizens and all those children use those 
social services.” Yorba Linda, California, mayor and Proposition 187 proponent Barbara 
Kiley described the citizen children of illegal aliens as “those little fuckers.”
60
 Richard 
Mountjoy, a Republican state assemblyman from East Los Angeles was also a staunch 
proponent of Proposition 187. Mountjoy even (unsuccessfully) introduced a series of 
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anti-immigrant bills prior to 1994, one of which would disqualify “anchor babies” from 
the birthright citizenship guaranteed to them in the Fourteenth Amendment. This desire to 
reverse the “institutional accident” of the Fourteenth Amendment in which persons born 
in the United States are automatically citizens was echoed by Peter Brimelow and backed 
by Governor Wilson and later the national Republican Party.
61
 In a display of racism and 
race-tainted rhetoric trumping intellectual backing, Mountjoy also lamented illegal 
immigration from Puerto Rico, which is, of course, a United States territory. People born 
in Puerto Rico are “natural born citizens” of the United States. Thus, a Puerto Rican 
cannot, by definition, illegally immigrate to the United States. However, Puerto Ricans 
were viewed as racially Hispanic and therefore a part of the illegal immigrant problem in 
California, which too had been racially coded Hispanic.
62
  
 Proponents of Proposition 187 openly decried the advent of multiculturalism. 
Many supporters categorized immigration as a “conquest” of California by Hispanics. 
Ruth Coffey, leader of Stop Immigration Now, a member organization of Proposition 187 
co-sponsor California Coalition for Immigration Reform, asserted, “I have no intention of 
being the object of ‘conquest,’ peaceful or otherwise, by Latinos, Asians, blacks, Arabs 
or any other group of individuals who have claimed my country.” Another prominent 
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Proposition 187 backer, Glenn Spencer, who ran Voices of Citizens Together, asserted 
that, “Someone is going to be leaving the state. It will either be them or us.”
63
 
 Proposition 187 proponents such as Barbara Coe of the California Commission  
 
for Immigration Reform depicted illegal immigrants as criminals: 
 
 
We are heartbroken when we learn of yet another brutal murder of an innocent 
victim,  many of them children, at the hands of illegal aliens … we are outraged 
by those representatives who allow this activity to … and take little action to 
protect us from the illegal alien perpetrators of violent crime.
64
 
 
 
 Proposition 187 had the effect of emboldening the anti-immigrant activity of its 
proponents. Illegal aliens and those suspected of being illegal aliens were turned away 
from emergency rooms for not having their immigration documents on their person 
available to produce at a moment’s notice, when requested. “A customer at a Santa Paula 
restaurant demanded to see the cook’s green card, declaring that it was every citizen’s 
duty to report illegals.”
65
 
 Restrictionists also advocated for a secure verification system for aliens to 
decrease fraud and to make it easier for governmental agencies to cross-check the person 
requesting assistance or in their custody. FAIR was one such proponent of an electronic 
identification card system for aliens.
66
 They did win this fight and the eventual 
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changeover to an electronic green card system became a contributing factor to the rising 
naturalization and mobilization rates of Hispanics in the mid-1990s.
67
 
 Despite the environmentalist roots of immigration restrictionist groups such as 
FAIR, which supported Proposition 187; mainstream national environmental groups, 
such as the Sierra Club; and local environmental groups, such as the California League of 
Conservation Voters (CLCV), opposed Proposition 187 in an effort to distance 
themselves from the radical anti-immigrant rhetoric of groups with environmentalist ties 
such as FAIR. Displaying their concern with public relations and fear of being tied to 
FAIR, Sam Schucat, the executive director of CLCV asserted that, “We had to…[oppose 
it] just to make sure we were on the right side of history on this one…. Environmentalists 
wanted to show that we are on the side of the people, not just endangered species.”
68
 In 
perhaps the most glaring display of the split within population control and environmental 
groups over immigration and immigrant rights, a split which precipitated Tanton’s 
founding of FAIR, ZPG opposed Proposition 187, calling it “punitive, inhumane, and 
clearly unconstitutional.”
69
 
Opponents of Proposition 187 feared its proponents would engage in intimidation 
at polling sites. This fear was rooted in precedent in Orange County, California, where in 
1988, the Republican Party placed uniformed security guards at polling stations without 
permission from election officials. Republican party officials alleged that they placed the 
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guards at voting precincts in response to rumors that Democrats were planning to bus 
aliens who were ineligible to vote to the voting precincts to vote. The guards allegedly 
held signs in Spanish and English warning that, “Non-citizens can’t vote.”
70
 The 
Republican Party asserted that they removed the guards when election officials warned 
that the guards could infringe on voting rights and intimidate legally registered 
Hispanics.
71
 Displaying the ongoing Hispanic and immigrant mobilization throughout the 
late 1980s and 1990s, Clinton campaign California legal counsel Philip Recht asserted 
that a significant issue with this GOP-driven voter intimidation was that, “Many of the 
new registrants are new citizens and first-time voters, persons who are particularly 
susceptible to intimidation tactics, persons who are not necessarily familiar with the 
voting process.” This incident reveals significant antagonism between the California state 
GOP and Democratic Party structures, with the Democrats accusing the Republicans of 
trying to intimidate newly naturalized and registered voters and the Republicans accusing 
the Democrats of registering illegal aliens to vote.
72
  
These same issues over Proposition 187 plagued the lead-up to the 1994 elections, 
as Proposition 187 proponent Barbara Coe distributed flyers at a meeting of the CCIR 
that read, “Only citizens can vote! Violators will be prosecuted!”
73
 These flyers were to 
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be posted on telephone poles outside of voting precincts. FBI agents questioned Coe three 
days prior to the 1994 election in order to determine if Coe’s plans amounted to violating 
the voting rights of minorities. The FBI and Justice Department determined that Coe was 
not a threat to minorities’ voting rights, none of Coe’s fliers were posted, and the issue 
appeared to have resolved itself. That is, until House Republicans, led by California 
Representative Dana Rohrabacher, held a hearing on what they deemed to be the federal 
government’s unnecessary intrusion into citizens’ private lives through their interrogation 
of Coe. Democrats such as Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank argued that it was 
Republicans’ own actions that caused Coe’s interrogation. Frank was referring here to the 
1988 instance of Republicans stationing armed guards at voting precincts, which resulted 
in the Republican Party being forced into paying out a settlement to the Democratic Party 
and to Hispanic advocacy groups.
74
 
Proposition 187 passed with a 59 percent majority, with 4.8 million people voting  
in favor and approximately 3.3 million voting against it.
75
 The exit polls here are quite  
interesting. A solid majority, 77 percent of Hispanics, and 53 percent of Asian American 
and African American voters all voted no on Proposition 187 while a majority of whites 
(63 percent) voted yes. Proposition 187 passed in fifty of California’s fifty-eight counties.  
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California’s overall population was approximately 57 percent white, 25 percent Hispanic, 
9 percent Asian American and 7 percent African American, yet whites made up 75-80 
percent of voters, while Hispanics made up 8 to 10 percent of the electorate, Asian 
Americans 4-5 percent and African Americans 10 percent meant Whites and African 
Americans voted in disproportionately high numbers when compared to other ethnicities 
represented in the California electorate.
76
 The passage of Proposition 187 prompted 
similar state and federal initiatives across the country in the mid-1990s.
77
 This 
overwhelming vote by Hispanics against Proposition 187 was not a foregone conclusion 
just weeks before the November election, representing the predominance of “walls” 
within the Hispanic immigrant community separating them.
78
 In the end, however, 
Proposition 187 held up mirrors within the Mexican immigrant community in California 
and represented “a coming together of the Hispanic community, a realization that it’s not 
just recent immigrants, but any one of them who might not look or act like a ‘citizen,’” 
asserted Claremont College pollster and political analyst Sherry Babitch Jeffe.
79
 The 
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overwhelming Hispanic opposition to the initiative came when Hispanics began to see 
Proposition 187 within its racialized context. NCLR attorney Victor Marquez argued: 
 
Race relations are an extremely touchy issue in communities of color. With his 
choice of advertising, Wilson has illustrated time and time again how it (Prop. 
187) is targeting the Latino community. He’s not concentrating on Europeans 
coming here to overstay their visa permits.
80
  
 
 
 What exactly were the majority of Californians’ affirming in voting yes on  
 
Proposition 187? Well, according to the ballot listing, “to deny public benefits.” More  
 
explicitly, Californians “found and declared that they had suffered  economic hardship  
 
caused by the presence of illegal aliens in th[e] state” and that they had “suffered  
 
personal injury and damage by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in th[e] state.”
81
 In  
 
voting yes, 59 percent of Californians also: 
 
 
declare[d] their intention to provide for cooperation between their agencies of 
state and local government with the federal government, and to establish a system 
of required notification by and between such agencies to prevent illegal aliens in 
the United States from receiving benefits or public services in the State of 
California.
82
 
 
 
After Proposition 187’s passage, LULAC and other opponents of Proposition 187  
 
such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), immediately filed suits in both state  
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and federal courts to prevent its implementation on the grounds that the measure violated  
 
both the state and United States constitutions.
83
 Proposition 187, like the later Personal  
 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, through its  
 
categorization of deserving and undeserving immigrants, created  “classes and sub- 
 
classes” of immigrants. In the plaintiff’s complaint from one such lawsuit, Gregorio v.  
 
Wilson, the opponents of Proposition 187 argued: 
 
 
The initiative…violates due process by cutting off benefits without a hearing on 
mere ‘suspicion’ by any one of tens of thousands of untrained state employees. It 
denies equal protection of the laws by creating classes and sub-classes of aliens 
without any rational basis, and by encouraging rampant discrimination against 
persons who appear or sound foreign.
84
 
 
 
On December 15, 1994, U.S. District Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer prohibited 
enforcement of the majority of Proposition 187 by issuing a temporary injunction against 
implementation of its health care, social services, and educational provisions. Judge 
Pfaelzer’s injunction joined two earlier orders blocking enforcement of substantial 
portions of Proposition 187 by San Francisco Judge Stuart R. Pollak and Los Angeles 
Judge W. Matthew Byrne.
85
 The temporary injunction against implementation of the 
health care, social services and educational provisions of Proposition 187 became 
permanent in 1997. Judge Pfaelzer cited the Supreme Court’s 1982 Plyler v. Doe decision 
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in her ruling. Pfaelzer and her arguments in 1995 were dismissed by Proposition 187 
proponents who classified her as “an exceedingly liberal judge.”
86
 The legal wrangling 
over Proposition 187 conclusively ended in 1999, after Democratic California Governor 
Gray Davis withdrew the state’s Supreme Court appeal and Judge Pfaelzer finalized the 
dismantling of Proposition 187. This ruling was, according to Mark Rosenbaum, the legal 
director of the Southern California chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), “the final shovel of dirt on the grave of Proposition 187.”
87
 However, 
Proposition 187’s death in the state of California only signaled the rise of similar efforts 
on a national level. 
 The intended goals of Proposition 187 were to save the state money by denying 
services to illegal aliens, to stop the flow of illegal immigrants into California, and to 
encourage those already present to “self-deport.”
88
 Self-deportation would prove to be 
impracticable, as evidenced by the prevalence of multi-status families and the 
dependence of California’s economy on low-wage immigrant workers, a dependence so 
prevalent that even Governor Wilson hired an illegal immigrant to work for him.
89
 For 
better or worse, immigrants (both legal and illegal) were a part of the fabric of 
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California’s society and economy, and they attempted to prove this through political 
mobilization throughout the mid-1990s. 
 In 1998, 9 percent of families in the United States with children were multi-status 
families, meaning they were comprised of a mix of citizens and non-citizens. In 
California, 27 percent of all families with children were multi-status families. Ten percent 
of all United States children, 30 percent of all California children and 47 percent of all 
children in Los Angeles resided in multi-status families in the mid-to-late 1990s.
90
 The 
citizenship makeup of families was a complicated and fluid mixture, as multi-status 
families can include citizens, legal aliens, and illegal aliens. According to Santa Ana 
immigration consultant Michele Garcia-Jurado, multi-status families were “a very, very 
common problem.”
91
 The pervasiveness of these complex, multi-status families in 
California meant that Proposition 187 would not have just affected illegal aliens. It would 
have cast a wide net with profound implications for many United States citizens residing 
in California, most specifically for citizen children with undocumented parents. For 
example, Dora Figueroa was an undocumented resident of California, married to a legal 
permanent resident. The Figueroas were the parents of a two year-old son, a natural born 
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citizen, and the mother was pregnant with their second child. Enforcement of Proposition 
187 would have uprooted the lives of many families like the Figueroas.
92
 
 In addition to flatly denying governmental benefits and services to illegal aliens, 
states tried to recoup the costs of providing such services by suing the government. Such 
advocates framed this debate as one in which states were forced to shoulder what they 
argued were the high fiscal costs of providing services to illegal aliens because of the 
federal government’s inability to do its job protecting and securing the national borders. 
Ann Morse, program manager of the immigration policy project at the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, argued that, “The federal government has control over 
the admission of immigrants, but has devolved much of the responsibility for serving 
them on state and local governments.”
93
 “Gateway” states such as California, Texas, and 
Florida drove these lawsuits, which were eventually thrown out by federal judges.
94
 
Governor Wilson filed several lawsuits against the federal government in 1994 on behalf 
of the state of California, in an attempt to recoup costs incurred by the state providing 
benefits and services to illegal aliens. Defending his fourth such filing of the year, in 
September 1994, Governor Wilson argued that, “California simply can’t wait any longer. 
Our borders are a sieve that makes a mockery of our laws and cripples our ability to 
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shape our own destiny.” This fourth lawsuit consolidated the three earlier suits into one 
lawsuit against the federal government. This lawsuit essentially argued, “That the 
presence of so many illegal immigrants here amounts to a foreign invasion of California.” 
The lawsuit stated that, “The massive and unlawful migration of foreign 
nationals…constitutes an invasion of the state of California against which the United 
States is obligated to protect California.”
95
 Governor Wilson’s lawsuit cited Article IV, 
Section 4, of the Constitution, which states that, “The United States shall guarantee to 
every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them 
against invasion.”
96
 Here, Governor Wilson not only co-opted but intensified the invasion 
rhetoric of the 1980s. 
New York Governor Mario Cuomo initially declined to add New York to those  
 
suing the federal government, instead negotiating with the federal government  
 
for better reimbursement terms for services paid for by the state for illegal immigrants.  
 
Governor Cuomo defended his decision against filing suit, explaining, “When you bring a  
 
lawsuit on this issue, it sends out the wrong message. I love immigrants. Legal, illegal –  
 
they’re not to be despised.”
97
 Of course, as many groups such as the ACLU were quick  
 
to point out, Governor Cuomo had considered filing suit, both alone and jointly with the  
 
other “gateway” states. He instead decided to negotiate for state compensation, a wise  
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political move given the immigrant influence in New York state. New York Mayor  
 
Rudolph Giuiliani went even further in his defense of immigrants, both legal and illegal,  
 
asserting: 
 
 
some of the hardest-working and most productive people in this city are 
undocumented aliens. If you come here and you work hard and you happen to be 
in an undocumented status, you’re one of the people who we want in this city. 
You’re somebody that we want to protect, and we want you to get out from under 
what is often a life of being like a fugitive, which is really unfair.
98
 
 
 
At least in small measure, the states’ concerns were appreciated by the federal 
government. In the fall of 1994, the Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR) Report 
called for “a short-term authorization of impact aid to offset at least a portion of the fiscal 
burdens of unlawful immigration until such a time as better enforcement measures are in 
place.”
99
 
 In stark contrast to the furor over immigrants in California, the Texas political and 
business establishment expressed clear disapproval of Proposition 187 and emphasized 
the strong business and personal ties between Texas and Mexico. The strongly anti-
welfare Texas Republican Governor George W. Bush was in favor of tighter enforcement 
at the border but opposed denying governmental services to illegal immigrants already 
residing in the country. The difference between California and Texas’ stances regarding 
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illegal immigrants was significantly influenced by the different business relationships 
with Mexico that California and Texas enjoyed. Texas exported about $19 billion dollars 
of goods per year to Mexico, compared to the $6 billion exported by California. More so 
than California, Texas’ economic well being required a cordial, if not friendly, 
relationship with Mexico. Texas businessmen and politicians saw California’s dalliances 
with nativism as an opening to further expand their exports to Mexico.
100
 
Proposition 187 and the court battles surrounding it gained significant coverage in  
 
the national media and popular support for it soared.
101
  Race and economics-inflected  
 
opposition to welfare coincided with anti-immigrant animus, creating tempting themes  
 
for right-wing mobilization, which also laid the basis for massive counter mobilization.  
 
Proponents of Proposition 187 began to realize that the most effective way to meet their  
 
goals of restricting immigration and immigrant rights was to do so through the federal,  
 
rather than state, government. Further, the same anti-immigrant frenzy that had brought  
 
about the passage of Proposition 187 in California also helped to usher in a Republican  
 
takeover of Congress. This Republican congressional takeover made restrictionists 
wanting to restrict both immigration and immigrant rights optimistic about their chances 
of passing Proposition 187-like legislation on the federal level. This California initiative 
set the stage on a national level for the efforts to restrict even legal aliens’ access to 
governmental resources in the mid-1990s. In a 1994 national poll, respondents were 
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asked what issues were most important to them in the 1994 election. 33 percent answered 
crime, 28 percent said welfare reform and 20 percent responded illegal immigration was 
the most important election issue to them.
102
 An October 1994 Gallup poll displayed that 
72 percent of respondents viewed expansive immigration as threatening to the “vital 
interests of the United States.”
103
 Reflective of this concern with immigration, Wayne 
Lutton and John Tanton, immigration and immigrant rights restrictionists, argued: 
 
Mass migration is no longer a solution to human problems. People will now have 
to stay in the land of their birth, and work to change the conditions they do not 
like. This is the effort that should be occupying our attention and our efforts, not 
shuffling the deck chairs on our global Titanic.
104
 
 
 
There were a number of attempts on both national and local levels in the early  
 
1990s to restrict immigrant rights. As a result of the early 1990s recession, people were  
 
increasingly concerned with the economy and use of welfare. Welfare rolls began to  
 
increase nationally and place increasing pressure and strain on state budgets. The reasons  
 
popularly cited for the surge in welfare cases in the early 1990s included “the amnesty  
 
program for illegal immigrants, which has made some of them eligible to receive  
 
welfare.”
105
 As a result of this perception that immigrants were fueling these rising  
 
welfare costs, draining state and federal coffers, in October 1993, the House passed a bill  
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extending emergency unemployment benefits for workers who had been unemployed for  
 
more than six months. This vote was a contentious one, with the rancor surrounding a  
 
provision of the extension bill that would increase the residency period required for  
 
immigrants to be eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) from three to five  
 
years. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus fought to retain the three year residency  
 
requirement for immigrant SSI eligibility, but were forced to retreat in the face of  
 
political wrangling and pressure. “The caucus fought hard on this bill and will continue to  
 
battle against those who would make impoverished legal immigrants scapegoats for our  
 
problems,” asserted Representative José Serrano (D. – NY).
106
 The move to  
 
restrict the rights of illegal aliens had now crossed into an effort to restrict the rights of  
 
legal aliens. Restrictionists such as Peter Brimelow were impervious to such arguments  
 
as Representative Serrano’s calls for fairness, against racial profiling, and for protection  
 
for Hispanics’ equal protection and civil rights. Brimelow argued: 
 
 
A common argument will be that employed in mid-1993 by Representative José 
Serrano (D. – New York), the Puerto Rican-born chairman of the Congressional 
Hispanic Caucus, while denouncing an anti-illegal immigrant amendment … “I 
resent having to prove I’m a citizen.” To this, the American answer must be: 
tough. Life is unfair ... I will be happy to do the same … when there are 2 to 3 
million illegal Englishmen crossing the border every year. Could any American 
politician be so callous? Well, do they want to keep their country?
107
 
 
 
It was quite telling that Brimelow, an immigrant from England, was so anti-
immigrant and rail against the danger of assimilating immigrants into American society. 
                                                             
106 Clifford Krauss, “After Wrangling, House Supports Extending Extra Jobless Benefits,” The 
New York Times, October 16, 1993, 1:10. 
 
107 Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense about America’s Immigration Disaster (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1995), 261. 
163 
 
This type of rhetoric was one “tell” displaying what Brimelow himself clearly stated, that 
America should be an Anglo-Saxon and emphatically not a multicultural nation. 
Brimelow claimed, “It is common sense that Americans have a legitimate interest in their 
country’s racial balance. It is common sense that they have a right to insist that their 
government stop shifting it. Indeed, it seems to me that they have a right to insist that it 
be shifted back.”
108
 Brimelow pointed out Representative Serrano’s Puerto Rican 
ancestry in an attempt to paint Hispanics in general as part of the illegal immigration 
problem. Brimelow’s invocation of Representative Serrano’s Puerto Rican ethnicity was 
intellectually misleading, however, as Puerto Ricans are considered to be natural born 
citizens of the United States. By definition, Puerto Rican citizens cannot illegally 
immigrate to the United States; they are, in fact, legal American citizens. Following 
Brimelow’s line of reasoning then, there was no more reason for Representative Serrano, 
a Puerto Rican, to prove his citizenship than there was for Brimelow, an Englishman, to 
prove his citizenship. Unless, of course, Brimelow’s argument was really about race and 
the profiling of Hispanics as illegal immigrants with the undue burden of proving their 
citizenship because of their ethnicity. 
There were real and tangible issues and concerns other than race and  
 
demographics behind Californians’ concerns about immigration. Criminal gangs were a  
 
growing issue in California, including Latino gangs. Take, Dana Point, for example.  
 
Dana Point was an affluent Orange County community. Development in affluent areas  
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brought many low-wage jobs in the construction and service industries. In California, this  
 
type of low-wage labor was traditionally reserved for Hispanics and this was the case in  
 
Dana Point. The housing affordable and available to these new low-wage workers in  
 
Dana Point was in one section of town called Lantern Village, where 2,252 Hispanics  
 
lived and where 30-40 percent of major crime in Dana Point occurred.
109
 Displaying both  
 
sides of the difficult situation one Dana Point resident wondered: 
 
 
What do you do if you’ve worked all your life to buy a dream home, and suddenly 
the neighborhood becomes more dangerous? Even ardent liberals react when 
people get killed on the street. And what do you do if you’re a hardworking, law-
abiding immigrant who just wants to make a buck and better your life, but other 
people want you to get the hell out?
110
 
 
 
 Despite these very real fears by the affluent white residents of Dana Point, they  
 
were not without the taint of racial stereotypes and an “us” versus “them”  
 
mentality. Dana Point resident Bill Shepherd categorized the problems as this: 
 
 
We have a clash of cultures. The conflict here? The whites are being taken over 
by a culture that is not assimilating. The dominant culture does not want graffiti 
everywhere. It does not want large groups of guys congregating outside drinking 
beer. It does not want vendors going door-to-door. It does not want laundry 
hanging out window. These were not part of the community five years ago.
111
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Not all Proposition 187 supporters blamed illegal aliens for California’s gang and  
 
crime problems. Proposition 187 supporter and Los Angeles resident Celeste Greig  
 
explained the reasons for her support of Proposition 187, despite her sympathies with  
 
immigrants and recognition that they came to the United States “to seek a better life,”  
 
asserting that: 
 
 
I think that this is not a perfect initiative, but it’s a step in the right direction…. I 
don’t think that the illegal aliens are to blame for crime. However, I do feel very 
strongly that they contribute to the decay of the economy…. Most of these people 
do not pay their share of taxes…. Our children are not getting enough education – 
the classrooms are crowded…. We have to take care of our people first.
112
 
 
 
Despite her support of the initiative, Greig asserted that, “If I came across 
 
somebody who I knew was an illegal alien I could not report them. I know it is hard to  
 
comprehend … but I just couldn’t do it.”
113
 Greig was not alone in supporting  
 
Proposition 187 but being unwilling to personally turn in suspected illegal aliens. An  
 
October 1994 Times Orange County poll found that 62 percent of those favoring  
 
Proposition 187 stated that they would not report on a student who was in the country  
 
illegally.
114
  
 
Proposition 187 had consequences for more than just white citizens of California.  
 
Immigrants (both legal and illegal) feared the consequences of Proposition 187 if it was  
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implemented. Sometimes lost in the political debate, there were real human beings who 
would be profoundly affected by this initiative’s implementation and most did not fit the 
stereotype of the illegal immigrant popularized by the SOS campaign and other anti-
immigrant groups. Take, for example, Xiomara T., an illegal immigrant who came to the 
United States to escape the violent conflict in Nicaragua that had taken several of her 
relatives. Xiomara was four-and-a-half months pregnant, lived with her boyfriend, and 
was gathering documents for an asylum claim to legalize her immigration status as a 
refugee. Because of Proposition 187, if she sought prenatal care then she would be 
subject to deportation. Xiomara explained, “I have lived in fear of going back to 
Nicaragua ever since leaving that country. So if Proposition 187 is the law, my only 
choice will be to stay away from the doctor until … I go into labor.” There was also 
anecdotal evidence that Proposition 187 was emboldening ordinary citizens into 
becoming immigration vigilantes of a kind, where private businesses including 
restaurants and grocery stores demanded immigration documentation from customers. 
MALDEF’s Saenz claimed, “We’re talking about people in the Latino and Asian 
communities being required to produce immigration papers to buy milk at the grocery 
stores or prescription drugs. These are things that people would not have thought about 
doing prior to 187.”
115
 Los Angeles native Pete Navarro called Proposition 187, “the 
most racist initiative ever” and “targets the most vulnerable segments of our population: 
children and the sick.” He argued that that Proposition 187 “doesn’t make practical 
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sense” and is a “global problem” that is “larger than what this initiative or any local 
initiative can handle.”
 116
  
Immigrant advocacy groups questioned the entire premise of Proposition 187, that 
illegal immigrants were a drain on the economy and used a disproportionate share of 
government benefits and services. Cecilia Munoz, senior immigration policy specialist 
for the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) asserted that, “This population is not here to 
get benefits – they’re here to work. And they’re in hiding from the federal government, 
which means they’re the last people to apply for welfare.”
117
 Regarding legal immigrants’ 
use of welfare benefits, Munoz pointed to the requirement that immigrants’ prove that 
they will not become “public charges” within five years of their entry. She added, “But 
they are not immune from falling on hard times. So there is some benefit use. But it is not 
chronic, and it is less than native-born Americans.”
118
 
The success of Proposition 187 within the California electorate pushed other 
states to begin similar initiatives. In Colorado, Tom Tancredo, president of Colorado-
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based conservative think tank the Independence Institute backed the ideas behind 
Proposition 187 as well as those behind the push against multiculturalism and bilingual 
education. Tancredo framed this debate as one of the failure of the federal government to 
control its borders, resulting in a need for the states to step in. Tancredo argued: “What 
we see in this proposition passing in California is part of a bigger phenomenon. There’s a 
strong anti-federal government feeling. The government has been unable to control the 
border in California. The people voted to take care of the problem.”
119
 The Independence 
Institute published a study in 1994 that continued to frame this debate over illegal 
immigrants within an economic and social context, arguing that there were high costs 
associated with providing health care, education, welfare, and incarceration for illegal 
immigrants. “Immigration and the multiculturalism it feeds are threatening to dissolve the 
bonds of common nationhood and the underlying sense of a common national destiny, 
bringing forward the danger of a Balkanized America.”
120
 
In the early to mid-1990s, California was not the only state in the United States 
that was grappling with the conflation of immigrants and welfare recipients. This 
heightened anti-immigrant sentiment and association of immigrants with welfare 
recipients was, in part, a consequence of the recession. A New York Times report from 
February 1992, noted the “growing hostility toward foreigners, even from social workers, 
whose caseloads have increased sharply as a result of the recession.” In fact, Suffolk 
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County, NY debated repealing a law promising non-reporting to the INS of 
undocumented aliens who applied for government assistance.
121
 Yet, it was the success 
and national exposure of the anti-immigrant cause carried forth by California’s 
Proposition 187 that helped to energize the nation and frame the national discussion over 
immigration and welfare in the mid-1990s. As a result of Proposition 187, the conflation 
of immigrants with welfare recipients and of the welfare state as a magnet drawing in 
aliens saturated the nation and the political culture. In the midst of the legal challenges to 
Proposition 187, the national Republicans and conservative publications such as the 
National Review launched a campaign to show that California voters had overwhelmingly 
supported the measure and to bring these reforms to the national arena.
122
  
“Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, the 
wretched refuse of your teeming shore, send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me: I 
lift my lamp beside the golden door.”
123
 It seemed that Emma Lazarus’ poem inscribed 
on the Statute of Liberty no longer applied, at least to non-white immigrants. Republican 
Representative from Florida, Clay Shaw, said as much in 1994 when he asserted that, 
“The inscription at the base of the Statue of Liberty was written before welfare…. People 
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[back then] came to this country to work.”
124
 Immigrants, then, were synonymous with 
welfare recipients. 
Also in the mid-1990s concerns about welfare fraud increased. Much of this 
perceived welfare fraud was believed to be perpetrated by illegal aliens. In 1992, Los 
Angeles County became the first in the nation to begin using a fingerprint identification 
system for those requesting welfare benefits. Many feared that this system would frighten 
illegal immigrants who could fear the involvement of INS.
125
 This action perpetuated a 
system of criminalizing welfare recipients and casting them as the “other.” 
Proposition 187 and its success at the ballot box in California helped to propel  
 
anti-immigrant legislation into the national political arena. Governor Wilson’s  
 
wholehearted embrace of Proposition 187 was seen as the most significant factor in his  
 
resounding defeat of Democratic challenger Kathleen Brown. Several weeks after the  
 
1994 elections, the National Review published a poem about the California elections,  
 
arguing that immigration and welfare reform were winning issues for the Republicans  
 
despite some national Republicans’ defections: 
 
 
With Kemp and Bennett screaming / Like Fay Wray in the ape’s /  adoring digits, 
Wilson / Cut all Kathleen’s escapes /  By calling California / An immigration 
dump, / Which set the lady up for / A stomach-churning slump.
126
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That Proposition 187 energized Republican support was evidenced by their 1994 
 
takeover of Congress and their inclusion of an anti-immigrant plank in their “Contract  
 
with America.” Republicans believed that their hard-line anti-immigration stances were  
 
energizing their base and bringing Republican voters to the polls. Within this plan,  
 
Republicans wanted to remove legal immigrants from eligibility for sixty federal  
 
programs, including health care, free and reduced school lunch programs, AFDC, SSI,  
 
job training benefits, and college loans.
127
 The anti-welfare plank of the “Contract with  
 
America” was tied to the anti-immigrant plank. In fact, it was through the removal of  
 
immigrants from eligibility for welfare that most of the savings from this plan was to  
 
originate.
128
 The Republican proposed “Personal Responsibility Act of 1995” contained  
 
within the “Contract with America” had as its first goal the reduction of illegitimate  
 
births. This goal called for the “reduction or denial of AFDC for certain children whose  
 
paternity is not established,” required “teens receiving AFDC to live at home,” “denial of  
 
AFDC for certain children born out-of-wedlock” (children born to mothers already  
 
receiving assistance), and gave the states the option “to deny AFDC benefits to children  
 
born out-of-wedlock to individuals aged 18, 19, or 20, and to deny such benefits and  
 
housing benefits to such individuals.” It also linked the receipt of benefits to work at least  
 
35 hours per week or participation in state sponsored work programs. It allowed states to  
 
“drop families from receiving AFDC benefits after they have received benefits for two  
 
years if at least one year has been spent in a work program.” It also required states to  
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render families ineligible for benefits after they had reached a five year total lifetime  
 
benefit limit.  In their descriptions of the “Personal Responsibility Act of 1995,”  
 
Republicans explicitly categorized this policy as an effort to dismantle New Deal and  
 
“Great Society” reforms and tradition of entitlements.
129
 By scapegoating these two  
 
undesirable groups, immigrants and black females, and linking their fates in this policy  
 
proposal, Republicans hoped to capitalize on the conjuncture of anti-immigrant and anti- 
 
welfare rhetoric in political culture in order to finally reverse liberalism’s few twentieth  
 
century anti-poverty victories.  
 
This conflation of immigrants and welfare recipients helped to set the stage for 
the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which 
nationalized this fight over immigrant rights and helped to create immigrant counter-
mobilization. In their “Contract with America” and welfare and immigration proposals, 
the national Republican Party borrowed much of Proposition 187, including the 
components denying public education to undocumented children, which had been 
consistently thrown out by the courts since 1982’s Plyler v. Doe. The national  
Republicans’ proposals for immigration and welfare reform went even further than  
Proposition 187 in that they denied most benefits even to legal aliens. Republicans 
nationwide were riding the wave of anti-immigrant sentiment that had swept Governor 
Wilson into re-election in California. This embracing of anti-immigrant and anti-welfare 
legislation by the national Republican party was encouraged vehemently by conservative 
                                                             
129 United States House of Representatives, “The Personal Responsibility Act (Welfare Reform),” 
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publications such as the National Review, which stated in an editorial several weeks after 
the 1994 elections: 
 
There could be no clearer indication of a national death wish than to combine 
accepting the loss of control over our borders with an unwillingness to stop 
subsidizing those who come over here illegally. That this situation should ever 
have developed is a disgrace to the entire U.S. political establishment … 
California’s Proposition 187 is the two-by four needed to get the political 
establishment’s attention.
130
 
 
 
Proposition 187 certainly got the attention of national Republicans. By staking 
their political fortunes with initiatives that were both restrictive toward immigration and 
toward immigrant rights, the Republicans won a resounding victory and swept into 
Congressional majorities in Washington, D.C. Proposition 187 and its success with the 
California electorate (though not in the courts) directly influenced the Republican 
majority and Speaker Newt Gingrich to use this anti-immigrant sentiment as a means to 
attack what they deemed to be the broken immigration and welfare systems in the United 
States. They did so, in 1996, with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act. In making the restriction of alien and welfare rights a 
priority, the national Republican leadership risked creating the immigrant voting bloc that 
Republican politicians had feared since the nineteenth century.
                                                             
130 “Tough Proposition,” National Review, November 21, 1994, 20. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CONJUNCTURE OF NATIONAL ANTI-IMMIGRANT AND ANTI-WELFARE 
LEGISLATION IN THE MID-1990s: THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996 
 
 
It seems to me they are just making other people upset. They are exporting hatred, 
and making Anglos think, “Yeah, those Mexicans. They’re just coming here to 
have babies and get on welfare.” Most people don’t differentiate between 
someone like me, whose grandmother was born in this country, and the guy who 
jumps the fence.
1
 
 Luis Natividad, chairman of the Latino Unity Coalition of San Diego, 1996. 
 
 
In the 1994 elections, Republicans swept into majorities in the House and Senate. 
Georgia Congressman Newt Gingrich was elected Republican Speaker of the House in 
1995. Like Governor Wilson in California, national Republicans largely rode the popular 
national wave of anti-welfare and anti-immigrant sentiment that helped to decisively pass 
Proposition 187. They believed that they had found a winning political formula in this 
combination of anti-welfare and anti-immigration rhetoric. And, they did not need to 
worry about alienating voters because they believed that “immigrants don’t vote.”
2
 
Immigration and welfare reform restrictionists in the 1990s succeeded in putting 
forth a remarkable number of policy proposals aimed at dismantling the letter and spirit 
of the Rights Revolution. These policies targeted legal immigrants, scapegoating them for 
societal problems earlier blamed on illegal immigrants. The other group most 
                                                             
1 Statement by Luis Natividad, chairman of the Latino Unity Coalition of San Diego in William 
Claiborne, “GOP Immigration Policies Concern Hispanics,” The Washington Post, August 12, 1996. 
 
2 Dan Carney, "Immigrant Vote Swings Democratic as Issues Move Front and Center," CQ 
Weekly, May 17, 1997, 1132. 
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significantly targeted by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) was single mothers. Like many immigrants, 
single mothers were largely blamed as unfairly using taxpayer money and contributing to 
the corruption of society through the breakdown of the traditional family structure. 
The most significant of these policy attacks on welfare recipients and immigrants 
was the PRWORA. The PRWORA was largely a bipartisan dismantling of the safety net 
for citizens and non-citizens alike, with Democratic efforts less punitive toward legal 
immigrants than Republican ones. In his push for welfare reform and the eventual signing 
of what he admitted was a problematic law, President Clinton made clear that he was 
determined to make good on a 1992 campaign pledge to “end welfare as we know it.”
3
 
This linkage of welfare and immigration was evident in Republican policy  
 
proposals and their 1994 “Contract with America” as well as in the rhetoric of  
 
Republican politicians and activists. Section 401 of Title IV of the “Personal  
 
Responsibility Act” in the Republican “Contract with America” called for making aliens  
 
ineligible for public welfare assistance. Section 402 of Title IV of the Republican  
 
“Personal Responsibility Act” required that state AFDC agencies report information on  
 
illegal aliens directly to INS.
4
 According to the Republican “Contract With America”: 
 
 
To further reduce welfare spending, welfare assistance (AFDC, SSI, food stamps, 
housing and host of other public assistance) is denied to non-citizens, except 
refugees over 75 years of age, those lawfully admitted to the U.S., or those who 
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4 United States Congress, “The Personal Responsibility Act “Welfare Reform,” Title IV of 
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have resided in the U.S. for at least five years.  Emergency medical assistance will 
continue to be provided to non-citizens.
5
 
 
 
During the same election cycle as Proposition 187 in California, this was what the  
 
national Republicans campaigned and won overwhelming victories on. Conservatives  
 
blamed the “massively anti-187 media” and the alleged “liberal media bias” in general  
 
for “high-minded lectures on the dangers of ‘nativism.’”
6
 Florida Republican  
 
Representative Clay Shaw Jr. argued that the “Personal Responsibility Act”: 
 
 
is not a departure from traditional immigration policy because we have always 
required that people come here because they can get ahead through hard work, not 
because they can get on welfare….these people just happened to be here when 
they developed certain needs, and our thought is that the taxpayers do not have a 
responsibility towards them if they are noncitizens.
7
  
 
 
In denying government services, including welfare benefits, to legal aliens the 
Republicans went further than even many restrictionists were willing to go. In fact, as 
would become evident in the massive immigrant counter-mobilization in the mid-1990s, 
the Republicans eventually overplayed their hand by demanding legal immigrants be 
denied most governmental benefits.  
The bipartisan Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR) was authorized by the 
Immigration Act of 1990 to “assess U.S. immigration policy and make recommendations 
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7 Robert Suro, “GOP Would Deny Legal Immigrants Many U.S. Benefits,” The Washington Post, 
December 24, 1994. 
 
177 
 
regarding its implementation and effects.” The CIR recognized that the political culture 
of the 1990s was laden with anti-immigrant rhetoric. “Distinguishing fact from fiction 
has been difficult, in some cases because of what has become a highly emotional debate 
on immigration.”
8
 The CIR issued a September 1994 statement recording their 
disagreement with the “Personal Responsibility Act” that said, “The commission 
recommends against any broad categorical denial of public benefits to legal immigrants.” 
The Chair of CIR, former Texas Democratic Representative Barbara Jordan asserted that 
“the commission is not prepared to lift the safety net out from under individuals who, we 
hope, will become integral parts of our social community.”
9
 
 In 1995, Republican Presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan promoted the idea 
of federal legislation using Proposition 187 as a model, arguing, “It’s outrageous that 
American taxpayers, as hard-pressed as they are…have to provide social welfare benefits 
for those whose accomplishments are to break the laws to get into the United States and 
to get on welfare.”
10
 Oklahoma conservative Democratic Representative Dave 
McCurdy’s 1994 campaign slogan was, “No check if you’re not a U.S. citizen,” and as he 
was elected, his message seems to have resonated with his constituency.
11
 California 
Democratic Representative Robert Matsui opposed much of the proposed welfare reforms 
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on the grounds that they scapegoated those least able to defend themselves: “Welfare 
recipients, along with criminals, will be seen as the reason our society is falling apart. All 
the polls show that people are fed up with criminals, immigrants and welfare recipients, 
people who can’t vote or are unwilling to vote. It’s really shameful.”
12
 These efforts by 
politicians and the desire by the electorate to cut benefits of welfare recipients was a 
bipartisan phenomenon. 
The anti-welfare and anti-immigrant animus had become inextricably intertwined 
and completely saturated the national political culture of the 1990s. This surge in anti-
welfare and anti-immigrant political rhetoric did not mean, however, that there was 
political consensus about how exactly and to what extent this anti-immigrant and anti-
welfare sentiment should be expressed in legislation. Though President Clinton signed it, 
with reservations, House Democrats split on the PRWORA 98-98 while only two House 
Republicans (Hispanics from Florida), Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart and 
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, voted against it. The House Minority Leader, 
Richard Gephardt, and the Senate Minority Leader, Thomas Daschle, voted against it as 
well. There were mixed reviews for the bill from within the Washington, D.C. beltway. 
Republican Senator and presidential candidate Bob Dole claimed it as a victory for 
himself and Republicans claiming that, “The first 100 days of the Dole administration 
have begun 97 days before the election.”
13
 Liberal Democrats such as New York 
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Representative Charles Rangel ascribed cynical politics to the passage of the bill, 
claiming, “My president – he’s a winner…and the kids are losers.”
14
 Democratic Senator 
from New York, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, no stranger to controversy over welfare 
reform, asserted that: 
 
In our haste to enact this bill –any bill! – before the November elections, we have 
chosen to ignore what little we do know about the subject of poverty. The [bill] 
before us is not “welfare reform,” it is “welfare repeal.” It is the first step in 
dismantling the social contract that has been in place in the United States at least 
since the 1930s.
15
 
 
 
 It was not only the Republicans who seemed to realize that, at least in the short- 
term, looking tough on immigrants and welfare was positive politically. President  
Clinton’s welfare bill also increased restrictions on alien eligibility, tightening the  
deeming provisions that calculated a sponsor’s income in with the immigrant’s income in 
order to determine eligibility for public benefits.
16
 Having suffered historic losses in the 
1994 elections, Democrats were eager to co-opt the tough talk on immigrants and welfare 
that was perceived to have helped the Republicans win landslide victories in 1994. In 
President Clinton’s 1995 State of the Union Address, his first since the Republican 
landslide in the 1994 election, he asserted: 
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I want to work with you, with all of you, to pass welfare reform. But our goal 
must be to liberate people and lift them up from dependence to independence, 
from welfare to work, from mere childbearing to responsible parenting. Our goal 
should not be to punish them because they happen to be poor.
17
 
 
 
President Clinton asserted that he would attempt to work with Republicans to roll back  
 
some of the harsh measures in the PRWORA directed toward legal immigrants, but also  
 
noted that it was in just such provisions that the bulk of the measure’s savings came  
 
from.
18
 Referencing the Republican welfare proposal in March 1994, President Clinton  
 
claimed that it “has a lot of things in it that I like, but I think it’s way too hard on  
 
financing things from legal immigrants.”
19
 When he announced that he would sign the  
 
PRWORA, President Clinton was careful to lay out his objections to the cuts for legal  
 
immigrants in the bill: 
 
 
This provision has nothing to do with welfare reform…. These immigrant families 
with children who fall on hard times through no fault of their own….should be 
eligible for medical and other help when they need it…. It is just wrong to say to 
people, [that] we’ll let you work here, you’re helping our country; you’ll pay 
taxes; you serve in our military; you may get killed defending America; but if 
somebody mugs you on the street corner or if you get cancer or you get hit by a 
car or the same thing happens to your children, we’re not going to give you 
assistance anymore.
20
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Clinton’s rhetoric displayed the entrenchment of a racialized and gendered stigma on 
welfare even within the Democratic base. What about the native-born who were 
ineligible for assistance? As will be examined in detail in Chapter 6, immigrant advocacy 
groups would successfully reframe the immigrant narrative so as to reposition certain 
immigrant groups such as the elderly, veterans, children, and refugees, within the 
category of deserving.  
The PRWORA was able to pass and was, in fact, rather popular largely because 
there was general bipartisan agreement surrounding the negative racial and gendered 
stereotypes of welfare recipients. Welfare was seen as contributing to the moral 
breakdown of society, to illegitimacy, dependency, and crime. Welfare recipients were 
seen as people unwilling to remove themselves from such cycles and live within society’s 
norms and were therefore unworthy of society’s assistance. Reagan’s stigmatization of 
the “welfare queen” had completely saturated popular and political culture by the mid-
1990s. Poor single mothers, and in particular poor black single mothers, were the most 
vulnerable within this debate. Immigrant advocacy groups realized this, and reframed the 
debate surrounding PRWORA and immigrants into a moral one equating immigrant 
rights with human rights. They emphasized veterans, children, the elderly, and refugees 
from Southeast Asia, in particular – people who could claim moral justification. 
Immigrant advocacy groups attempted to place at least a portion of immigrants within 
deserving status and make claims to social citizenship that continued to elude poor 
native-born women of color. This shrewd tactic by immigrant advocacy groups proved 
effective. Problems of welfare dependency, illegitimacy, and moral decay remained 
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gendered and racialized problems from which certain immigrant groups, but not poor 
native-born women of color, were able to transcend through moral suasion that attacked 
the legitimacy of their placement within the stigmatized undeserving caste, but did not 
attack or question the legitimacy or racist and sexist underpinnings of the existence of the 
undeserving caste itself.
21
 
In a speech given at his signing of the PRWORA, President Clinton spoke for 
himself and Vice President Al Gore, asserting that, “We also believe that the 
congressional leadership insisted on cuts and programs for legal immigrants that are far 
too deep. These cuts, however, have nothing to do with the fundamental purpose of 
welfare reform.”
22
 President Clinton and the Democrats were unable to soften that 
portion of the bill before its passage. These “budget saving measures” that targeted legal 
aliens provided the bulk of cost savings from the welfare reform law.
23
 
 These efforts to restrict immigrant access to public benefits were viewed as mean-
spirited by many. Rafael Lantigua, an activist within the New York community of 
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immigrants from the Dominican Republic, argued that, “If the Republicans want to get 
rid of the entire safety net, then they should have the courage to say so instead of picking 
on a group of people who cannot vote.”
24
 It was this removal of the safety net, 
particularly from children and the elderly, that immigrant advocacy groups and advocates 
for the poor used as a means to mobilize communities against the PRWORA. Vermont 
Democratic Governor Howard Dean worried that “kids will be the victims” of 
Republican proposals.
25
 
 The Catholic Church joined with the Council of Jewish Federations and the  
 
National Council of La Raza (NCLR) to oppose anti-immigrant and anti-welfare  
 
legislation. The bishops issued a joint statement that asserted, “We cannot support  
 
punitive approaches that target immigrants, even legal residents, and take away the  
 
minimal benefits that they now receive.”
26
 When a pending compromise bill seemed  
 
likely to garner President Clinton’s signature, Reverend Fred Kammer, the president of  
 
Catholic Charities USA, asserted that, “Today’s proposals are largely a sham designed to  
 
appease the ignorant and to pander to our worst prejudices in an election year.”
27
 The  
 
Council of Jewish Federations argued that such punitive measures would create “a nation  
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divided, separate but unequal.”
28
 But many politicians did not agree that the benefits  
 
were minimal or beneficial. Republican Representative James M. Talent of Missouri  
 
asserted that the current welfare state in the United States “is luring them into a kind of  
 
spiritual poverty by destroying their families and their incentives to work.”
29
 Florida  
 
Republican Representative John Mica compared how alligators can become dependent on  
 
people who feed them to people on welfare.
30
 Representative Mica presented the  
 
following analogy about signs around Florida waterways warning “do not feed the  
 
alligators.” Representative Mica explained the reason for these signs: 
 
 
if left in a natural state, alligators can fend for themselves…unnatural feeding and 
artificial care creates dependency [and] … these otherwise able-bodies alligators 
can no longer survive on their own … with our current handout, nonwork welfare 
system, we have upset the natural order…. We have created a system of 
dependency…. Today we have a chance to restore that natural order, to break the 
chains of dependency and stop the enslavement of another generation of 
Americans.
31
  
 
 
Representative Mica was not the only Republican to compare welfare recipients to  
 
animals. Referencing a federal government program introducing wolves back into the  
 
wild in Wyoming, Wyoming Representative Barbara Cubin compared welfare recipients  
 
to wolves. Representative Cubin explained that the federal government had supplied the  
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wolves with food and shelter while attempting to reintroduce them to the wild: 
 
 
This is what I call the wolf welfare program…. Guess what? They opened the 
gate to let the wolves out and now the wolves will not go…. What has happened 
with the wolves, just like what happens with human beings, when you take away 
their incentives, when you take away their freedom, when you take away their 
dignity, they have to be provided for. The biologists are now giving incentives 
outside of the gates, trying to get them out. What a great idea.
32
 
 
 
 As we have seen, the perception and fear of immigrant as paupers has been an  
 
enduring facet of American society. Particularly in the 1980s, the debate over  
 
immigration articulated the idea that immigration created a crisis in America largely as a  
 
result of immigrants’ (perceived) disproportionate use of welfare benefits. The United 
States’ welfare state became seen as a magnet drawing in immigrants eager to collect 
welfare benefits and live off the hardworking native born citizens of the United States. 
Thus, the answer to the immigration crisis began to be seen as the restriction of welfare. 
Immigrants were cast as undeserving within the racialized and gendered stigma reserved 
for welfare recipients. Welfare reform efforts that targeted legal immigrants to a 
significant extent began in the early 1990s, as anti-immigrant rhetoric was heightening 
and the battle over Proposition 187 was being waged in California. A November 1993 
House Subcommittee on Human Resources discussed the “immigrant problem” and the 
issue of the United States’ welfare state as a magnet. These hearings reflected the 
saturation of anti-immigrant rhetoric that immigrants took jobs from native-born 
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Americans, stagnated wages, and were disproportionately high users of welfare. A 
significant subject of debate in this hearing was whether or not legal immigrants were 
being unfairly lumped together with illegal immigrants as part of an effort to portray legal 
immigrants as deserving. The INS Commissioner, Doris Meissner, argued that when it 
came to welfare use by immigrants and anti-immigrant rhetoric that “an awful lot of what 
are problems with illegal immigration tend to be ascribed to legitimate immigrants.”
33
 
Meissner feared legal immigrants were being scapegoated. She asserted that much of the  
anti-immigrant rhetoric of the 1990s was strikingly similar to that of the nineteenth  
 
century. Meissner depicted a recent trip to Ellis Island and its museum documenting  
 
immigration to the United States, explaining: 
 
 
it is very startling, because one of the walls has all the political cartoons of the 
day 100 years ago, 60 years ago, and it is the same – I don’t think we have 
progressed as a country. Maybe the cartoons have gotten worse, as well. Because 
we are talking about the same thing, that these immigrants are taking our jobs, 
they are costing our communities money, you know, we are going to fall apart as 
a nation.
34
 
 
 
Meissner also articulated portions of the pro-immigrant sentiment that existed in 
the United States alongside anti-immigrant rhetoric, asserting, “I know that immigrants 
built this country…. I think you don’t find any better workers, any more industrious 
people than somebody, whether they are legal or illegal … they are here to make a better 
life for themselves and their family.” The Directing Attorney of the National Immigration 
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Law Center in Los Angeles, Charles Wheeler, echoed Meissner’s sentiments about 
immigrants that the welfare state was not a magnet for immigration. Wheeler pointed to 
the “very strong, effective deterrent” of the INS and State Department screenings to deny 
residency to immigrants deemed “likely to become a public charge.”
35
 Wheeler and 
Meissner were part of a middle and upper class educated elite who tended to be 
expansionist when it came to immigration and immigrant rights. They formed a powerful 
and vocal cross-class and cross-racial coalition in favor of an expansive immigration 
stance in the United States. 
Efforts to exclude immigrants on the grounds that they were “likely to become a 
public charge” are older than the republic itself, rooted in colonial efforts and then 
individual state efforts to exclude immigrants who were deemed unable to take care of 
themselves. It was in the Immigration Act of 1882 that the “likely to become a public 
charge” (or LPC) provision was first enacted into federal law. The Immigration Act of 
1882 required immigrants to be inspected by state commissioners before landing. The 
Act stated that if “there shall be found among the passengers any convict, lunatic, idiot, 
or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge 
… such persons shall not be permitted to land.”
36
 This approach was reinforced in the 
INA, which allowed for deportation of immigrants who became a public charge within 
five years of their entry into the United States. Immigrants were not subject to 
deportation if the cause of their becoming a public charge could be proven to have 
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occurred after their entry.
37
 Generally, the LPC clause has been interpreted narrowly and 
in order for an alien who becomes a public charge to be eligible for deportation, “There 
must be a legal obligation to repay services or benefits provided, a demand for payment, 
and a refusal or omission to pay.” Prior to the PRWORA, receipt of welfare benefits was 
not used as a deportable action under the LPC clause.
38
  
Refugees were one classification of immigrant who were regularly excluded from 
this LPC provision. In the late twentieth century, the INS used sponsorship (for three-
year periods in the period leading up to PRWORA) as a means to ensure that immigrants 
would not become public charges in the future. This LPC clause has been fraught with 
controversy. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s, there was a significant growing 
critique of United States’ deportation policy and the Immigration Service’s application of 
the LPC clause retroactively as a means of deporting immigrants who ran afoul of 
society’s social norms, particularly through enforcement of the dominant view of sexual 
morality by deporting women who engaged in prostitution or bore children outside of 
wedlock.
39
 The INS has also been accused of uneven enforcement of the LPC clause, 
specifically more rigid enforcement along the border with Mexico than Canada or in 
regard to European immigrants.
40
 Charges of lax enforcement of the LPC clause were not 
without significant merit, however. Between FY 1908-1980, 1,046,677 aliens were 
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deported. 22,556 aliens were deported during those years because they were deemed 
LPC. The overwhelmingly majority of aliens deported for cause from 1908-1980 were 
deported for entering “without inspection” or through use of fraudulent documents 
(334,889), for entering without proper documents (154,896), or for failing to “maintain or 
comply with conditions of nonimmigrant status” (124,465), which generally meant 
overstaying student or visitor visas. The number of aliens deported for being LPC was 
closest to the number of aliens deported for being illiterate (16,762) or for having mental 
or physical impairments (27,305). However, from 1971-1980, only 31 immigrants were 
deported for being LPC.
41
 From 1981-1990 no immigrants were denied entry for being 
LPC.
42
 A significant reason for this decline in immigrants deemed to be LPC is a result of 
deeming and the tightening of sponsorship regulations in the 1980s. The problem with 
sponsorship, as was highlighted in the hearings and debate leading up to the PRWORA 
was that the affidavits of support required by would be sponsors were not considered 
legally enforceable. Immigration restrictionists wanted to make affidavits of support 
legally binding documents and enforce receipt of welfare benefits as a deportable offense 
under the LPC clause.
43
  
 Meissner’s assertions that immigrants did not come to the United States to take  
 
advantage of welfare was backed up by the stories of people from the Dominican  
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Republic hoping to obtain visas to emigrate to the United States. One such woman,  
 
waiting on a spouse visa to join her husband in New Jersey claimed, “I’ve got two good  
 
arms and two good legs to work. I don’t want to go there to live on welfare; I want to go  
 
there to improve my life.”
44
 News of the anti-alien measures in the PRWORA had  
 
reached the Dominican Republic, but as welfare was not among the reasons potential  
 
immigrants wished to go to the United States, it was not a deterrent. Another Dominican  
 
hoping to be able to immigrate to the United States, Ruben Cueva, asserted that: 
 
 
If you’ve got money, the Dominican Republic is the best country in the world in 
which to live. The rich here, they have no need to go anywhere. But we who are 
poor, we are eating stones, so these measures are not going to stop anybody from 
going to New York in search of the green.
45
 
 
 
Displaying that it was the opportunity and hope that drew people to the United States and  
 
not the magnet of welfare benefits, Billilo Vidal explained: 
  
 
If I had the money, I’d be out of here in a flash, regardless of whatever measures 
might be taken in the United States. It’s not that I want to go, but that I have to go. 
I’ve got five kids and I’m not even able to give them what they need for breakfast. 
I want to have a house that I own, instead of having to pay rent, and I can only 
achieve that in the United States, not here.
46
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The question of restricting immigration became wrapped up in the idea of  
 
restricting alien rights, which was done, in part, to stop the effects of the so-called  
 
welfare magnet of the United States social welfare system. However, the belief that the  
 
United States welfare state was acting as a magnet for immigration was not agreed upon  
 
by all. Charles Wheeler, the Directing Attorney with the National Immigration Law  
 
Center, argued that: 
 
 
There is no credible evidence that access to a Federal benefit program acts as a 
magnet drawing immigrants here … there is no evidence that depriving them of 
future access to these programs would in any way deter them from coming into 
this country either legally or illegally…. They come here to join family members. 
They come here to work. And they come here to flee persecution in their home 
country. They do not come here to get on welfare.
47
 
 
To the contrary, the Chief Deputy Director of the California Department of 
Finance and Under Secretary of the State of California Health and Welfare Agency, 
Theresa Parker, argued that the welfare magnet drawing in immigrants was a real thing. 
Parker cited a study by the University of California Latino Population Research Program, 
which stated that “75 percent of the women who were questioned said that if they had a 
second birth that they would again cross because of the desire to obtain United States 
citizenship for their infants, because of the substantial gains in quality of life as far as 
education, health care, et cetera.”
48
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Michael Fix, director of the Immigrant Policy Program at the Urban Institute  
argued that, “In time of plenty, we ignore immigration and immigrants, and in times of  
 
scarcity, we become quite frightened of them.” Fix also pointed out the more nuanced  
 
effects of immigration. He argued that immigrants did not have wholly positive or  
 
negative effects everywhere on every segment of the economy and on every segment of  
 
the population at all times. David Simcox, senior fellow for the Center for Immigration  
 
Studies, also refuted the idea of the welfare magnet, arguing that, “If you go back to Ellis  
 
Island … instead of Social Security or welfare, they said, the streets are paved with gold.  
 
Or you can get a job being paid in gold and make all kinds of money, please come to the  
 
United States. And these people did.”
49
 
 
 The PRWORA was significantly influenced by the anti-immigrant rhetoric that 
immigrants were a drain on American society, economy, and resources, and that 
immigrants were not worthy of or deserving of virtually any type of governmental 
assistance. These undeserving immigrants included the elderly and disabled via 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and small children via food stamps.
50
 Citizenship 
status dictated deserving status, as evidenced by the fact that citizen children of non-
citizens (legal and illegal) retained benefits (small though they were) while non-citizen 
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children did not.
51
 The fact that the child was a citizen and not the child’s minor status 
was what classified these children as deserving of benefits. These citizen children of 
aliens straddled the wide divide between the deserving and undeserving poor. Charles H. 
Wheeler, director of the National Immigration Law Center attributed this to political 
expediency, “Instead of carving out a group of people who are abusing the system, they 
take the politically expedient and safe route of cutting off a group of people on the basis 
of citizenship, or lack of it. That sends a message to these aliens that they are less 
deserving.” Wheeler recognized in this something that the national Republican Party did 
not – the potential for anti-immigrant legislation to create an immigrant voting bloc. 
Wheeler asserted that if the “Contract with America” successfully became law, “A lot of 
permanent residents will become citizens so they can retain eligibility for public 
benefits.”
52
 One prominent Republican who believed that denying legal immigrants’ 
access to government benefits was breaking a “contract with the government” that these 
immigrants made when they came to the United States was Republican Senator from 
Wyoming Alan K. Simpson, who asserted that denying legal immigrants such benefits 
“would be a very grave mistake…. They live in your home town. They go to the Rotary 
Club. They’re in the service club. They are in every sense a part of us – except for one 
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thing, the right to vote.”
53
 It was the lack of voting rights that made them easy targets for 
budget savings in welfare reform and that consequently mobilized them to naturalize and 
obtain the right to vote. 
As a result of the PRWORA, most legal aliens were considered ineligible for SSI, 
food stamps, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF, which replaced AFDC), and 
Medicaid. If non-citizens deemed ineligible for such government benefits attempted to 
tap into these resources, even if they were among the exceptions that were deemed 
qualified and eligible, this action constituted evidence of them having become a public 
charge and was grounds for their deportation.
54
 Within the PRWORA, anti-welfare and 
anti-immigrant actors created a hierarchy of the deserving/undeserving status of aliens 
that went beyond the legal/illegal dichotomy. This hierarchy extended to include aliens 
present in the United States before the date of enactment of this legislation (August 22, 
1996) and those who entered the United States after the legislation was enacted.
55
 Legal 
immigrants arriving after the date of enactment of this legislation would be ineligible for 
most federal benefits, including Medicaid and public housing, for their initial five years 
of residency. After the initial five-year residency period, legal immigrants would be 
subject to deeming provisions. As a consequence of the PRWORA, sponsors’ affidavits 
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of support became legally binding, meaning that sponsor’s incomes and assets were used 
in determinations of need for legal immigrants.
56
 
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), signed by President Clinton on September 30, 1996, continued this hierarchy 
of aliens.
57
 California Republican Congressman Elton Gallegly attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to insert a Proposition 187-like provision in the IIRIRA denying illegal 
immigrants the right to public education. This amendment was supported by Speaker 
Newt Gingrich, who asserted that “this used to be the land of opportunity. Now it’s the 
land of welfare.”
58
 IIRIRA increased border patrol funding including funds and resources 
for fence-building; increased restrictions on asylum seekers, forcing those seeking 
asylum to petition within one year of entry; further restricted immigrants’ eligibility for 
government benefits; increased sponsorship restrictions, particularly financial elegibility 
for sponsorship, and strengthened deportation, civil, criminal, and grievance procedures 
for criminal and undocumented aliens.
59
 
Title IV of the PWRORA significantly restricted non-citizen eligibility for 
federal, state, and local benefits. There were exceptions to these restrictions, and in the 
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exceptions, the lines of the underclass became most visible. Title IV of the PRWORA 
included three new types of main restrictions on non-citizens’ access to governmental 
benefits. First, “qualified aliens” were declared ineligible for SSI and food stamps.
 60
 
Second, most “qualified aliens” were barred from means-tested assistance programs 
during their first five years in the United States. This ban only applied to non-citizens 
who had arrived after August 22, 1996, the enactment date of the PRWORA. Third, states 
had the option to deny “qualified aliens” eligibility for programs such as TANF, Social 
Services Block Grants, and Medicaid. Under the PRWORA, states could bar “qualified 
aliens” from these programs regardless of whether they were present before August 22, 
1996 or arrived after that date but had legally resided in the United States for at least five 
years.
61
 These restrictions were removed if/when the alien naturalized. This lack of status 
as a citizen was what classified them as undeserving. There was significant debate about 
the numbers and proportion of aliens using welfare. The Congressional Budget Office, 
however, estimated that by restricting alien access to government assistance, the 
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PRWORA would save the United States 32.3 billion dollars for the years 1997-2002.
62
 
These budget savings made legal aliens an attractive target. 
Contrary to anti-immigrant rhetoric, illegal aliens were generally ineligible for 
most forms of governmental assistance except for emergency medical care. However, 
access to elementary and secondary education previously had been considered a basic 
human right. States had not been able to deny educational benefits to illegal aliens. 
However, following the failed but still popular precedent of Proposition 187, the 
PRWORA and IIRIRA, in explicit defiance of the 1982 Supreme Court decision Plyler v. 
Doe, gave states the authority to deny children who were illegal aliens access to public 
education.
63
  This denial of educational opportunity amounted to relegating a growing 
minority of the population to lifetimes of poverty and uncertainty.  
Plyler v. Doe was not the only precedent which the PRWORA and IIRIRA defied. 
Most significant to this study is the welfare reform act’s defiance of earlier court rulings 
that had argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade 
states “from distinguishing between legal immigrants, refugees, and citizens, although 
illegal immigrants could be denied eligibility for most state or federal programs targeted 
to citizens.” Fundamental to the PRWORA and the IIRIRA was their explicit 
                                                             
62 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law 104-208, U.S. Statutes at Large 
110 Stat 3009 (1996); The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Public Law 104-193, U.S. Statutes at Large 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); United States Congressional Budget 
Office, “Immigration and Welfare Reform,” U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995; Thomas J. Espenshade, 
Jessica L. Baraka and Gregory A. Huber, “Implications of the 1996 Welfare and Immigration Reform Acts 
for US Immigration,” Population and Development Review 23, no.4 (December 1997): 775. 
  
63 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Alien Public Assistance Under the 
New Welfare Act and Major Immigration Bills (House/Senate H.R. 2202) by Joyce C. Vialet and Larry M. 
Eig (Washington: CRS, 1996), 1-6;  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, Public Law 104-193, U.S. Statutes at Large 110 Stat. 2105 (1996);  Plyler v. Doe  457 U.S. 202 
(1982). 
198 
 
differentiation between citizens and non-citizens (in eligibility for benefits), hierarchies 
of non-citizens (largely in refugee status and date of arrival), and allowance of states to 
make such distinctions between immigrants in eligibility decisions.
64
 It was through these 
incredibly intricate classifications of non-citizens that the framers of the PRWORA 
carved out space within the undeserving poor and underclass for these aliens. 
The provisions of the PRWORA that hurt aliens the most were the restrictions on  
SSI, which particularly affected the elderly; eligibility restrictions on food stamps; 
college tuition assistance programs; job training programs; TANF; and Medicaid.
65
 As a 
result of the PRWORA, if legal immigrants were even eligible for federal loans and 
grants for college, their sponsors’ income would be calculated as constituting a portion of 
their income.
66
 Richard Day, chief counsel for the Senate immigration subcommittee, 
tried to frame the argument in favor of restricting legal immigrants’ access to federal 
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tuition assistance funds within an “us” vs. “them” or “native” vs. “alien” context, 
asserting that the more assistance given to immigrants then the less assistance that was 
available for the native-born: 
 
If this South Korean family with three kids had said to U.S. officials, ‘We’re 
going to need to have Pell grants to get the kids through school,’ how many 
Americans would think, ‘There isn’t enough around so native-born kids can go to 
college, we shouldn’t be admitting people who are going to need that.’
67
 
 
 
According to Title IV of the PRWORA, all aliens (including those present in the 
United States before the enactment of PRWORA) were ineligible for SSI, with a few 
exceptions.
68
 SSI primarily assisted elderly people who either were not employed in the 
United States long enough to qualify for Social Security or who’s employment in the 
United States consisted of such low-wage work that their Social Security benefits were 
incredibly meager. The SSI benefit was meant to cushion these elderly poor and give 
them enough support to survive. The amounts were not much and most people would 
marvel that they were able to survive at all on such small amounts of money. For 
example, Juan Martinez was a Texas farmworker originally from Mexico. He worked as 
a farmworker for 16 years in Texas and was forced to retire because of illness. He and his 
wife lived off a combined $426 per month in Social Security benefits and $178 in SSI. 
They stood to lose those SSI benefits and would be forced to live off $5,112 per year 
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without SSI. Martinez claimed, “They can check with my bosses, they can find out if I 
worked or not. If they get rid of the check, I couldn’t pay the electric, I couldn’t pay the 
water, I couldn’t pay for the old car I got – I couldn’t pay for anything.”
69
  
Generally, during a legal immigrant’s first five years of residency in the United  
 
States, their sponsor’s (generally children’s) income was counted as their own if they  
 
attempted to apply for SSI. But the PRWORA aimed to make these elderly and poor legal  
 
immigrants ineligible for SSI even after that five year deeming period was over.  
 
Wyoming Republican Senator Alan Simpson decried this ability of legal immigrants to  
obtain SSI benefits, arguing, “These elderly parents, who have never contributed to our  
system in any way, then receive a generous pension for the rest of their lives from the  
American taxpayer.”
70
The number of SSI applications filed by legal immigrants  
increased from 51,500 in 1982 to 1,541,000 million in 1992.
71
 In 1993, the total number  
 
of SSI recipients who were citizens was 5.25 million while the total number of legal  
 
immigrants receiving SSI was 680,000 or 12 percent.
72
 There were many problems with  
 
the sponsorship economic requirements laid out in the “deeming” provisions. For  
 
example Luke Williams, the executive director of the Coalition for Humane Immigrant  
 
Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA) wondered: 
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What happens when an immigrant’s son who has a nice aerospace job for three 
years suddenly loses his job and can no longer provide for his father? Does the 
old man move to the street? This bill doesn’t give you any guidance where it’s not 
cut and dried. That’s where the greatest potential for damage comes in.
73
 
 
 
According to Title IV of the PRWORA, all immigrants (including those present in 
the United States before the enactment of PRWORA) were ineligible for food stamps 
with a few exceptions.
74
  Maria Lopez, a legal immigrant from the Dominican Republic 
with three children who received AFDC and food stamps said that her community was 
abuzz with news about the impending welfare reforms: “Everybody is talking about it. 
They say there will be no welfare, no Medicaid, no help at all. We will wind up on the 
streets. So the future means death.”
75
 Aliens were not the only ones worried and confused 
about the exact implementation of the law. Social services agencies and employees were 
playing catch-up, as well. One such social services employee said, “We’re still not sure 
what’s going on. Our manager is supposed to meet with us to fill us in on what we are 
supposed to tell the public.”
76
 This confusion over the implementation of the PRWORA 
was evident even in the days after the new rules were to be put in place lest states risk 
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penalties and fines from the federal government. Still, administrators in many cities were 
loathe to revoke food stamp benefits and send families out to the streets to starve. Carol 
Ann Wilson, the Director of the Department of Human Services in Hudson County, New 
Jersey, instructed her staff to give aliens who were now ineligible for food stamps at least 
30 days worth of additional benefits before cutting them off and would not report on 
illegal immigrants to INS. She defended this saying, “We still have compassion here.”
77
 
Richard Blum, a NYC Legal Aid Society lawyer, said that if agencies “have a choice of 
violating the law, I would like to see them err on the side of not letting people starve 
rather than cutting off their food stamps before they know what they’re doing.”
78
  
In Orange County, California, approximately 40 percent of food stamp recipients 
were aliens expected to lose eligibility under the new rules. In New York, about 5 to 10 
percent were subject to loss of food stamps. In Texas, about 187,000 families were 
expected to lose food stamps. In Hidalgo County, Texas, alone, 32,000 or one out of 
every 12 to 15 people were legal immigrants subject to loss of food stamp benefits under 
PRWORA.
79
 Because of the high incidence of mixed households (households with a 
mixture of citizens and non-citizens), the statistics on immigrant receipt of welfare 
benefits can easily be skewed to support a particular argument. When you look at the 
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numbers of individual recipients who were immigrants versus native-born citizens 
nationwide, the incidence of immigrants as welfare recipients was significantly less than 
that of citizens. In 1992, the number of households in the United States entirely 
comprised of citizens receiving food stamps was 9.1 million. The number of mixed 
households (comprised of both citizens and non-citizens) receiving food stamps in 1992 
was 610,000 while the number of households comprised entirely of non-citizens 
receiving food stamps in 1992 was 350,000.
80
 
According to Title IV of the PRWORA, all immigrants (including those present in  
 
the United States before the enactment of PRWORA) were ineligible for TANF, with a  
 
few exceptions.
81
 For immigrants who entered the United States after the date of the  
 
enactment of the PRWORA, after the five year prohibition on receipt of TANF, the states  
 
had discretion over aliens’ receipt of welfare benefits. It was at this point in which the  
 
states could then use their discretion to “deem” the alien’s sponsor’s income in order to  
 
determine the alien’s eligibility. Again, there were exceptions.
82
 In 1995, in the midst of  
 
congressional debates over what would become the PRWORA, the National Immigration  
 
forum began publicizing exactly how legal immigrants would be affected by the proposed  
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welfare reform bills. For example, take the circumstances of “Davita,” a legal  
 
permanent resident from Pakistan and mother of two citizen children. She divorced her  
 
mentally and physically abusive husband, a naturalized citizen. “Davita” was placed  
 
under court order to not take her children beyond a fifty mile radius of New York City  
 
without her husband’s permission, which he would never give. This prevented her from  
 
returning to Pakistan with her children. In order to support herself and her children she  
 
received AFDC and Medicaid and completed a job readiness program that included  
 
English and computer classes. If PRWORA had been in effect when “Davita” was trying  
 
to flee her abusive husband, she would not have been eligible for those benefits and  
 
would likely have had to choose between staying with her kids and leaving a dangerous  
 
and abusive husband. These are the types of stories the National Immigration Forum used  
 
to humanize immigrant welfare recipients.
83
 
 
The National Immigration Forum wanted to portray the diversity of immigrants  
 
and their situations and to display that immigrant welfare recipients were complex people  
 
with complex stories and not people trying to selfishly live off the American people and  
 
government. Although non-citizens were frequently depicted as being disproportionately  
 
high consumers of public assistance such as AFDC, the numbers did not reflect that. In  
 
1992, 12.9 million families (95 percent of AFDC recipients) comprised of citizens  
 
received AFDC (which was replaced with TANF in the PRWORA) and 400,000 families  
 
(3 percent) comprised of legal permanent residents received AFDC.
84
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States had the discretion to decide on the Medicaid eligibility of legal-qualified  
 
aliens: “Until five years after date of entry/grant of asylum/withholding for  
 
refugees, asylees and aliens who deportation has been withheld, permanent residents who  
 
have worked 40 qualifying quarters, veterans, aliens on active duty.” Again, legal  
 
qualified aliens who entered the United States after enactment of this legislation were  
 
ineligible for Medicaid for five years after the date of their entry and then were subject to  
 
deeming, with the exceptions of “refugees, asylees, aliens whose deportation has been  
 
withheld, veterans, aliens on active duty, Cuban and Haitian refugees.”
85
 Robert Quirico,  
 
a 45 year old recently naturalized immigrant from Puerto Rico who suffered a stroke and  
 
heart problems since emigrating said, “I need a doctor to be by my side at all times. If  
 
there’s no Medicaid, death would be better for me…. I heard that even naturalized  
 
citizens will be affected. I came here to improve my life, to prosper. But I think all my  
 
dreams are falling apart.”
86
 
Because of the significant confusion and administrative work necessary to begin 
implementation of the PRWORA, in October 1996, Congress extended the eligibility for 
immigrants to continue receiving food stamps until April 1, 1997. Vermont Democratic 
Senator Patrick Leahy, a staunch opponent of cutting immigrants’ food stamp eligibility, 
cynically claimed that, “It may have occurred to the negotiators that stories about hungry 
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legal immigrants would play poorly over the Thanksgiving and Christmas Holidays. 
Having to count this as a victory for hungry people is an emblem of how misguided the 
welfare bill is.”  
Under the PRWORA, not only did legal aliens lose access to many government 
services; but so-called entitlement programs for all poverty-stricken individuals were 
ended. Republicans insisted on ending entitlements rather than attempting to fix what 
most politicians viewed as a “broken system.” Senator Robert Packwood argued that such 
anti-poverty advocacy groups believed that, “If we just lengthen the ears on this 
hippopotamus and screw up its tail, it’s going to fly. It isn’t going to fly, no matter how 
we redesign it.”
87
 
Fear and confusion gripped immigrant communities in response to the PRWORA. 
Manuel Mantos, executive director of the Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant 
Rights, explained, “Word doesn’t filter through that accurately. So the word on the street 
is you’re not going to be treated in the hospital if you’re not a citizen. Word on the street 
is if you owe a couple dollars on a parking violation, you may be deported. So there’s 
widespread panic.” The issue here really was not that immigrants were such 
disproportionately high consumers of government benefits. In fact, 12 percent of 
households in New York City with a foreign born head of household received public 
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assistance in 1996 versus 14 percent of households with a native-born head of 
household.
88
  
Some states filed suit against the federal government over the PRWORA.
89
 The 
states’ major point of dissatisfaction was that while the PRWORA gave states’ significant 
discretion over whether or not to give non-citizens benefits, many believed that the 
federal government was also significantly shifting the financial burden of these programs 
to state and local governments as well. Under the PRWORA, states could deny non-
citizens access to cash welfare, Medicaid, Title XX block grant programs, and other state 
and local assistance programs.
90
 
 In addition to the furor from states, some cities and counties also expressed their 
discontent with the new laws. For example, the Jersey City, New Jersey, City Council 
passed a resolution forbidding city workers from turning in or arresting immigrant 
residents (legal or illegal), effectively making Jersey City a “safe haven” or sanctuary 
city. This resolution was in direct defiance of the new federal laws requiring city, state, 
and federal employees to turn in to INS illegal immigrants who attempted to access 
police, hospital, and education services.
91
 Many local authorities throughout the country 
believed that the PRWORA simply shifted costs from the federal government to local 
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governments. Larry E. Naake, executive director of the National Association of Counties 
asserted that, “We see this as not necessarily a tax savings but a shift in the tax burden. 
Perhaps federal taxpayers will get some relief, but in the end, the county taxpayers will 
have to pick up the costs.” This sentiment was echoed by Los Angeles County Supervisor 
Gloria Molina, who claimed that, “All the legal immigrant who have been taken off the 
welfare rolls are going to end up on our doorstep.”
92
 Under PRWORA, most legal 
immigrants would become ineligible for SSI and food stamps and it would be up to 
states’ discretion to determine which, if any, legal immigrants remained eligible for 
Medicaid. In California, as in most locales across the country, the counties were the final 
link in the social safety net and were required to provide social services such as medical 
care in county hospitals for people with no means to pay for it (excluding illegal 
immigrants). The upsurge in the numbers of legal immigrants who would not have any 
other access to medical care except for county hospitals frightened the California State 
Association of Counties. Mike Nevin, its president, asserted that, “It’s just devastating. 
These people will be at the doorsteps of our hospitals with communicable diseases, and 
we’ll have to take care of them. It’s an awful situation, because we just don’t have the 
money. What will we do? I don’t know.”
93
 
Many charged that the PRWORA was really about anti-alien sentiment. In an  
 
October 1996 speech, Republican New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani said as much,  
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asserting that: 
 
 
The anti-immigration movement that’s now sweeping the country in my view is 
no different than movements that swept the country in the past. You look back at 
the Chinese Exclusionary Act, or the Know-Nothing movement – these were 
movements that encouraged Americans to fear foreigners, to fear something that’s 
different, and to stop immigration.
94
  
 
 
Oscar Armando Lopez came to the United States in 1970 and became a legal  
 
permanent resident in 1985. It was not until 1995 that he began the process of applying  
 
for United States citizenship. Lopez explained why he waited so long to apply for  
 
citizenship, saying that: 
 
 
It seems like American people and the Congress are against immigrants and 
Spanish people these days. I don’t understand why, but we are in trouble. I gained 
a lot of respect at my work when I became a resident. But if I get sick and lose my 
job, maybe I can’t get help unless I’m a citizen. So I guess it’s time.
95
 
 
 
Lopez was not alone in coming to the conclusion that “it’s time” to naturalize. 
 
Increasing numbers of immigrants were able to naturalize in the mid-1990s as a result of  
 
Citizenship USA, a Clinton backed INS initiative to reduce the approximately one  
 
million immigrant-long backlog of applications for naturalizations.
96
 There was  
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significant controversy over Citizenship USA, which was plagued with charges of fraud.  
 
President Clinton and Vice President Gore were also accused of using the initiative to  
 
increase the numbers of likely Democratic voters in advance of the 1996 elections.
97
 
 
The juncture of immigration and welfare policy was front and center for the 1996  
 
elections. Several GOP Party Platform proposals stated that the Republican Party,  
 
“Asserts a constitutional amendment or constitutionally valid legislation declaring that  
 
children born in the United States of parents who are not legally present in the United  
 
States or who are not long-term residents are not automatically citizens.”
98
 In the final  
 
1996 GOP Party Platform, the influence of Proposition 187 and attacks on the Fourteenth  
 
amendment’s birthright citizenship were prominent. The 1996 GOP immigration plank  
 
asserted: 
 
Illegal immigration has reached crisis proportions … burdens taxpayers, strains 
public services, takes jobs, and increases crime…. Illegal aliens should not 
receive public benefits other than emergency aid, and those who become parents 
while illegally in the United States should not be qualified to claim benefits for 
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their offspring. Legal immigrants should depend for assistance on their sponsors 
… not the American taxpayers…. We support a constitutional amendment or 
constitutionally-valid legislation declaring that children born in the United States 
of parents who are not legally present in the United States or who are not long-
term residents are not automatically citizens.
99
 
 
 
In 1996, the Republicans also continued their efforts to make English the official 
 
language of the United States and included this idea in their 1996 party platform,  
 
asserting that, “We support the official recognition of English as the nation's common  
 
language.”
100
 In the mid-1990s, the English as a national language debate continued.  
 
Republican Senator and Presidential candidate Bob Dole announced his support for the  
 
English Language Amendment (ELA) and the House also passed an English as the  
 
official language measure in 1996. However, the Senate refused to take similar action and  
 
President Clinton asserted he would veto any such legislation that came across his desk.  
 
The real crux of the issue was not about immigrant children, but instead about adults and  
 
voting rights. The ELA would bar not only bilingual education, but also bilingual ballots.  
 
Republican Senator Alan Simpson argued in defense of ELA: 
 
We do not ask very much of a new immigrant to this country, but one thing we do 
expect of them is that they accept our system of government and our common 
language…. I fear that providing bilingual ballots to certain groups in this country 
will not encourage the learning of English…. We need to bring people into the 
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mainstream of our society, and treating them specially, differently or separately, 
does not further that goal.
101
 
 
Including this type of immigration language and an English-only language  
 
requirement within the GOP platform played well to the conservative white base but was  
 
damaging in immigrant, particularly Hispanic, communities – communities that  
 
previously had been conservative. Ray Uzeta, director of the Chicano Federation of San  
 
Diego said: 
 
 
With all these anti-immigrant proposals, nothing surprises us anymore. But I do 
know that it enhances and perpetuates the myth that people who come here – and 
let’s be frank, we’re talking about Mexicans – give birth to children in order to rip 
off the American public.
102
  
 
 
While 1996 GOP Vice Presidential candidate Jack Kemp may have wanted “to  
 
help transform the party … into a party that is attractive to the heterogeneity, diversity,  
 
pluralism and multiculturalism of America,” that was not the direction that the GOP  
 
platform was steering the party.
103
 The GOP Platform demanded the repeal of the  
 
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing birthright citizenship, the ending of all social  
 
services to illegal aliens except for emergency medical care, and that legal immigrants’  
 
sponsors should provide any needed assistance to legal aliens, who should be ineligible  
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for federal assistance programs.
104
 
Post-1965, immigration was increasingly made up of Hispanic and Asian 
immigrants. These immigrants, particularly the Latino immigrants who had historically 
had very low rates of naturalization, naturalized in significantly increasing numbers in 
1995 and 1996 as a result of the anti-alien rights sentiment that had been increasing 
throughout the 1980s through the 1994 passage of Proposition 187 in California and 
Republican takeover of Congress. The naturalization and politicization of Hispanics and 
other immigrant groups continued to increase throughout the 1990s as a result of the 1996 
welfare and immigration reforms, which significantly curtailed legal and illegal 
immigrants’ rights as well as those of refugees and asylees. Further, Republicans failed to 
anticipate conservative and restrictionist Hispanic citizens’ reactions to the punitive and 
racialized 1996 welfare and immigration reforms. These reforms alienated these Hispanic 
citizens and further coalesced Hispanics and other immigrant groups into formidable 
special interest groups who would have increasing influence over immigration reform. 
These groups had begun politicizing and flexing their muscles in the 1980s, particularly 
during the implementation of IRCA’s legalization program.
105
 These immigrant special 
interest groups really came into their own as a result of the 1994-1996 anti-immigrant 
rights rhetoric and policies and were thereafter able to exert significant influence on the 
democratic election process as well as over specific policymakers. 
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 Despite their many failures and miscalculations, the efforts to restrict immigrant 
rights and welfare rights within the United States had a decisive impact on the resources 
available and popular support for social spending. There were significant cuts to spending 
and changes in eligibility requirements, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) was abolished and replaced with the state administered Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families (TANF). Time limits were placed on the receipt of benefits and attachment to 
the workforce was the primary goal.  
In the words of Bill Clinton as he signed the welfare reform into law, these 
reforms ended “welfare as we know it.”
106
 However, as a result of the “chain” migration 
put in place as a result of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, both legal and 
illegal immigration continued to increase. Many of the most punitive measures of welfare 
reform were walked back or administered less harshly by individual states, under heavy 
pressure from immigrant advocacy groups. Neither the PRWORA nor the IIRIRA solved 
the underlying issues of immigration and welfare reform. However, by scapegoating legal 
aliens and framing the immigration and welfare problems as a race-based, Hispanic 
problem, this welfare and immigration backlash created a Hispanic (and larger 
immigrant) political awakening and backlash.
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CHAPTER VI 
FROM IMMIGRANTS TO ACTIVISTS: THE IMMIGRANT POLITICAL 
MOBILIZATION OF THE 1990s 
 
 
But one thing is certain: Latinos will participate as never before and Latino 
candidates will continue to win new offices in Congress, state legislatures and 
local governments. The face of U.S. democracy will be a shade browner by the 
end of 1996, and by being so, the U.S. will remain true to its ideals.
1
 
    Antonio González and Lydia Camarillo, 1996. 
 
 
The mid-1990s linkage of welfare and immigrants occurred within the context of 
the historic depiction of aliens as dependent and a drain on the society and economy. This 
anti-immigrant and anti-welfare legislation created a perfect storm that galvanized 
immigrant advocacy groups, particularly Hispanics, and spurred groundbreaking and 
historic naturalization and mobilization campaigns by immigrant advocacy groups such 
as the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) and the League of United Latin American 
Citizens (LULAC). These mobilization and naturalization campaigns succeeded in 
creating a profound political awakening and political countermovement by a group that 
had historically been politically underrepresented. 
The counter-mobilization of Hispanics in the mid-1990s was rooted in precedent. 
One important vehicle of Hispanic efforts to bring about social and legal change was the 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC). LULAC was founded in 1929 as a 
Texas-based, middle-class organization to fight widespread and systematic discrimination 
against Hispanics. Its mission was to “advance the economic condition, educational 
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attainment, political influence, housing, health, and civil rights of the Hispanic population 
of the United States.”
2
 Initially, because of the Jim Crow conditions forced upon Latinos 
in Texas, LULAC was most concerned with combating “political disfranchisement, racial 
segregation, and racial discrimination.”
3
 In the 1990s, LULAC also advocated economic 
boycotts, such as those of Walt Disney and Chevron, because of their support of 
California Governor Pete Wilson and Proposition 187. In 1995, Hispanics numbered 30 
percent of California’s population and there were 25 million Hispanic citizens within the 
United States, making the prospects of economic boycotts exerting significant pressure 
on businesses quite high. Rudy Arredondo, LULAC member, asserted that, 
“Economically we have tremendous power.”
4
 LULAC also instituted voter registration 
drives such as “LULAC Voter,” which will be discussed later in this chapter.
5
 
The Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) was formed in 1968 
with the help of a substantial ($2.5 million) grant from the Ford Foundation.
6
 MALDEF’s 
mission statement states, “Often described as the ‘law firm of the Latino community,’ 
MALDEF promotes social change through advocacy, communications, community 
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education, and litigation in the areas of education, employment, immigration rights, and 
political access.”
7
 MALDEF was involved in voter registration and mobilization drives, 
and also in litigating issues of importance to the Hispanic community, such as the 
creation of “at-large” electoral districts, which had the effect of minimizing the influence 
of heavily localized Latino populations on election results.
8
 MALDEF was also involved 
in litigating educational rights and affirmative action lawsuits.
9
 Perhaps its most well-
known and influential court battle was that of Plyler v. Doe, which has significantly 
hindered the ability of anti-immigrant groups since then to restrict immigrant educational 
rights. 
The naturalization rate for immigrants and specifically Hispanics, began 
increasing significantly in 1996, largely as a result of cost-benefit analysis by immigrants. 
As a result of increasing anti-immigrant rhetoric, immigrants feared losing access to 
government benefits. Even those immigrants not accessing government benefits feared 
losing the ability to access them. Immigrants also feared the potential long-term 
consequences of the anti-immigrant rhetoric swirling around them and wanted to be able 
to fight this with the vote. Structurally, this upsurge in naturalization was aided by the 
Clinton backed INS initiative Citizenship U.S.A., and by the green card changeover to an 
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electronic version.
10
 The impending threats caused by the PRWORA, combined with the 
opportunities for easier naturalization afforded by the 1986 IRCA amnesty, Citizenship 
U.S.A., and the green card changeover, along with the mobilization efforts by immigrant 
advocacy groups, resulted in not only increased rates of naturalization but also increased 
rates of political activity by those newly naturalized.
11
  
The punitive restrictions toward immigrants in the PRWORA resulted in 
increased alien naturalization, particularly among poor aliens. The PRWORA also 
increased immigrant politicization (particularly among Hispanics). One powerful, 
unintended consequence of the restrictions on alien rights in the PRWORA was the 
alienation of Hispanic citizens who were restrictive toward immigration but who were 
turned off by the punitive restrictions on alien rights in these reforms. All of this resulted 
in the continued coalescing of immigrants into powerful special interest groups, that 
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exerted significant pressure on policymakers. Immigrants portrayed a significant display 
of power in elections, voting in increasing numbers and as a strong bloc, thereby making 
adept use of democratic process. There were two main issues at play here. First, the 
influence of anti-immigrant rhetoric and legislation on naturalization rates and second, 
the influence of this anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy on the politicization rates of those 
already naturalized. 
 The 1986 IRCA amnesty, the green card changeover to an electronic version, and 
Citizenship USA were all incredibly effective at increasing the naturalization rates of 
immigrants. The numbers of immigrants legalized under IRCA exceeded 2.4 million 
people by 1991.
12
 Most of those immigrants legalized under IRCA were eligible for 
citizenship by mid-1995, as they were first required to complete a five-year residency in 
the United States after legalizing their status under IRCA before they were eligible to 
apply for citizenship. Additional legal immigrants were spurred to naturalize rather than 
maintain their status as legal permanent residents as a result of the 1992 INS changeover 
to an electronic version of the green card, necessitating green card holders to submit 
paperwork to receive the new electronic versions of the green card. Given this additional 
required process to simply maintain their non-citizen status, many green card holders 
elected instead to apply for naturalization.
13
 Additionally, in 1996, Mexico amended its 
constitution to allow for its citizens to maintain dual citizenship with the United States. 
                                                             
12 Robert Barde, Susan B. Carter and Richard Sutch, “Immigrants Admitted Under the Preference 
System: 1996-1991,” in Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition On Line, ed. Susan B.. 
Carter et. al. (Boston: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
13 Susan Bibler Coutin, “Cultural Logics of Belonging and Movement: Transnationalism, 
Naturalization, and U.S. Immigration Policies,” American Ethnologist 30, no. 4 (November 2003): 513. 
220 
 
This amendment also allowed first generation Mexican Americans to apply for dual 
nationality, which affected approximately two to three million Mexican legal immigrants 
living in the United States who were eligible for United States citizenship but had not yet 
applied for it.
14
 NCLR President Raul Yzaguirre expressed the organization’s conflicted 
feelings on the issue of Mexican Americans retaining dual citizenship: “They [the 
Mexican government] asked for our views and we said it was good for Mexican nationals 
who are here legally and were concerned about becoming citizens because they might 
lose their property.” However, Yzaguirre also noted that, “We fear a backlash. We fear 
that it will spark a wave of anti-immigrant feeling [in the United States].”
15
 
In 1994 there were approximately five hundred thousand naturalization  
 
applications on file with the INS. That number doubled to over one million in 1995 and  
 
increased to 1.6 million in 1997. As a result of this significantly increased number of  
 
applications for naturalization, the INS was faced with an increasing backlog. This  
 
significant and growing backlog in the processing of naturalization applications led to the  
 
implementation of Citizenship USA. This initiative was backed by President Clinton and  
 
led by Vice President Albert Gore and INS Commissioner Doris Meissner. The goal of  
 
Citizenship USA was to decrease the backlog of naturalization applications to six months  
 
in the highest volume regions to counter the anti-immigrant rhetoric that the United  
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States could not possibly absorb the number of immigrants already in the country.
16
 In  
 
testimony before a Senate hearing on naturalization practices, NCLR President Yzaguirre  
 
lauded Citizenship USA’s reduction in backlogs and waiting periods for INS review of  
 
naturalization applications: 
 
 
INS must be encouraged, rather than attacked, in its efforts to improve and make 
the process more efficient. Can anyone imagine having to wait six months for a 
driver’s license or Social Security card? If this were to occur, the public would be 
justifiably enraged and demand that the government take immediate steps to 
reduce the backlog.
17
 
 
 
In the short period (FY 1995-FY 1996) that Citizenship USA was in effect, it had  
 
a profound effect on reducing the backlogs. In the five key areas it targeted, it succeeded  
 
in reducing backlogs to six months. Yet, by February 1998, that wait time had increased  
 
again to two years.
18
 Perhaps it was Citizenship USA’s very efficacy and the realization  
 
by Republicans that an immigrant voting bloc seemed to be coalescing, that began  
 
congressional effort to discredit and end Citizenship USA as fraudulently allowing  
 
immigrants to naturalize. Yzaguirre asserted: 
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There is no denying that some politicians are uncomfortable with the fact that so 
many of the new citizens are ethnic minorities … it is inaccurate to suggest that 
immigrants are naturalizing to preserve benefits that only small numbers of them 
actually use. Politicians looking for an easy explanation for high naturalization 
rates would be better served by listening to immigrants’ anger directed at their 
own rhetoric.
19
 
 
 
Part of this fraud charge directed toward the INS over Citizenship USA centered 
on Naturalization Assistance Services (NAS), which was an organization that contracted 
with the INS to provide citizenship testing. Indiana Representative Mark Souder charged 
that “blatant cheating” occurred at NAS citizenship testing facilities and that the INS was 
aware of this “blatant cheating” at NAS facilities for over a year and continued 
contracting with NAS without sanctioning them at all. Representative Souder and others’ 
charge was that by continuing to contract with NAS, the INS was sanctioning the 
degradation of the meaning of United States citizenship.
20
  
The Republican-controlled House subcommittee investigating the INS  
 
subpoenaed the FBI “criminal history records” on all United States citizens naturalized  
 
between August 31, 1995, and September 30, 1996, under Citizenship USA. They  
 
combed the documents for evidence that could be used to attack the “good moral  
 
character” of these new citizens. There were some irregularities eventually discovered in  
 
an audit of INS naturalizations between August 1995 and September 1996. In fiscal year  
 
1995, for example, the INS was forced to void the citizenship of twenty people it had  
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mistakenly approved for naturalization. One of the big issues, both with the INS backlog  
 
of naturalization applications and the problems discovered with a small minority of those  
 
approved for naturalizations, was the incredibly slow nature of required FBI background  
 
checks.
21
 The House Republicans’ goal was to show that the INS, in their implementation  
 
of Citizenship USA, engaged in fraudulent efforts to impart citizenship to as many  
 
immigrants as possible in advance of the 1996 elections, in order to gain as many new  
 
Democratic voters as possible.
22
 In response to these attacks, Massachusetts Democratic  
 
Senator Ted Kennedy asserted that: 
 
 
What is happening is democracy at work. It is also poetic justice. Anti-immigrant 
Republicans have created an unintended backlash against themselves. It is hard to 
take them seriously when they complain that too many immigrants are becoming 
citizens and preparing to exercise their right to vote against an anti-immigrant-
Republican House.
23
 
 
 
That naturalization rates were increasing as a result of the PRWORA and the  
 
spate of anti-immigrant rhetoric and legislation in the United States was an accepted  
 
occurrence by many in the United States’ government.  
 
Raul Yzaguirre, President of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) attributed  
 
the mid-1990s surge in naturalization rates to mobilization efforts by Hispanic  
 
organizations, the effect of anti-immigrant rhetoric and legislation, and the IRCA 1986  
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legalizations. Yzaguirre placed significant blame on the debates surrounding Proposition  
 
187 and the PRWORA, asserting that they: 
 
 
conveyed to immigrants, both legal and undocumented, the impression that they 
were under attack…. Immigrants tell us that they want to naturalize so they can 
vote and fight against such immigrant-bashing campaigns…. The ensuing result 
of this new law [PRWORA] was to force immigrants to naturalize – even if they 
aren’t currently receiving benefits – because the safety net may not be available to 
them or their children in times of crisis.
24
 
 
 
The number of Mexican Americans naturalized increased from 23,630 in 1993 to 
79,614 in 1995 and then jumped to 217,418 in 1996, partially as a result of the increased 
efficiency in processing applications as a result of Citizenship USA. The number of 
naturalizations of Mexican Americans then decreased after the program’s end to 134,494 
in 1997. The number of Cubans naturalized went from 15,109 in 1993 to 62,168 in 1996. 
The number of Hispanics from elsewhere in the Americas naturalized in 1993 was 68,814 
and increased to 244,962 in 1996.
25
 Now many of these legal immigrants targeted by 
anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies were United States citizens and eligible to register to 
vote. However, Republicans successfully succeeded in demonizing Citizenship USA and 
slowing down the pace of naturalizations, thereby once again increasing the backlog of 
applicants. This backlog was potentially catastrophic for legal immigrants who faced 
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losing precious and necessary benefits while waiting, through no fault of their own, for 
their naturalization applications to be processed by the INS.
26
 
Some states even got into the business of promoting naturalization. New Jersey 
Republican Governor Christine Todd Whitman proposed that the state of New Jersey 
spend $2 million in 1997 to help elderly and disabled immigrants become citizens. New 
York Republican Governor George Pataki also promoted a similar plan to assist 
immigrants to naturalize. “It’s to the financial advantage of both the immigrants and the 
state to achieve naturalization. So we’re really mounting a campaign to help them out.”
27
 
Governors lobbied Congress to “meet the needs of aged and disabled legal immigrants 
who cannot naturalize and whose benefits may be affected.”
28
 This lobbying effort by the 
states was largely because of fear that states and localities would then be forced to pick 
up the tab for necessary services for legal immigrants. Governor Pataki asserted, “I don’t 
think that it’s appropriate for states to have to pick up the tab. These legal immigrants are 
here in the United States, and their status is legal, because of the policies of the Federal 
Government.”
29
 Governors, including prominent Republican governors, joined forces 
with immigrant advocacy groups such as NCLR to lobby the federal government for 
restoration of benefits to legal immigrants. The governors pled their case using 
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economics, claiming that immigrants who lost their federal benefits would cost states and 
localities a significant amount of money. NCLR attempted an emotional and moral plea 
to the federal government, using the stories of immigrants who would be affected by the 
benefits cuts. Cecilia Munoz, deputy vice president for policy at NCLR, stated that their 
tactic “created outrage and made what happened real in the way that months of advocacy 
before the bill passed failed to do.” NCLR managed to personalize the potential policy 
effects of the PRWORA for legislators, which ended up being an incredibly effective 
strategy. Frank Sharry, executive director of the National Immigration Forum explained, 
In less than a year since they shredded the safety net for legal immigrants, Congress and 
the President have decided to restore much of it. That’s a remarkable political 
turnaround.” That “remarkable turnaround” likely was influenced by the results of the 
1996 election, in which exit polls showed that Democrats made significant gains among 
Hispanic voters while Republicans (most associated with the benefit cuts for legal 
immigrants and anti-immigrant rhetoric) suffered significant losses amongst Hispanic 
voters.
30
 
In the lead-up to the 1996 elections, there were many concerted efforts by 
Hispanic and other immigrant groups to register voters. The sense of a common threat 
fostered coalitions between different immigrant groups. Most major Hispanic advocacy 
organizations had voter registration projects of some kind, including: the Mexican-
American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF); Midwest Voter Registration and Education 
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Project (MVRP); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials 
(NALEO); National Council of La Raza (NCLR); Puerto Rican Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (PRLDEF); Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP); 
and the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC).
31
 The goal of these 
drives was to educate and register as many Hispanic voters as possible. 
It was not just advocacy groups that got involved in voter registration drives 
within the Hispanic community. The National Association of Hispanic Publications 
(NAHP) and Univision also sponsored a voter registration drive in the months leading up 
to the 1996 elections. Univision, the United States’ largest Spanish-language television 
network, aired public service announcements about voting as well as increased news 
coverage about voting and voter-related issues. The NAHP used Hispanic celebrities such 
as Cheech Marin, Edward James Olmos, and Rita Moreno in a series of print ads and 
public service announcements telling citizens that “Your vote Counts: Register and Vote 
in 1996.”
32
 The NAHP and Univision also distributed free print posters bearing those 
celebrity images and the above message in order to disseminate voter information as 
widely as possible.
33
 This campaign was bilingual and targeted at the diverse members of 
the Hispanic community in America. Executive Director of NALEO, Arturo Vegas, 
explained why such a drive was so important: “Voting has real implications for the 
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political strength of our community.”
34
 Luis Rossi, editor of the weekly La Raza 
publication in Chicago, explained, “The registration of voters is an important civic 
responsibility. As editors, we have a responsibility to inform Hispanic Americans about 
how to register and vote.”
35
 NALEO also found other ways to educate and mobilize 
Hispanics. It created a long-term project with the goal of increasing Latinos’ political 
knowledge/literacy through events such as the “National Listening Hour,” town-hall type 
meetings meant to engage Latinos in the political process.
36
 
SSI and food stamps restrictions were the most widely publicized and elicited the 
most significant and widespread support for legal immigrants. These benefit restrictions 
were used to depict the policies as particularly punitive and mean-spirited and as 
targeting children and the elderly, those groups most vulnerable.
37
 In the five “gateway” 
states that included the significant portion of the United States’ immigrant population, 
between 750,000 – 1,000,000 immigrants would be deemed ineligible for food stamps 
and between 430,000-500,000 immigrants were subject to loss of SSI benefits.
38
 In his 
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1997 State of the Union Address, President Clinton asserted that, “We must join together 
to…restore basic health and disability benefits when misfortune strikes immigrants who 
came to this country legally, who work hard, pay taxes, and obey the law. To do 
otherwise is simply unworthy of a great nation of immigrants.”
39
  
Jewish Advocacy groups and Laotian advocacy groups joined forces with 
Hispanic immigrant advocacy groups, staging rallies, demonstrations and receptions to 
lobby legislators. Religious groups such as the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 
also decried welfare reform as unfair to legal immigrants and poor children.
40
 David 
Bernstein, Director of the American Jewish Committee for the Washington, D.C. region, 
explained, “We all find ourselves in the same boat. Not all of these communities have 
been politically active in the past, but they’re discovering that there really is strength in 
numbers and that our interests on these issues are virtually identical.”
41
 The life stories of 
these elderly, legal immigrants helped to frame the debate over restoration of benefits. 
Many of these men were veterans, disabled in World War II and Vietnam, fighting either 
directly or indirectly to assist Americans. Take the story of 85-year-old Moises Sapiro, 
who lost an eye and his hearing in Russia while fighting the Nazis. As a Jewish man in 
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Russia, he faced significant discrimination and threat of violence. As such, he came to the 
United States in 1989 as a legal refugee and received $484 per month in SSI, benefits he 
could have lost under the PRWORA. “They say that those who are sick and weak will no 
longer be protected. My heart is crying about it. I have close friends, veterans like me. 
They cannot sleep, and their legs shake. They are terrified.” This elderly Jewish man, 
who survived the Nazis and Russian pogroms and lost an eye and his hearing fighting on 
the side of the Allies in World War II, was crying and shaking and unable to sleep 
because the United States government was about to take away his $484 per month in aid. 
Clearly, this was a potential public relations nightmare for Republicans. In April of 1997, 
5,000 Russian Jews demonstrated on the steps of the United States’ Capitol, demanding 
the reinstatement of benefits for elderly legal immigrants. Many of the men wore their 
military uniforms. One such man, 72-year-old Lev Paralski, asserted, “We agree they 
should make young people work, but for the old who survived the war and helped give 
America victory, it is wrong to deprive them of benefits. Every man must do his duty, 
and we have done ours.”
42
 
The head of Latinos for Citizenship, Leadership and Civic Duty, Luz Diago, 
explained why this effort to draw on commonalities across all immigrant groups and, in 
fact, all Americans, promised to be so effective, “This is a very important step for us, 
finding that common ground and getting people to participate. We all have elderly 
relatives. They are our treasure, and these laws are forcing us all to choose whether we 
can have them with us or not.” 75-year-old Cuban refugee Amable Hidalgo, who had 
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been a refugee in the United States since 1980, was forced to quit his job waiting tables 
because of deteriorating vision and mobility. Hidalgo explained, “I never wanted the 
government to support me, but I have no choice. If they take this [SSI] away, how do I 
feed and dress myself? How do I pay the rent? This is making me sick and crazy.”
43
 
Salvador De Leon, a 76-year-old retired carpenter and legal immigrant from the 
Dominican Republic said, “I’m very scared. I can’t work because I have a weak heart and 
S.S.I. is my only income.”
44
 
Laotians and Indochinese fighters who assisted the United States during the 
Vietnam War also faced loss of their benefits under the PRWORA. They rallied for the 
reinstatement of their benefits, staging public demonstrations in Washington, D.C.  
68-year-old Nhia Lor Vang, a Laotian veteran who had been recruited by the CIA to 
mark North Vietnamese holdings for the Americans to bomb and rescued downed United 
States pilots, laid out his claim to benefits, asserting, “I rescued many American pilots, 
and I feel I am worthy of American help. When the American troops pulled out, we had 
to run for our lives. We came here not by choice but by death.”
45
 
“One of our greatest fears is that the United States will have a rash of suicides 
amongst the very old and disabled immigrants who are left without any source of income 
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or medical care,” stated Sharon Daly of Catholic Charities.
46
 A spate of suicides by 
elderly immigrants across the nation facing the imminent likelihood of not having food, 
shelter and medical care underscored the punitive nature of these SSI cuts for elderly 
immigrants.
47
 These suicides publicized to the nation that these cuts affected real people 
and real families and not simply the caricatured “immigrant” or “welfare recipient” 
floating around the political culture. Director of the Washington, D.C. office of the 
Council for Jewish Federations, Diana Aviv, stated, “We have reports from all parts of 
the country informing us that elderly parents are considering suicide rather than 
impoverishing their children and grandchildren with expenses that their families cannot 
possibly pay.”
48
 In Stockton, California, 75-year-old Ignacio Munoz shot and killed 
himself 15 days after receiving notification from the Social Security Administration that 
his $440 per month disability aid would be ending. Munoz did not know how he would 
be able to support himself without the disability benefits and tried to access assistance. 
“He came to our office and said ‘What is going to happen? What can I do? I can’t go 
back to Mexico,’” reported the director of the Council for the Spanish Speaking, Jose 
Rodriguez.
49
 87-year-old Russian Jewish refugee Yekaterina Drubick, plagued by strokes 
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and Alzheimer’s, was also subject to losing her SSI benefits as a result of the PRWORA. 
If this happened, Drubick stated, “I take my life. I have nothing. I take poison.”
50
 
Munoz’s suicide also reflected the growing concern about the revocation of 
disability benefits for poor elderly legal immigrants. This eligibility was restored in the 
Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act of 1997 for the approximately five hundred 
thousand legal residents who faced revocation of SSI benefits under PRWORA. Joel 
Najar, NCLR policy analyst asserted that, “Congress understood that they went too far in 
the welfare bill by cutting off disabled folks.” Expressing optimism in the ongoing battle 
to win restoration of SSI benefits for all legal immigrants, Michigan Democratic 
Congressman Sander Levin claimed, “I think the battle for fairness will be won. Congress 
has to make sure that the laws are fair and humane and effective. It is wrong and 
ineffective to throw elderly people, most of them elderly women, on the street.”
51
 
In the early 1990s, NCLR had already begun advocating an antipoverty agenda, in 
response to high poverty levels within certain segments of the Hispanic population and 
also in recognition that such efforts were particularly important given the heightened anti-
immigrant and anti-welfare rhetoric and policy proposals of the mid-1990s.
52
 NCLR 
initially attempted to frame the issues as civil rights issues.
53
 The civil rights struggle and 
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Rights Revolution was the context from which NCLR as an organization arose in the 
1960s. However, after PRWORA in 1996, NCLR began a strategy of moving away from 
the common lobbying strategy of civil rights groups to ask for their stances to be enacted 
in legislation without any teeth to back those requests up with. NCLR began consciously 
trying to create an organizational structure and apparatus that would give their requests 
teeth and give them more pressure to be able to exert on policymakers.
54
 They continued 
to demand that politicians and policymakers pay attention to Hispanics and Hispanic 
issues within the context of race relations in the United States. NCLR Representative 
Charles Kamasaki asserted that, “He [Clinton] is not speaking to the Latino community 
on that issue…his version of race relations has been a black-white paradigm.”
55
 
NCLR’s 1996 voter registration drive was coined “Time for Action ’96.” NCLR 
President Raul Yzaguirre explained that, “Voter registration efforts are part of a more 
comprehensive mobilization campaign” including such varied naturalization and 
mobilization efforts as “Citizenship Day,” a swearing-in ceremony, and “Advocacy 
Central … where participants can make their voice heard by sending letters and petitions 
to their Congressional representatives and to the presidential candidates.” Yzaguirre 
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asserted that, “The time for complacency is over. We are serious, and we want equity.”
56
 
According to Yzaguirre, “The business of NCLR is to change attitudes – our own as well 
as the public at large – and to build self-confidence on our part, and tolerance on the part 
of others.”
57
 
One important example of advocacy efforts to mobilize Latino citizens politically  
 
was the Latino Vote USA campaign, which targeted Latino citizens for voter registration  
 
and get out the vote drives. These voter drives were very effective. Exit polls showed that  
 
approximately 76 percent of registered Latinos voted in Florida, Texas, California, and  
 
New York, compared with 49 percent of all eligible voters. Approximately 70 percent of  
 
Latinos in those four states voted for the incumbent Democratic Presidential candidate,  
 
Bill Clinton.
58
 The Latino Vote Campaigns were headed by the Southwest Voter  
 
Registration and Education Project (SVREP). The SVREP was founded in 1974 by  
 
William C. Velásquez in an attempt to increase Latino political participation. Its motto  
 
was “Su voto es su voz” or “your vote is your voice.”
59 The 1995-1996 SVREP  
 
campaign aimed to mobilize Hispanics to register and vote and to hold onto the political  
 
gains they had made as a voting bloc. Another goal of the 1995-1996 SVREP campaign  
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was to target young adults in the 18-20 year-old bracket.
60
 One way that the SVREP  
 
hoped to draw in apathetic and young voters was through a new tactic – the designation  
 
of one day, October 26, 1996, as a special rally day where volunteers assisted voters to  
 
vote early and at the rally locations themselves in an effort to make voting as easy and  
 
unintimidating as possible. The SVREP targeted key states for these rallies: California,  
 
Illinois, Florida, New Mexico, Michigan, and Colorado. They framed voting as an  
 
absolute imperative. “We have to convey to Latinos that their vote is the most important  
 
thing in this election. It’s as important as saving our country,” explained Housing and  
 
Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Henry Cisneros.
61
 One way in which organizers  
 
hoped to convey this message of the importance of voting for Hispanics was through the  
 
composition of songs encouraging Hispanics to vote. Through the cooperation of Spanish  
 
language radio stations, which gave these songs frequent playtime on the radio, they were  
 
able to reach key voters in the younger demographic. Latino composer Lalo Guerrero was  
 
integral to this effort to use songs as a sort of propaganda tool to get out the vote.  
 
Guerrero wrote more than 100 songs for this purpose, explaining, “We have to elect  
 
people who can help us.” In these songs, Guerrero referred to Hispanics as the “mighty  
 
sleeping giant” who needs to awaken and take its place “where we belong, in the  
 
mainstream of society.” Guerrero also invoked the concept of Atzlan, something that  
 
was very controversial in anti-immigrant circles, explaining that before the Anglos  
 
arrived, “lived the descendants of Cuauhtemoc, from the great Tenochtitlan, we were  
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here before Columbus when this land was called Atzlan.”
62
 The song continues: 
 
 
Wake up, Chicanos, wake up, let’s get involved, wake up you sleeping giant, 
we’ll get our problems solved. No more mañana syndrome, we have the antitdote. 
We’re going to get the hell out and register to vote … we’re Mexican Americans, 
or Latinos, take your choice. Hispanos, let’s raise our voice. Wake up, Chicanos 
… the only way to change things is to register and vote.
63
 
 
 
Latino Vote USA and other groups involved in voter registration drives hoped 
that the anti-immigrant rhetoric among politicians and the general populace would drive 
Hispanics to the voting booths in record high numbers. They believed that the anti-
immigrant rhetoric and policies coming mostly out of the Republican Party would 
significantly affect the way that Hispanics voted and push them away from the 
Republicans and toward the Democratic Party. “The fact that Pat Buchanan set the tone 
of the debate for the Republican Party is bad news for their prospects of winning the 
Hispanic vote,” said John White, Political Science Professor at The Catholic University 
of America where he has studied the intricacies of the Hispanic vote. The SVREP, led by 
its Executive Director Lydia Camarillo, used the effects of Proposition 187 to drive 
Hispanics to the polls, asserting that, “Very clearly and succinctly what is being said in 
these communities is that: If you do not vote, this is what happens.” The goal of SVERP-
led Latino Vote USA 1996 was to increase the number of registered Hispanic voters in 
the United States. Their goal was to have 5-6.5 million registered Hispanic voters for the 
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1996 elections, up from 3.5 million registered Hispanic voters in the 1992 elections.
64
 
Clearly, there was general recognition that the particularly virulent strain of anti-
immigrant rhetoric running throughout American political culture was driving these 
efforts at increased Hispanic political mobilization. SVREP President, Antonio Gonzalez 
claimed that, “The current political climate is motivating many Latinos to apply for 
citizenship and register to vote.”
65
 Just days before the 1996 elections, the common 
message of Get Out the Vote activists in the Hispanic community was “I vote therefore I 
am.” Joseph Romo, Coordinator of the Boyle Heights Voter Registration Drive, 
explained that, “Our purpose is to motivate people to vote. Voting is the only way that 
politicians respond to our needs.”
66
 
Overall, Hispanic voter participation in the 1996 elections increased by 28.7 
percent over the 1992 elections.
67
 Of the total United States voting electorate in the 1996 
presidential elections, 79 percent of Hispanics voted for President Clinton while only 46 
percent of white non-Hispanics voted for Clinton.
68
 Despite this high percentage of 
Hispanics voting for President Clinton, he did not score particularly high marks for his 
first term in office from Hispanics. A December 1996 Hispanic Link survey noted that 
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over half of respondents gave Clinton a grade of “C” for his handling of issues related to 
Hispanics and just over half also had low expectations for his handling of issues central 
to Hispanics in his second term. Respondent Adalin Torres-Zayas typified these feelings 
of disappointment with Clinton, noting that, “After he signed the welfare bill, I lost all 
faith. I couldn’t stomach voting for him again.” There was an overall sense of 
ambivalence about Hispanic choices in the 1996 elections, as they seemed to be choices 
between bad and worse.
69
 In the 1996 congressional elections, Hispanics overwhelmingly 
voted for Democratic candidates, by about 42 percentage points. But among non-
Hispanic whites, Democratic congressional candidates received about sixteen percent less 
of the vote than did Republican candidates.
70
 While Hispanics showed themselves 
capable of delivering elections to the Democrats, they were not a predictable and reliable 
voting bloc for either party. Despite what many Hispanics believed were poor choices 
available to them for the 1996 presidential election, groups such as SVREP believed that 
high Hispanic political mobilization was necessary in order to begin to change those 
choices and make them more palatable and even energizing for Hispanic voters. This 
political mobilization was necessary in order to “keep government accountable to the 
Latino community.”
71
 SVREP President Antonio González asserted that, “The current 
political climate is increasing our community’s civic participation like never before and 
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helping speed up the parade towards empowerment.”
72
 One of the points that SVREP 
leaders tried to bring home to the Latino community was that with high levels of voter 
turnout they could not only significantly influence the national elections, but because of 
their high concentrations in so-called “gateway” cities and states, they could exert even 
more electoral influence on a local level.
73
 They achieved this goal by increasing the 
number of Latino congressmen from seventeen to nineteen in the 1996 elections.
74
  
The overwhelming Hispanic support for Democrats in the 1996 election came 
with high expectations for President Clinton and the Democratic Party. In addition, 
immigrants continued to coalesce into powerful special interest groups, which exerted 
significant pressure on policymakers. Immigrants showed a significant display of power 
in elections, voting in increasing numbers and as a strong bloc, thereby making adept use 
of the democratic process.
75
 They attempted to revive an immigrant narrative that 
depicted immigrants as hard-working members of society, and a political force to be 
reckoned with.
76
 
NCLR and other immigrant advocacy groups made known that they expected the  
 
Hispanic representation in appointed government positions to reflect their demographic  
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presence in the American populace. NCLR President Yzaguirre asserted this position in  
 
the form of a warning to Democratic politicians and the party as a whole: 
 
 
If policymakers continue to exclude our community, they should be warned well 
in advance of the next election not to assume that we will support them no matter 
what. Indeed, if this situation continues to fester, Latinos, as many did last year, 
will be looking elsewhere for their leaders.
77
 
 
 
Despite the overall support for Democratic national candidates over Republican  
 
candidates, because of Republicans higher levels of support for the PRWORA and  
 
IIRIRA and anti-immigrant rhetoric, on a local level Hispanic support was not nearly as  
 
much of a cohesive voting bloc in favor of Democrats. For example, in New Mexico, the  
 
Hispanic vote helped to re-elect the Republican Senator Pete Domenici over his  
 
Democratic challenger. According to Annette Aviña, the Research Director of the  
 
Southwest Voter Research Institute (SVRI), noted that, “It seems like Latinos, as they  
 
are attacked on the issues, tend to support candidates that support them. This is as it  
 
should be. Latinos should hold candidates accountable to the issues of importance to  
 
Latinos.”
78
 Lydia Camarillo, Executive Director of SVREP echoed Aviña’s sentiment,  
 
asserting that: 
 
 
The Democrats can count on that [Latino] vote only if they are committed to 
Latino issues. If they also get away trying to be too centralist [sic], trying to be 
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too conservative, trying to appease the Republican attitude that its [sic] OK to 
block the borders with a militia, they too will be in trouble.
79
  
 
 
Of course, in California, Proposition 187 and anti-immigrant rhetoric was most 
closely associated with Republicans. Proposition 209, an anti-affirmative action initiative, 
was also on the ballot in 1996. At the polls in 1996, Hispanics expressed their 
dissatisfaction with such anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric. A 1996 survey conducted 
by NALEO found that 80 percent of newly naturalized Latino citizens were registered to 
vote and planned to vote in the 1996 November elections. In this survey, 96 percent of 
respondents stated that their motivation for naturalizing was to be able to vote in the 1996 
elections. Sixty-one percent of these new citizens were registered as Democrats while 
only 6 percent registered as Republicans. The remaining 33 percent registered as 
Independents.
80
  
Advocacy efforts by groups like NCLR were at least somewhat effective in 
rolling back some of the most punitive measures of the welfare reform bill. In 1997, 
portions of the punitive measures toward aliens in the PRWORA were removed in the 
Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act in 1997. This adjustment was an effort to exclude 
segments of the populations of small children and the elderly/disabled from undeserving 
status. The Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act of 1997 allowed legal non-citizens who 
were receiving SSI benefits on August 22, 1996, to remain eligible for SSI. It also 
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extended the five-year exemption called for in the PRWORA to seven years for refugees 
and asylees, likely to face persecution on return to their home country. This could extend 
their eligibility for SSI, Food Stamps, Medicaid, TANF, and Social Services Block Grant. 
The Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act of 1997 also exempted legal alien children from 
the PRWORA’s five year ban on Medicaid eligibility.
81
 In 1998 and 2002, many legal 
immigrants had their eligibility for food stamps restored. For example, in 2002, 
immigrant children were exempted from sponsor deeming restrictions required for the 
receipt of food stamps and immigrants receiving SSI disability also saw their food stamp 
eligibility restored. In 2003, food stamp eligibility was also restored for qualified adult 
aliens with five years residency and the residency waiting period was lifted for immigrant 
children. These changes completed a series of corrections to the 1996 PRWORA which 
resulted in the restoration of food stamp benefits to approximately four hundred thousand 
legal residents, no small feat considering that virtually all non-citizens lost food stamp 
benefits under the PRWORA.
82
  Here, within the undeserving, poor, non-citizen group, 
the elderly/disabled and children were placed higher on the hierarchy, while refugees and 
asylees saw their status lowered. These were small victories that were nonetheless of 
incredible significance to the poor and elderly immigrants they affected. It was a hard 
fought victory by President Clinton and Democrats, and it became clear that any further 
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victories for new legal immigrants would be exceedingly difficult. Florida Republican 
Congressman Clay Shaw asserted, “There is a lot about the deal that gives me 
indigestion. But there are limits. S.S.I. will be ended as a pension plan for third world 
countries. We are not giving on that.”
83
 New elderly legal immigrants would continue to 
be subjected to deeming and the five year residency requirement. Anti-immigrant 
sentiment clearly remained within American political culture despite these victories for 
immigrant rights. 
These legislative victories for immigrant groups allowed Hispanic legislators to 
move away from a reactionary posture, as they had been forced into for most of the 
1990s. By 1997 they were able to move more into a pro-active stance. California 
Democrat and Chairman of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, Xavier Becerra, said, 
“Yes, we were constantly having to put out fires. And when you are constantly fighting 
fires, it’s hard to develop a strategy of pre-emption on some of the major issues. You’ve 
got all of your fire engines out on the scene already.”
84
 Becerra and other Hispanic 
Caucus members attempted to proactively get the President and lawmakers to listen to 
Hispanic concerns and incorporate them into policy measures, rather than fighting battles 
to rescind punitive measures, as they were forced to do with the PRWORA. Members of 
the Hispanic Caucus were able to garner more respect for and attention to their positions 
as a result of the coalescing of an Hispanic voting bloc that heavily favored Democrats in 
the 1996 elections, which emboldened these members. “We’ve decided to pre-empt these 
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fires to the degree we can,” asserted Representative Becerra. Georgina Verdugo, regional 
council for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) said, 
“They are becoming much more vocal and much more effective, and they are exploring 
how they can get their positions across. In the White House, the Latino voting population 
is general is seen as much stronger. They can capitalize of that a bit more.” Hispanics had 
come through for Democrats and President Clinton in the voting booths in November and 
now they expected to have their voices heard. They wanted President Clinton to make 
good on his promise to restore benefits to legal immigrants. Representative Becerra 
asserted, “The President pledged to do this in August, and we were there in November 
supporting this President. We expected that something would be done.”
85
  
There was rather significant partisan rancor within the initially bipartisan 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus. These varied political opinions reflected among the 
CHC’s members were simply a reflection of the incredible diversity within Hispanic 
America. Immigrant advocacy groups such as NCLR encouraged a pan-ethnicism in 
order to display significant numbers and strength to legislators and power players – a 
Hispanic bloc vote, and mobilized Hispanic public opinion. The problem was that 
Hispanics were a very diverse group within the United States with very diverse opinions 
and interests. For example, Latinos were overwhelmingly Catholic and conservative on 
social issues such as abortion and gay rights. Older generation Latinos also tended to be 
more conservative on immigration, as well. Despite the fact that these Latino political 
stances seemed, on their face, to coincide well with Republican Party platforms, it was 
                                                             
85 Lizette Alvarez, “For Hispanic Lawmakers, Time to Take the Offensive,” The New York Times, 
August 25, 1997. 
246 
 
the anti-immigrant rhetoric and tone of many Republicans that turned Latinos 
overwhelmingly away from the Republican Party in the 1996 elections. The Republican 
anti-immigrant stance helped to break down the walls and competition separating older 
and newer immigrants and constructed mirrors in which they saw themselves reflected in 
each other and in their hardships. Their political identities and interests became more 
closely aligned as Latinos. Anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies were seen as a threat to 
all Latinos, regardless of their other social and political stances.
86
 
Even Republican legislators who had been vocally in favor of eliminating benefits 
for legal immigrants recognized the unifying effects that effort had on the Hispanic, and 
larger immigrant, community. Republican Florida Representative Clay Shaw, who had 
initially not only voted in favor of cutting benefits for legal immigrants but had been a 
vehement and vocal proponent of doing so, eventually changed his position on cutting 
benefits for elderly legal immigrants. Representative Shaw recognized that the war on 
immigrants and welfare epitomized by the PRWORA and IIRIRA “was something that 
brought them [the Hispanic community] together.” Major players from both parties paid 
attention. Democratic Vice President Al Gore and Representative Richard Gephardt 
attended the 1997 NCLR convention. NCLR president Yzaguirre said, “We have every 
reason to believe, and there are an awful lot of examples that both Gore and Gephardt, 
and whatever their counterparts may be in the Republican Party, are taking the Hispanic 
vote very seriously, very early on.” Speaker Gingrich hired a Spanish speaking press 
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secretary. The Republican National Committee (RNC) created a committee to map out 
how to attract more Hispanic voters. The National Republican Congressional Committee 
created and disseminated a guide to attracting Hispanic voters. Texas Republican 
Representative Harry Bonilla asserted, “There’s not a corporation worth its salt right now 
that is not looking to market to Hispanic voters. Anyone with half a brain needs to realize 
that we must be cognizant of that.”
87
 
Immigrant advocacy groups began to win the messaging war among the  
American public by 1998. In 1993, 65 percent of Americans favored reductions in current  
immigration levels compared with only 36 percent of Americans favoring immigration  
reductions in 1997.
88
 This 29 percent decrease in the percentage of Americans favoring 
reduced levels of immigration was a striking turnaround in American sentiment toward  
immigration, perhaps spurred along in part by the booming economy. Republican Senator 
from Michigan, Spencer Abraham, noted that, “A couple of years ago people were 
advocating building a wall around the country. That’s no longer the case. Before, we 
heard only one side of the immigration issue. Now, we get to talk about some of the 
positive contributions immigrants have made.”
89
 The assumption by those pushing to 
restrict immigrant rights in the mid-1990s was that public opinion of the citizenry was 
behind them and that aliens’ opinions did not need to be considered because they were 
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not voters.
90
 Through significant mobilization achieved largely through naturalization and 
voter registration drives, immigrant and Hispanic organizations made those anti-
immigrant actors pay for their miscalculations and forced policymakers to recognize the 
power of immigrant advocacy groups within the democratic process. Frank Sharry, 
Executive Director of the National Immigration Forum claimed that: 
 
The calculus was that immigration divides Democrats and energizes Republicans. 
But with the stronger economy and immigrants becoming citizens and voting in 
record numbers and voting against those they see as hostile, the calculus has 
switched. It now divides Republicans and energizes Democrats.
91
  
 
 
In large part, the immigrant mobilization worked. Republican Senator from Michigan  
 
Spencer Abraham claimed, “We had a period in which the direction of the party was to  
 
try to restrict immigration. Those days are over.”
92
 Sharry explained that the anti- 
 
immigrant backlash of the 1990s ended with the 1996 elections: 
 
 
It seemed to me that in ’94, when Prop. 187 passed, the consensus was that 
immigrants don’t vote and the people who do vote are angry about immigration. 
The consensus in ’97 is that the people who are angry about immigration don’t 
vote on that issue and that immigrants do vote and vote on that issue alone.
93
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A Los Angeles Times editorial noted that, “For the first time in 20 years there was no 
whining about the paltry turnout of Latino voters. Thank God and Pete Wilson, not 
necessarily in that order.”
94
 
 The very same anti-immigrant rhetoric that helped to sweep the Republicans into 
office in 1994 and pass anti-immigrant legislation in the form of Proposition 187 in 
California and the PRWORA on a federal level also helped to mobilize immigrants to 
naturalize and register to vote. Immigrants, particularly Hispanics, spoke with their votes 
and were effective at rolling back some of the most punitive anti-immigrant measures by 
beating back the pauper stereotype and winning their claims to social citizenship and 
legitimacy as Americans, feats that native-born welfare moms were unable to accomplish 
in this same period, which many blame on lack of interest group mobilization for native-
born welfare moms on the same scale that immigrant interest groups mobilized over 
welfare reform. It seemed as though the era of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy efforts 
to restrict immigrant rights was over, a product of its very success. Anti-immigrant 
efforts had the unintended consequence of waking a “sleeping giant” by breaking down 
the walls of difference separating older and newer immigrants and constructing mirrors 
uniting them under common threats. Hispanic immigrant political identities and interests 
became more closely aligned as the voice of a united ethnic group and began to take on 
increasing importance. Anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies were increasingly seen as a 
threat to all Hispanics, regardless of their other social and political stances, allowing for 
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their effective mobilization against the punitive anti-immigrant measures within the 
PRWORA.
95
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The two most enduring symbols of immigrants throughout American history have 
been that of the immigrant pauper and that of the hardworking immigrant who “helped to 
build this country.”
1
 The tension between these two narratives within American political 
culture has resulted in extremely polarizing rhetoric and legislation, particularly over the 
course of the late twentieth century. As the United States began as a nation of peoples 
who were themselves immigrants, Americans have continually grappled with Hector St. 
John de Crevèceour’s question, “What is an American?”
2
 
 At the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century, it appeared to many that 
the United States could no longer absorb mass immigration, particularly the kinds of 
immigrants who were increasingly reaching American shores – that is, lower-skilled, 
younger, single, and non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants. What would happen to the American 
racial stock, to American social and political institutions? What would happen to the 
financial futures of native-born Americans if this mass immigration of undesirables was 
allowed to continue unabated? What would become of American society and culture? 
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Anti-immigrant rhetoric in American political culture evolved within a racialized 
narrative that depicted immigrants as taking jobs from more deserving native-born 
Americans, lowering or stagnating wages; as being unassimilable; as a corrupting 
influence on American society, politics, and culture; and as disproportionate consumers 
of welfare. The implementation of the National Origins Quota System in 1924 reflected 
the fears within the American citizenry that mass immigration would result in a 
permanent change to the demographics in America. Many Americans feared that what it 
meant to be an American, racially, socially, culturally, politically, and morally would 
change if such massive influxes of newcomers believed to be so different from 
themselves was allowed to continue. The Quota System helped to ensure that the “racial 
stock” of America did not become irrevocably degraded with those deemed inferior.  
 The intellectual underpinning of United States’ immigration policy based in racial 
hierarchies became increasingly difficult to justify within the United States and to the rest 
of the world as United States soldiers fought against Hitler and the Nazis in World War II 
and the world began to realize what theories of racial hierarchies could result in if taken 
to their extreme. After World War II, the United States became embroiled in the Cold 
War with the Soviet Union. The United States portrayed itself as the shining example to 
the world of freedom and democracy, while at home it was denying basic civil rights to 
African Americans, Latinos, and others of color.
3
 Within the Civil Rights Movement and 
Rights Revolution, equality and freedom were charging and polarizing the country. As 
President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 
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1965, how could the United States continue to keep in place an antiquated immigration 
policy that was based on racial hierarchies? Consequently, Johnson signed the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 into law, removing racial hierarchies from 
American immigration policy and replacing them with more traditional American 
capitalist hierarchies. 
 Constant throughout the history of immigration to the United States has been the 
fear that “non-white” immigration would have disastrous repercussions for the United 
States. As increasing numbers of black and brown immigrants came to the United States 
from Africa, Asia, and Central and South America as a result of the INA 1965, fears 
resurfaced about the destructive potential that these changing demographics might have 
on America. Fears intensified that these immigrants were unassimilable. As the twentieth 
century progressed, southern and eastern Europeans became increasingly assimilated into 
whiteness and the most feared immigrants demographically became immigrants from 
Africa, Asia, and Central and South America. Anti-immigrant rhetoric began to increase 
at the same time as anti-welfare rhetoric and imagery also heightened, both within a 
racialized context of black and brown “others.” By the 1980s and 1990s, “illegal 
immigrant” became synonymous with “Mexican” within American political culture.  
 At the same time as Ronald Reagan popularized the imagery of the black “welfare 
queen,” immigrants were becoming increasingly associated with welfare recipients. 
Immigration restrictionist groups such as FAIR and conservative organizations such as 
the John Birch Society began to popularize the idea that the United States’ welfare state 
was a magnet drawing in masses of poor immigrants desiring to take advantage of 
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government benefits in the United States. In the 1980s, the idea of welfare as a magnet 
became increasingly mainstream as did the idea of an immigrant invasion, particularly of 
illegal immigrants. 
 The late twentieth century immigration restrictionist movement had clear 
analogues with the late nineteenth century restrictionist movement, particularly within 
American political culture. In the 1990s, efforts to restrict immigration merged with 
efforts to restrict alien rights. These 1990s restrictionists believed that controlling 
immigration would end the so-called “welfare magnet” they believed was causing this 
invasion. Legal immigrants became painted with the same brush as illegal immigrants. 
The Republican Party, led by Governor Pete Wilson in California, moved to restrict 
immigrant rights in the form of Proposition 187. Still, Proposition 187 on its face only 
targeted illegal immigrants. In practice, however, Proposition 187 encouraged racial 
profiling, which resulted in the targeting of legal immigrants for harassment and 
discrimination as well. Proposition 187 scored a resounding victory among the white 
populace of California, helping to propel Wilson to re-election in what had originally 
promised to be an uphill re-election battle. 
 Seeing the significant grassroots support Proposition 187 garnered in California, 
the national Republican Party officially got on the anti-immigrant bandwagon during the 
1994 elections and their anti-immigrant rhetoric helped to propel the party to majorities 
in both the House and the Senate. National Republicans had campaigned on a platform 
they called “the Contract with America,” which included an anti-immigrant plank. In the 
“Personal Responsibility Act” laid out in the “Contract with America,” Republicans 
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aimed to “reform” welfare, ending entitlements and reversing the social contract first 
forged by Franklin Roosevelt in the New Deal and continued by Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society. The savings from this reform of welfare was two-fold -- shifting costs to states 
through replacing AFDC with TANF, a system of block grants to the states, and by 
declaring most legal aliens ineligible for government benefits. Legal immigrants were 
now demonized within American political culture as disproportionate consumers of 
welfare and as undeserving.  
 However, with this constant threat and harassment caused by the anti-immigrant 
rhetoric that had been mainstreamed in American political culture by the mid-1990s, the 
Republicans woke a “sleeping giant” in the immigrant, specifically, Hispanic, population. 
Immigrant groups attempted to take control of the immigrant narrative and articulate that 
immigrants were hard-working, deserving, and contributing members of American 
society and culture. Immigrants began naturalizing in record numbers, mobilizing 
politically, and proved themselves a powerful collective political force in the 1996 
elections. By 1998, many of the most punitive restrictions against legal aliens in the 1996 
welfare and immigration reforms were rolled back and politicians began catering to the 
immigrant and particularly the “Hispanic vote.” 
 In their haste to take advantage of their historic victories in 1994 and capitalize on 
what appeared to be the winning political strategy of anti-immigrant sentiment in order to 
restrict both immigrant rights and roll back the foundation of the United States’ welfare 
state, Republicans went too far in their efforts to dismantle the spirit of the Rights 
Revolution and the welfare rights movement on the backs of immigrants. Even legal 
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immigrants were forced to live in a constant state of fear of further restrictions on their 
rights, refused service in restaurants, and underwent the humiliation and degradation of 
demands to produce their immigration papers at seemingly non-political places such as 
grocery stores and restaurants. Even citizens who “looked” or “sounded” foreign were 
subject to these violations of their civil rights. These actions bonded previously 
factionalized immigrant groups together to meet a common threat. Citizens, legal 
immigrants, and illegal immigrants alike were stereotyped and branded as criminal, lazy, 
welfare recipients who were taking jobs from native-born Americans and corrupting 
American society with their foreign influences. These racialized attacks on immigrant 
rights unified immigrant groups, who made their voices heard in the 1996 elections, 
winning a reprieve, at least, from the mainstreaming of anti-immigrant sentiment in 
American political culture and leaving a lasting legacy of powerful and mobilized 
immigrant advocacy groups. They gained national political recognition of a Hispanic and 
larger immigrant voting bloc, which won them, at the very least, lip service to their 
demands and interests and a tenuous claim to social citizenship. Immigrant advocacy 
groups had taken advantage of American immigration policy in order to assert their 
demands for full inclusion within American society and polity. In their efforts to 
dismantle the Rights Revolution, anti-immigrant activists inadvertently re-energized the 
fight for immigrant rights and racial equality in America.
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